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E.O. 12958: DECL:05/01/07
TAGS: OVIP, (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, KCFE, NATO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV, MAY 1, 1997, MOSCOW.

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ALEX WOLFF, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, REASON 1.5 (D).
2. (U) THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY'S OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSE, "OSOBNYAK," IN CENTRAL MOSCOW.
3. (U) ATTENDING THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WERE, ON THE U.S. SIDE, THE SECRETARY, U.S. CHARGE, MOSCOW JOHN TEFFT, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY LYNN DAVIS, S/NIS SENIOR COORDINATOR JIM COLLINS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOHN KORNBLUM, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY JAMIE RUBIN, SENIOR DIRECTOR SANDY VERSHBOW, JCS REPRESENTATIVE LT. GEN. MYERS, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAN LODAL, AN INTERPRETER, AND AN EMBASSY NOTETAKER. THE RUSSIAN SIDE CONSISTED OF FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AFANASYEVSKIY, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. YULIY VORONTSOV, PRIMAKOV AIDE ROBERT MAKARYAN, SECURITY AFFAIRS AND DISARMAMENT DIRECTOR SERGEY KISLYAK, EUROPEAN COOPERATION DIRECTOR A. BELOUS, MINISTRY SPOKESPERSON G. TARASOV, NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR NIKOLAY SPASSKIY, A 3-STAR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE (UNNAMED), AN INTERPRETER, AND IGOR NEVEROV (NOTETAKER).
4. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY PRESENTED U.S. PROPOSALS ON CFE-RELATED ASPECTS OF A NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT, STRESSING THE NEED FOR INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL LIMITS. SHE URGED THE GOR TO LOOK AT NATO IN A

COMPLETELY NEW WAY, MUCH AS THE U.S. NOW LOOKS AT RUSSIA IN A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT WAY. FM PRIMAKOV SAID U.S. PROPOSALS ON NEW NATIONAL LIMITS AMONG THE 30 WERE UNMANAGEABLE AND THAT IT WAS UNREALISTIC NOT TO CALL NATO A "BLOC" IN THE CONTEXT OF ENDING THE CFE'S "BLOC-TO-BLOC" CHARACTER. HE SAID RUSSIA AGREED TO THE IDEA OF NATIONAL LIMITS AND WOULD ESCHEW SUFFICIENCY AND SUB-LIMITS, BUT WANTED AN EXPLICIT SUBTOTAL TO APPLY TO "ANY" ALLIANCE AMONG THE 30. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE LACK OF RESTRICTIONS ON GROWTH IN NATIONAL LIMITS. ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, HE OUTLINED HIS CONCEPT FOR THE INCLUSION OF THE "THREE NO'S" IN A NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT OUTSIDE-THE-16 INFRASTRUCTURE LANGUAGE COULD BE WORKED OUT IF THE U.S. UNDERSTOOD THAT "SCALE" WAS THE KEY. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO ACCELERATE EXPERTS TALKS WITH AN EYE TOWARD AGREEMENT IN TIME FOR A MAY 27 EVENT IN PARIS. END SUMMARY.

5. ~~(S)~~ PRIMAKOV OPENED THE MEETING NOTING THAT HE HAD JUST GOTTEN OFF THE PHONE WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, WHO HAD BEEN SATISFIED WITH HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE A FEW MOMENTS EARLIER. HE SAID HE WAS READY TO DO AS YELTSIN ASKED: TO LOOK FOR A "BREAKTHROUGH" WITH THE SECRETARY ON CFE ADAPTATION ISSUES. HE OUTLINED HIS VIEW OF THE CFE ADAPTATION PROCESS AS ONE OF MODERNIZING A TIME-TESTED TOOL, ONE WHICH IT WOULD BE "INCORRECT" TO ELIMINATE. HE DEFINED THE TASK NOW AS ONE OF SEEKING A WAY NOT TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT, WITH THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO, WE WERE GOING TO ALLOW UNLIMITED GROWTH IN FORCES AND EQUIPMENT IN THE TREATY AREA. THE RUSSIANS, HE SAID, HAVE TAKEN U.S. CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT BY ACCEDING TO OUR DESIRE TO AVOID A SUFFICIENCY RULE AND FIXED SUBCEILINGS BASED ON GROUPS, AND OUR INTEREST IN PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL CEILINGS. HE ADDED THE FOLLOWING PROVISIO: THAT THE SUB-TOTAL OF NATIONAL CEILINGS IN ANY ALLIANCE (OR GROUPING) NOT EXCEED THOSE ENUMERATED IN THE 1991 TREATY ARTICLE IV. PRIMAKOV ADDED THAT THIS WOULD APPLY TO RUSSIA AS WELL IF IT WERE TO JOIN OTHER STATES IN AN ALLIANCE OR GROUP. A REVIEW AFTER FIVE YEARS WOULD PROVIDE FOR A REEVALUATION BY THE STATES, HE CONCLUDED. PRIMAKOV ASKED, THOUGH, WHY THE U.S. WAS PUTTING FORWARD A PROPOSAL TO OPEN UP THE NUMBERS AFTER FIVE YEARS AND ALLOW STATES TO OPT OUT OF THE SYSTEM AND RAISE THEIR FORCE/EQUIPMENT LEVELS. HE CALLED THIS A POTENTIAL NEW "ARMS RACE."

6. ~~(C)~~ THE SECRETARY RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT THE TWO SIDES STILL HAVE A BASIC DIFFERENCE REGARDING THE WAY WE LOOK AT THE ISSUE. IN MODERNIZING THIS TREATY TO FIT THE WORLD OF TODAY, RUSSIA MUST LOOK AT NATO IN A NEW WAY -- NOT AS AN ADVERSARY -- AND MUST BE WILLING TO CAST OFF THE 1991 TREATY NUMBERS AND BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH. THE NUMBERS WERE TAILORED TO AN OLD CONCEPT. THE RUSSIAN APPROACH IS BASICALLY A SUFFICIENCY RULE "IN DIFFERENT CLOTHING." SHE WARNED THAT WE CANNOT WORK OUT A NATIONAL CEILINGS FORMULA IF THEY END UP BEING PUT UNDER THE 1991 BLOC-TO-BLOC RUBRIC, BUT NOTED THAT WE UNDERSTAND RUSSIA'S DIFFICULTIES IN SELLING THIS TO THEIR PUBLIC. AGREEMENTS ON LIMITS OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD HELP WITH THAT, SHE CONCLUDED.

7. ~~(C)~~ THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE U.S. APPROACH FOR AGREEMENT BY ALL 30 STATES TO THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL LIMITS PUT FORWARD BY EACH STATE, WITH A REVIEW FOR ADJUSTMENT AFTER FIVE YEARS. A SIMPLE COUNT BY THE RUSSIANS COULD SATISFY THEM AS TO THE DE FACTO LIMIT ON NATO'S FORCES AND EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD RESULT. THE SECRETARY TOLD PRIMAKOV THAT SHE THOUGHT THIS U.S. APPROACH, WITH DE FACTO LIMITS AND PERIODIC REEVALUATION WOULD GIVE THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN EXPERTS SOMETHING TO WORK WITH, AND ADDED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PURSUE THIS APPROACH IN VIENNA. SHE WARNED, HOWEVER, THAT PRIMAKOV'S STATEMENTS HINTING THAT RUSSIA MIGHT CREATE ITS OWN MILITARY ALLIANCE WENT AGAINST WHAT OUR TWO PRESIDENTS HAD AGREED IN HELSINKI.

8. ~~(C)~~ PRIMAKOV DISAGREED WITH THE U.S. APPROACH, CALLING IT "NOT REALISTIC," AND SAYING THAT NATO IS A MILITARY BLOC, WITH A UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND, NOT JUST AN ABSTRACT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. HE WARNED "WE CAN'T GET AWAY FROM THAT." ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL, PRIMAKOV ARGUED THAT, WITH ONLY NATIONAL CEILINGS, AND NATO AN "OPEN" MILITARY ALLIANCE, NATO'S MILITARY POTENTIAL COULD NOT BE LIMITED. HE ASKED WHAT COULD RUSSIA DO IF OTHER COUNTRIES WANTED TO INCREASE THEIR CEILINGS (HE USED A CHAIN REACTION OF TURKEY, GREECE AND CYPRUS RAISING CEILINGS AS AN EXAMPLE.) ON USE OF THE 1991 NUMBERS, PRIMAKOV OFFERED INSTEAD TO CONSIDER CURRENT NUMBERS OF THE 16. PRIMAKOV THEN ASKED THAT WE CONSIDER ALLOWING RUSSIA LEEWAY IN STATIONED FORCE NUMBERS FOR "EMERGENCIES," MUCH AS WE HAD ASKED FOR THEM IN CONNECTION WITH LIMITS ON STATIONED FOREIGN FORCES OUTSIDE THE 16.

9. ~~(C)~~ THE SECRETARY REITERATED HER PLEA FOR THE GOR TO SEE NATO DIFFERENTLY, AS NOT DIRECTED AT RUSSIA, BUT

COOPERATING WITH IT (I.E., IN BOSNIA). SHE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAVE RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S PLEA FOR US TO SEE RUSSIA DIFFERENTLY. RESPONDING TO PRIMAKOV'S POINTS ON POSSIBLE CEILING INCREASES, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE ALL HAVE AN INTEREST IN KEEPING NATIONAL CEILINGS AS LOW AS POSSIBLE AND, SINCE THE ORGANIZATION OPERATES BY CONSENSUS, WE ALL HAVE AN EFFECTIVE VETO OVER THE OTHER STATES' PROPOSALS. IF ONE STATE WANTED TO INCREASE ITS CEILING, ANOTHER WOULD HAVE TO DECREASE ITS CEILING, SHE SAID. PRIMAKOV CONTENDED THAT ALLIANCE SUB-CEILINGS AND USE OF EXISTING CEILING NUMBERS WERE THE ONLY WAY COUNTRIES WOULD STICK TO CEILINGS, AND THE ONLY WAY TO GET ONE COUNTRY TO DECREASE ITS CEILING WHEN ANOTHER COUNTRY INCREASED ITS CEILING. UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS THEN DESCRIBED OUR VISION OF HOW EACH STATE WOULD PROPOSE ITS CEILING, DISCUSS NATIONAL CEILINGS OF OTHER STATES, AND EVENTUALLY AGREE ON NEW NATIONAL CEILINGS (PERHAPS AT LOWER LEVELS). THE RESULT, SHE SAID, WOULD BE BINDING LIMITS, AND RUSSIA COULD VERIFY WHAT DE FACTO LIMITS WOULD APPLY TO THE 16, OR ANY PARTICULAR GROUPING OF COUNTRIES AMONG THE 30.

10. ~~(C)~~ THERE WAS SOME BACK AND FORTH REGARDING HOW LONG SUCH A PROCESS WOULD TAKE. THE SECRETARY STATED FIRMLY THAT THE PROCESS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME, BUT SO WOULD A SUFFICIENCY APPROACH. SHE SAID THAT SHE THOUGHT, IN THE END, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. AFTER ALL, SHE CONCLUDED, WE WANT A PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA AND STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THE WHOLE THRUST ON BOTH SIDES IS TOWARD LOWER LIMITS. PRIMAKOV AGREED THAT WE MAY HAVE ENOUGH IN COMMON TO WORK WITH AND DEFINED THE TASK OF THE TWO SIDES AS FINDING A FORMULA TO ALLOW THE SETTING OF LIMITS FOR THE DECREASE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS LIMITED BY TREATY FOR MILITARY ALLIANCES. DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT DESCRIBED THE TASK AS USE OF THE CFE PROCESS TO COME UP WITH CONCRETE MEASURES TO ASSURE THE PEACE OF THE REGION WITH RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY NEEDS OF ALL. PRIMAKOV SAID HE APPRECIATED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S "PRETTY WORDS," AND CONCLUDED BY SAYING "DON'T THINK WE'RE JUST BEING STUBBORN. IF WE WERE TO EXPAND (AND WE'RE NOT), YOU WOULD ALSO WANT ASSURANCES FROM US."

11. ~~(C)~~ ON THE NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF THE DOCUMENT, PRIMAKOV SAID WE CAN AGREE ON CERTAIN THINGS NOW: (AS THE PRESIDENTS AGREED) THE DOCUMENT WILL HAVE THE THREE NO'S; THE TEXT WILL SAY THAT RUSSIA UNDERSTANDS THIS TO

MEAN "XXX" (THE TEXT OF THE "XXX" WILL BE AGREED TO BY SOLANA); THEN THE TEXT WILL SAY THAT NATO AGREES WITH THIS INTERPRETATION. PRIMAKOV UNDERSCORED THAT HE WAS NOT SPECIFYING WHAT EXACTLY THE "XXX" WILL BE AT THIS TIME. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT HELSINKI PROVIDED A USEFUL MODEL FOR AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO WORK WITHIN THAT MODEL.

12. ~~(C)~~ SAYING THAT THE ISSUE OF NON-DEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT FORCES BY NATO OUTSIDE THE 16 HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED, PRIMAKOV RAISED THE ISSUE OF INFRASTRUCTURE. HE STATED THAT RUSSIA UNDERSTANDS NATO WILL NEED SOME INFRASTRUCTURE. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND DEFENSE INTEROPERABILITY MEASURES WILL BE NEEDED, HE CONTINUED. HE SUGGESTED THAT EXPERTS FROM BOTH SIDES WORK OUT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, LANGUAGE AND LIMITS FOR SUCH INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND EXERCISES, FOR INSTANCE. PRIMAKOV STRESSED THAT, IN DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN THE NECESSARY AND THE SUPERFLUOUS, AND IN GUARANTEEING THAT THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS NOT THREATENING, SCALE WILL BE THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR. PRIMAKOV RAISED A FINAL QUESTION ON WHETHER NATIONAL LIMITS WOULD ALLOW THE TRANSFER OF TREATY LIMITED EQUIPMENT TO OTHER COUNTRIES WITHIN THE 16. HE THOUGHT IF THIS ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED, "WE WOULD BE CLOSE" TO AGREEMENT.

13. ~~(C)~~ ON INFRASTRUCTURE, THE SECRETARY ASSURED PRIMAKOV THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NATO'S INFRASTRUCTURE WOULD NOT BE A THREAT TO RUSSIA. ON TLE TRANSFERS, SHE SAID THAT THE WORDING ON THIS IN HELSINKI WAS CHOSEN CAREFULLY AND WE SHOULDN'T MOVE AWAY FROM IT. PRIMAKOV AGREED. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT WE WILL NEED TO MOVE FAST TO HAVE A DOCUMENT BY MAY 27. MEANWHILE, SHE SAID, WE ARE ON THE ROAD TO MADRID AND THERE WILL BE ENLARGEMENT. PRIMAKOV AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD URGE HIS TEAM OF MILITARY OFFICERS (PLUS THE MFA'S SERGEY KISLYAK) TO WORK HARD AND QUICKLY WITH THE U.S. SIDE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

ALBRIGHT