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TAGS: OVIP (ALBRIGHT, MADELEINE K.), PREL, PGOV, RS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S FEBRUARY 1 LUNCH WITH RUSSIAN FM  
IVANOV

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY STEPHEN MULL FOR REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D).
2. (U) FEBRUARY 1, 2000, MOSCOW, RUSSIA.

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3. (U) PARTICIPANTS.

U.S.:

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT

AMB. COLLINS

J. RUBIN

E. SHOCAS, CHIEF OF STAFF

S. SESTANOVICH

GEN. KERRICK

C. DUNKERLEY

A. WOLFF, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT

J. BEYRLE (NOTETAKER)

P. AFANASENKO (INTERPRETER)

RUSSIA:

FM IVANOV

AMB. USHAKOV

AMB. LAVROV

**REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare,  
Senior Reviewer**

DFM MAMEDOV  
DFM BERDENNIKOV  
GEN. ZLENKO

SUMMARY

4. (S) THE SECRETARY AND FM IVANOV DISCUSSED NEXT STEPS ON UNMOVIC AND IRAQ. OTHER TOPICS COVERED INCLUDED THE NEGATIVE INFLUENCES OF AFGHANISTAN IN CENTRAL ASIA; PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH; THE NEED FOR RUSSIAN ACTIVISM IN IMPLEMENTING ITS AGREEMENTS WITH GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA RELATED TO THE CFE TREATY; AND LATEST  
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS. END SUMMARY.

UNMOVIC

5. (S) AFTER OPENING TOASTS, FM IVANOV NOTED THE PRESENCE OF UN AMBASSADOR LAVROV AND TURNED THE SUBJECT TO UNMOVIC. NOW THAT BLIX HAD BEEN AGREED UPON, IT WAS TIME TO TURN OUR ATTENTION TO THE FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION. THE SECRETARY SAID MAKING THE COMMISSION WORK WOULD BE DIFFICULT; THE ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAMS SHE'D SEEN LOOKED HOPELESS, WITH POLITICAL PEOPLE IN TECHNICAL JOBS, STAFF CHOSEN BY COUNTRY AND NOT BY EXPERTISE - AND THERE WAS THE OVERALL QUESTION OF WHETHER IRAQ WOULD ACCEPT THE COMMISSION AT ALL. IVANOV AGREED THAT WE MUST CONSIDER THE OPTIONS IF IRAQ REFUSED. AT SOME POINT, SOMEONE -- MAYBE HIMSELF OR ANOTHER UNSC MEMBER -- MIGHT HAVE TO FLY TO BAGHDAD, BUT IT WAS HARD TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD COME NEXT IF IRAQ STOOD BY A REFUSAL.

6. (S) THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHOULD NOT GIVE IRAQ A VETO. GETTING THE COMMISSION STRUCTURE ESTABLISHED SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY. IF SOMEONE FLEW TO BAGHDAD, THE IRAQIS WOULD VIEW IT AS AN INVITATION TO BARGAIN OVER THE STRUCTURE, WHICH WAS INAPPROPRIATE. IN GENERAL WE NEED TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS; TO THAT END, PERHAPS SOME OF THE UNSCOM STAFF SHOULD COME BACK. LAVROV SUGGESTED THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HOLD BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THEY STARTED PROPOSING NAMES; HE SUPPOSED EACH SIDE

HAD ITS "BLACK LIST." THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE U.S. MIGHT CONSIDER SENDING SOMEONE TO MOSCOW FOR THESE  
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CONSULTATIONS. THE MAIN THING WAS NOT TO HAVE A POTEMKIN COMMISSION. THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN NEEDED TO GET THIS DONE TOGETHER, NOT AGAINST EACH OTHER.

7. (S) IVANOV RAISED THE LETTER HE HAD WRITTEN ABOUT "HOLDS" IN THE ESSENTIALS COMMITTEE. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR HOLDS ARE MOTIVATED BY DUAL USE CONCERNS. LACK OF

TRANSPARENCY IS A PROBLEM; WE FEEL WE DON'T KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT WHAT'S HAPPENING. LAVROV COUNTERED THAT EVEN WHEN THE RUSSIANS PROVIDED INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOUT SUPPLIERS, THE HOLDS ARE NOT ALWAYS LIFTED. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SOME OF THE ITEMS ARE DUAL USE. DEPUTY FM MAMEDOV NOTED THAT SEVEN EXPORT CONTROL GROUPS ARE WORKING; PERHAPS SOME OF THOSE EXPERTS COULD BE QUERIED.

8. (S) IVANOV COMPLAINED IT WAS DIFFICULT TO LAUNCH THE BLIX COMMISSION WHEN U.S. AIR STRIKES AGAINST IRAQ CONTINUE. WAS THE U.S. MERELY ASSERTING ITS RIGHT TO STRIKE? - BECAUSE OTHERWISE THE TARGETING HAD NO OBVIOUS LOGIC. THE SECRETARY SAID THE PLANES ARE ENFORCING A NO-FLY ZONE; THEY BOMB ONLY AS A RESPONSE TO BEING TARGETED. THAT'S A DEAD END, IVANOV ARGUED; NO ONE BUT THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT TO LAUNCH THESE STRIKES. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT MANY SC MEMBERS AGREED TO ESTABLISH THE NFZS; THE AIR STRIKES REFLECTED A LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE. IVANOV WONDERED HOW LONG THIS WOULD CONTINUE; SADDAM HUSSEIN NO LONGER WAS A THREAT TO HIS NEIGHBORS. THE SECRETARY DISAGREED; IRAQ DID CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO IRAN. SHE SAID SHE HAD TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING WHY RUSSIA CONSIDERED ITS RELATIONS WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN SO IMPORTANT THAT IT ALLOWED THEM TO CREATE PROBLEMS IN U.S.-RUSSIAN  
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RELATIONS.

AFGHANISTAN/CENTRAL ASIA

9. (S) IVANOV SAID RUSSIA IS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE CENTRAL ASIA. THE TALIBAN HAD REACTED DEFIANTLY TO THE UNSC SANCTIONS, EVEN BEFORE THEIR RECENT RECOGNITION OF THE "CHECHEN GOVERNMENT." MUCH OF THE MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE CHECHEN REBELS FLOWED OUT OF AFGHANISTAN THROUGH CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS. THE

6+2 PROCESS HAD DONE LITTLE TO PROMOTE A MORE STABLE AFGHANISTAN. THE U.S. AND RUSSIA NEEDED A COORDINATED EFFORT. THE SECRETARY SAID THE SANCTIONS HAD HAD A STRONG EFFECT AGAINST THE TALIBAN -- PERHAPS WE SHOULD TIGHTEN THEM. AMB. SESTANOVICH NOTED THAT THE CENTRAL ASIANS'S BIGGEST VULNERABILITY IS THEIR INABILITY TO CONTROL THEIR BORDERS, RECALLING THE DISCUSSION AT THE JANUARY CIS SUMMIT ABOUT A COMMAND POST EXERCISE INVOLVING RUSSIA, UZBEKISTAN AND KYRGYZSTAN TO PREPARE FOR THE EXPECTED SPRING OFFENSIVE IN THE VALLEYS.

10. (S) IVANOV MUSED THAT THE UNSC MIGHT LOOK AT HOW THE SANCTIONS ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED, AND CONSIDER SOME DIFFERENT MEASURES. LAVROV SAID SYG ANNAN HAD EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM OF THE 6+2 PROCESS DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW, BUT WARNED AGAINST WIDENING THE FORMAT. THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS HAD BEEN WITH PAKISTAN AND LATELY WITH TURKMENISTAN. BUT IN THE MAIN, RUSSIA AGREED WITH THE U.S.

TO SUPPORT THE 6+2 PROCESS.  
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CFE

11. (S) THE SECRETARY RECALLED THE GOOD AGREEMENTS REACHED ON CFE AT THE ISTANBUL SUMMIT; THE KEY NOW WAS FULL IMPLEMENTATION, BUT WE SENSED A SLOWDOWN IN PROGRESS. AMB. DUNKERLEY BRIEFED ON HIS MEETINGS THE PREVIOUS WEEK WITH THE RUSSIAN MFA, AND RECALLED THE U.S. HAS UP TO \$43 MILLION AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT DESTRUCTION AND WITHDRAWAL PROJECTS. IVANOV SAID DUNKERLEY'S REPORT SHOWED THAT CERTAIN STEPS HAD BEEN TAKEN: THE RUSSIANS HAD FORMED THEIR NEGOTIATING TEAMS, AND HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND LUCINSKI AT THE CIS SUMMIT.

12. (S) GEN. ZLENKO AGREED THAT SOME PRACTICAL STEPS HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. THE ISTANBUL DECISIONS ON GEORGIA AND MOLDOVA HAD BEEN DIFFICULT AND RUSSIA HAD DECIDED TO COMPROMISE ITS INTERESTS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE REGION. THE GENERAL STAFF HAS DETAILED PLANS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL AND DISMANTLING OF BASES, BUT RUSSIA INTENDS TO AVOID THE MISTAKES OF ITS WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST EUROPE. IT MIGHT TAKE 3-5 YEARS TO WITHDRAW 7000 MEN IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE PROPER CONDITIONS. OF COURSE RUSSIA WILL DO ITS BEST TO MEET THE DEADLINES AGREED TO AT ISTANBUL, BUT

MUST ALSO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF ITS SERVICEMEN. IVANOV NOTED THAT 2300 RAILCARS OF MUNITIONS NEEDED TO BE DESTROYED ON SITE IN TRANSNISTRIA. THE SITUATION IN GEORGIA WAS DIFFICULT - RUSSIA MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO RELOCATE OR WITHDRAW. BUT RUSSIA KNEW THE GEORGIANS WOULD  
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BE COMPLAINING IF THEY DIDN'T ACT, AND THEN HE COULD EXPECT A PHONE CALL FROM THE SECRETARY.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

13. (S) THE SECRETARY RECOUNTED HER MEETINGS WITH ALIYEV AND KOCHARIAN IN DAVOS. ALTHOUGH THINGS HAD SEEMED UNPRODUCTIVE INITIALLY, BOTH HAD COME BACK WITH IDEAS WHEN FACED WITH THE PROSPECT THAT THEIR EFFORTS MIGHT COLLAPSE. BUT THE ASSASSINATIONS IN YEREVAN HAD CLEARLY DAMPENED KOCHARIAN'S EARLIER WILLINGNESS TO TAKE RISKS. PUTIN'S STATEMENT AT THE CIS SUMMIT SUPPORTING AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH WAS IMPORTANT, BUT IT WOULD HELP IF RUSSIA COULD REASSURE YEREVAN THAT THE DEAL WAS GOOD FOR REGIONAL SECURITY - MAYBE THE RUSSIAN MILITARY COULD HELP GET THIS POINT ACROSS.

14. (S) IVANOV SAID HE'D HAD LONG TALKS WITH BOTH KOCHARIAN AND ALIYEV ALONG THE SAME LINES. KOCHARIAN WAS SINCERE IN

SAYING HE NEEDS INTERNAL STABILITY BEFORE HE CAN MAKE A MAJOR AGREEMENT. HE BELIEVES HE DOESN'T HAVE THE SUPPORT HE ENJOYED BEFORE THE ASSASSINATION, AND THUS FEELS COMPELLED TO MAKE CHANGES IN THIS POSITION. DESPITE THE FACT THAT YEREVAN GETS MORE TERRITORY IN THE DEAL, THEY FEEL IT LEAVES THEM SURROUNDED ON THREE SIDES BY THE TURKS AND THEIR CLOSE COUSINS, AND GEORGIA IS UNSTABLE. SOME SECURITY ASSURANCES SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE REGION, AN IDEA PUTIN HAD PROPOSED DURING HIS METING WITH THE THREE PRESIDENTS. THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT, WHERE TURKEY PROVIDED ASSURANCES TO THE AZERIS, RUSSIA TO ARMENIA, AND THE U.S.

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AND GERMANY TO GEORGIA, WAS NOT A SOLUTION.

15. (S) THE SECRETARY SAID SHE'D TOLD THE PRESIDENTS THEY SHOULDN'T MISS THE OPPORTUNITY THEY HAVE NOW FOR PEACE. ANKARA SEEMS TO HAVE A NEW AND MORE AMENABLE POLICY, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL NEVER GO AS FAR AS ARMENIA'S IDEE FIXE, THE APOLOGY FOR GENOCIDE. MEANWHILE, KOCHARIAN TALKS ABOUT

A COMMON STATE IN PHASES; HE'S CLEARLY PARALYZED WITHOUT SOME WORKABLE SOLUTION ON THE MEGHRI.

KOSOVO

16. (S) THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL TOGETHER, AND WERE HAPPY TO HEAR SERGEYEV AFFIRM THAT RUSSIAN FORCES WILL STAY IN KFOR THROUGH THE SUMMER OF 2000. KOUCHNER WAS WORKING HARD AND DOING A GOOD JOB, BUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS NOT FULFILLING ITS PLEDGES TO UNMIK; KOUCHNER SAID THERE ISN'T ENOUGH MONEY FOR TEACHERS, POLICE FORCES, ETC. SHE WAS PLANNING A BRIEF STOP IN CROATIA TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT. IVANOV SAID THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA WAS COMPLEX BECAUSE OF THE FEDERATION. THE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE WAS BEING REDUCED, AND TENSIONS WILL GROW. THIS SHOULD BE KEPT ON THE AGENDA. MUSLIM AND NATIONALISTIC FORCES ARE VERY ACTIVE.

17. (S) ON KOSOVO, IVANOV SAID RUSSIA DISAGREED WITH THE U.S. EVEN IF IT ACCEPTED WASHINGTON'S THESIS THAT MILOSEVIC IS THE PROBLEM, WHAT WOULD BE THE SOLUTION IF HE

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LEFT TOMORROW? ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE COUNTRY'S 21 OPPOSITION PARTIES WOULD SUCCEED HIM, AND NOT ONE OF THEM SUPPORTED KOSOVO'S SECESSION. MEANWHILE, IN KOSOVO, THERE WAS NO POLITICAL FORCE THAT ADVOCATED STAYING IN THE FEDERATION; THEY WERE ALL BUSY CREATING CRIMINAL LAWS THAT BRING NO ONE BENEFIT. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

18. (S) THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IF SHE WERE EVER TO RETURN TO TEACHING, SHE COULD BUILD A SERIES OF LECTURES AROUND

THE THESIS THAT STATES THAT DO NOT RECOGNIZE EARLY THEY SHOULD GIVE MORE AUTONOMY TO PROBLEMATIC REGIONS OFTEN LIVE TO REGRET IT. REGARDING MILOSEVIC, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE FRONTLINE STATES SEE HIM AS A THREAT. THE BEST OUTCOME IS A STRONG STABILITY PACT AND A DEMOCRATIC SERBIA -- AND THAT MEANS MILOSEVIC HAS TO GO. ALMOST ANY OPPOSITION LEADER WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT. WE HAD WORKED WITH THE OPPOSITION TO MAKE THEM MORE EFFECTIVE; DJUKANOVIC WAS AN INTERESTING FIGURE. (YES, IVANOV INTERJECTED, HE GIVES HOPE TO SMUGGLERS OF CONTRABAND.) SHE AGREED WITH IVANOV THAT NO LEADER SUPPORTED OUTRIGHT INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO, BUT SOME DID SEE A RAMBOUILLET-LIKE SOLUTION WHERE A REFERENDUM

WOULD ESTABLISH A PREFERENCE AND GIVE SOME CONFIDENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.  
ALBRIGHT

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