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Memorandum of Conversation

Date: January 19, 1998

S/NIS-EP  
S/S  
Place: Radisson SAS Hotel, Lulea, Sweden

RELEASE IN FULL

Tuesday, January 20, 1998

DECLASSIFIED

**TO THE SECRETARY, NODIS  
FROM STROBE TALBOTT**

**(COPIES PLEASE TO SANDY BERGER, NSC, AND LEON FUERTH, OVP)**

**(In Stockholm)**

**SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH PRIMAKOV IN SWEDEN**

**AFTER AN HOUR AND A HALF MEETING LAST NIGHT (MONDAY) AND TWO MORE ENCOUNTERS TODAY (TUESDAY), PRIMAKOV HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO TRYING, ON HIS RETURN TO MOSCOW, TO SEEK TWO ADDITIONAL STEPS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE RECENT WISNER-KOPTEV SESSION AND THE GORE-CHEARNORMYDRIN PHONE CONVERSATION: 1) A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE PUTTING THE CATCH-ALL LAW ON THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA, AND 2) A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THE IRANIAN FIRM SANAM, INCLUDING PROHIBITION OF SANAM'S FURTHER ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO BRING ABOUT BOTH THESE DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE THE END OF JANUARY.**

**JIM COLLINS AFFIRMED THESE UNDERTAKINGS IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH PRIMAKOV'S PRINCIPAL AIDE ROBERT MAKARYAN.**

**IN A FINAL ONE-ON-ONE THAT I HAD WITH HIM SHORTLY BEFORE WE WENT OUR SEPARATE WAYS FROM LULEA, PRIMAKOV REITERATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SERIOUSNESS AND URGENCY OF THIS ISSUE. HE ALSO UNDERScoreD HOW "DIFFICULT, COMPLICATED AND SENSITIVE" THE PROBLEM IS ON THE RUSSIAN END. IT IS ESSENTIAL, HE SAID, TO MINIMIZE THE APPEARANCE THAT RUSSIA IS TAKING THESE STEPS "UNDER PRESSURE AND THREATS" FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE PROCESS THAT WISNER AND KOPTEV HAVE ESTABLISHED — AND THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT**

Declassification Authority: Geoffrey W. Chapman, Senior Reviewer, A/GIS/IPS  
10/28/2019

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**AND PRIME MINISTER HAVE GIVEN THEIR IMPRIMATUR — WILL SURVIVE AND PRODUCE RESULTS, HE SAID, “ONLY IF IT GOES FORWARD IN THE FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP — A KIND OF JOINT VENTURE IN PURSUIT OF MUTUAL INTERESTS.”**

**HE EXPLICITLY WARNED AGAINST “SANCTIONS OF ANY KIND.” I REPLIED THAT SANCTIONS REMAIN A POSSIBILITY, IN THE CONTEXT OF BOTH IRAN/MISSILES AND ILSA. “IF THAT HAPPENS, WE’LL HAVE A CATASTROPHE ON OUR HANDS,” HE SAID. I SAID THAT WE WERE FACING THE POSSIBILITY OF SANCTIONS IN PART BECAUSE OF HOW LONG IT HAD TAKEN TO GET TO THIS POINT, REMINDING HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN WORKING THE ISSUE FOR NEARLY A YEAR, STARTING WITH THE GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN MEETING IN FEBRUARY 97; THEREFORE WE — AND HE — HAD TO “MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME” IN COMING DAYS, AND CERTAINLY IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO.**

**HE SAID I WAS “UNDERESTIMATING” BOTH HOW FAR THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAD COME AND HOW HARD IT WAS FOR RUSSIA TO DEAL “WITH A PROBLEM OF THIS KIND.”**

**WE AGREED THAT JIM COLLINS, WHO RETURNS TO MOSCOW TOMORROW, WILL FOLLOW UP DIRECTLY WITH PRIMAKOV.**

**HERE FOLLOWS THE MEMCON OF THE SESSION I HAD WITH PRIMAKOV LAST NIGHT.**

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**Date, Monday, January 19, 1998**

**Time: 1815-1940**

**Place: Radisson SAS Hotel, Lulea, Sweden**

**Participants:**

**Russia**                      **Foreign Minister Primakov**  
**Deputy FM Avdayev**  
**Special Assistant Robert Markarian**

**U.S.**                              **Deputy Secretary Talbott**  
**Amb. James F. Collins**  
**D Exec. Asst. Eric Edelman**

**ST: Thanks for everything you did in helping set up the presentation of Amb. Collins credentials to President Yeltsin earlier today. I've gotten Jim's report of the meeting and his description of the President, who I gather seemed to be quite healthy and vigorous.**

**YMP: You don't owe me any thanks. We should thank you for sending us a good, solid professional. We had a drink and a laugh together after he presented his credentials. He is much too modest a man. When he had his photo op after he presented his credentials he went and stood next to me. All the other Ambassadors at the ceremony came forward and had their pictures taken right next to President Yeltsin. After the whole line had presented its credentials, the President called for Amb. Collins to come forward again to have a proper photo taken with the President. I had to push him forward to go up and have his picture taken again with President Yeltsin.**

**ST: I bring you greetings from Madeleine.**

**YMP: Thank you. I spoke with her on the telephone...when was it?**

**Markarian: It was about the 13th of January.**

**YMP: I also shared my views on the Middle East Peace Process with her.**

**ST: She has a lot of hard work ahead of her this week.**

**YMP: I was pleased with the phone call and with the letter she sent to me on the Baltic Charter. I understand the context.**

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**ST: It represented the same, consistent line we have always taken on that question.**

**YMP: I think, on the one hand that we are working and cooperating well together in general.**

**On Iraq, I think there was not a problem with our mission to Baghdad. It did not do anything that harmed U.S. interests in the region.**

**ST: With regard to Iraq we are mainly worried about one person — Saddam Hussein.**

**YMP: Our position with regard to Saddam is clear. He must fulfill all of his obligations under the relevant UN resolutions. However, I would add two things. First, you can't dictate to him how he fulfills those resolutions. Second, you should avoid resorting to the use of force against him. You can go right up to that point. I have no problem with that. But, you should not actually employ force against him. I also have to say that it was not a smart thing when you had Ritter arrive in Baghdad with a team of Americans and British with only one Russian and one other foreigner. We should work together to get him to fulfill the resolutions. We have no interest in seeing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We agree on that. We do have, however, some tactical differences with you.**

**We think it is important to let him know when he has fulfilled one of his obligations. Once he has checked off something on the list, then you can say to him, "Okay, now do the next one." For instance, everyone agrees — China, France, Russia — that the nuclear file can be closed. We can do this now. The UN has had a big success. We can announce that to the world and move from an inspection regime to a situation of permanent monitoring by experts.**

**The ballistic missile file is another one that probably needs to be closed. On chemical and biological weapons more work needs to be done by the inspectors. You want to wait and close all of the files at once. We think that is a mistake. We think that we should approach them one at a time. If Saddam does something normally and properly he should get a normal, proper response.**

**Turning to the use of force. Let me just say that if this were the days of the cold war, that is to say the days when everything was 'a zero-sum game' [in English], then I would say, "Please, be my guest, use force." That way we would be the only ones to gain advantage from such an action. The coalition would fragment.**

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**Everyone is against the use of force. Perhaps the British would support it but everyone else in Europe is against it. The Chinese are against it. All of the Arabs oppose. The entire Middle East would be frozen by it. Let's face it. You can't bring him down with air operations. Only ground operations can do that and ground operations are out of the question because there would be too many casualties. Remember, this would not be a military ground operation like retaking Kuwait. You would have to take Baghdad. It would be, as so many are saying, counterproductive.**

**We all need to stick to the agreed line that Saddam must fulfill his obligations under the relevant UN resolutions. We have supported that. I know the Iraqis very well. I am telling you quite frankly that I have been sending daily messages to Tariq Aziz and getting virtually daily replies. In all my communications I have stressed that it is important for Iraq to maintain maximum patience and flexibility. We have said that Butler should not provoke the Iraqis but that they, in turn, must not provoke him. I am being very candid with you.**

**With regard to the Middle East Peace Process. We are at a dead end. I am always very frank with you. We find the situation very troubling. The U.S. always asks us to use our influence in the region to advance the process but when real negotiations begin then the U.S. quickly moves to exclude us from the action and tries to keep us on the sidelines. If we could work out some things we could do together we might be able to accomplish more there. You have to understand what Netanyahu wants to do. He wants to draw a line through Madrid and Oslo and start with a blank slate.**

**If the Co-Sponsors convened a meeting with the Europeans, with the moderate Arabs (like the Egyptians), the Israelis, the Syrians, in other words all of the parties to the conflict either in a conference setting or close political contacts, it would be enormously helpful to the Palestinians. The Palestinians have done everything they can from a security point of view. They can't do anything further. You know, I have good personal relations with Netanyahu. In fact, I like him better than Peres. I think he is more direct and straight-forward. The problem I have, is that you have tried to do everything on your own by your self. We have been excluded.**

**I spoke about this issue with Secretary Christopher when we met for the first time in Helsinki. At that time, he said he would send us Dennis Ross. He told me that in our last meeting as well. Then Madeleine repeated it last summer. It has been two years since it was proposed. But, where is Dennis? Where has he been? I haven't seen him. We have a lot to think about with regard to the Middle East. I am speaking to you very frankly because I know that you will pass it directly to**

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**Madeleine.**

**You know, last spring, with a lot of help from Madeleine, we signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It was a major achievement. Nonetheless, I am very uneasy. I am worried about the possible entry of the Baltic states into NATO. As you know well that is not the same thing as welcoming Poland, the Czechs, or Hungary into NATO. That was not pleasant for us but it was not the same thing as the Baltic states. I realize that you don't want to say "No" to the Baltic states or announce that NATO is a closed organization. I understand that and as a result we don't insist on it. But I don't understand what you are saying when U.S. officials make statements like, "We are preparing the Baltic states for membership in NATO." What does that mean? I have read some things that Brzezinski has written on the subject. They are absolute falsifications. He has written that Russia insists on "one-sided" security guarantees like in the days when Russian tanks guaranteed Baltic security. This is totally false and Brzezinski knows it. We have talked about overlapping, multilateral security guarantees from Russia, NATO, other Europeans, Scandinavia, etc. All of this discussion of the Baltic states and NATO has started a problem in the Duma. Admittedly, the ones who are raising this in the Duma are not the best people, but none the less they represent a certain segment of Russian public opinion.**

**On the Russian-NATO Permanent Joint Council. We have certain information to the effect that you and some of your allies want to turn the PJC into nothing more than a discussion club. We understand that you and the Allies want to work out your positions on all issues first and then present them to us so there can be no real give and take. If you have issues or concerns you should not discuss them among yourselves behind our back. Come to us and raise the issues directly with us. I want to assure you that we approach the PJC constructively. We think it is a mechanism where issues can be broached and where we can work to bring our positions closer together. We don't want to use it to cause problems. I think Sergeyev will be discussing this with Cohen as well.**

**We should be working also on reducing conventional forces in Europe. Yeltsin's last speech in Sweden proposed force reductions in the Leningrad military district. This basically took the northern flank issue off the agenda. We also need to discuss reductions in the south. This is an issue that requires us to have serious discussions.**

**I also need to discuss START II ratification with you. This is an area where both sides are going to need maximum patience. We want to move ahead with ratification. I have spoken to Zyuganov about it, and I think he understands. There is no point in talking to Zhirinovskiy. I want to stress to you that we want**

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ratification. And we want it because we want Bill Clinton to come to Moscow for a successful summit with President Yeltsin. We will get ratification in the end. I can't tell you right now how we will get it, but I assure you that we will.

Sergeyev told me he has factions in the General Staff that are not completely on board. I met with them at the Foreign Ministry. I explained to them that this was something that we had to have and that President Yeltsin had announced that we would do this. In the end, they agreed. I believe that when we finish with the budget battle in the Duma we will turn to the START II ratification process.

Let me turn to your beloved Nagorno-Karabakh.

ST: Let me guess: You think I should go there tomorrow...

YMP (laughing): Maybe not tomorrow, but soon.

ST: Let's start in Paris, where I am supposed to meet with the other two Minsk Conference co-chairs during the first week in February.

YMP: Okay, start in Paris if you like. But, once you have flown all the way across the Atlantic you are only a couple of hours from Stepanakert. You might as well keep going. You really should. We are doing everything we can to support President Ter-Petrosian. I have sent him letters and spoken with him by telephone to give him the message that we think he did something smart and courageous when he wrote his article endorsing a package settlement. But, you know, he has very serious opposition. We are trying to support him. Aliev knows this and has no problem, but the N-K Armenians are a big problem. If the Conference Co-Chairs representing the U.S., France and Russia, were to come to Stepanakert they would come as the representative of three, well I would say, three very serious countries. It would have some effect. It would indicate that if they oppose a peace settlement they are flouting the will of the entire world.

Georgia is also a matter of some concern. Shevardnadze has said that the only solution is for the Russian forces to be withdrawn. He is getting the impression — not from you, by the way — that they can be replaced by an IFOR-like force with U.S. troops that would resolve the Abkhazia situation in Georgia's favor. The situation there is very bad. It will not happen. Among our peacekeepers 50 soldiers have died there. One soldier recently shot all of his comrades with automatic weapons. 10 people were killed.

ST: When did this happen? Was it recently?

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**Markaryan: About six months ago.**

**YMP: It was horrible. We would be happy to get our forces out. We are ready to leave any time. But if they do there would be a sea of blood. Pulling Russian peacekeepers out could set off bloodshed much worse than anything in Yugoslavia. Then the world would say, "You see, there you have Russian peacekeeping! they come, do nothing and leave and there is a bloodbath." Much as we might like to we cannot just leave.**

**The former Yugoslavia is a different kind of conflict. Let me turn to that subject now. If you think that we are happy with the behavior of the Bosnia Serbs, you are wrong. They are a bunch of idiots. But we don't think it serves anyone's purpose to split the Republika Srpska between Pale and Banja Luka. After all, Krajisnik is not the worst person you could have. Now we have Mr. Dodik and his government. We agree that we should support him, but we don't agree to do it the way that Holbrooke likes to do things. We would prefer to support him more subtly in a way that does not provoke a split in Srpska. We have our own sources of information and our own view of things there. You are not the only ones with a view on this. We have been able to exert some salutary influence on Milosovic. The two of us need to have closer consultations and work more closely together on Yugoslavia.**

**You know Brzezinski has written that you do not need to take Russia into account. But, he is wrong. Russia still counts in international affairs.**

**ST: Yevgeniy Maksimovich, I have listened very attentively to what you have said. I hope you will allow me to respond to what you have said on all these subjects and then that you'll let me raise another subject — which is really the main one on my mind and the main problem we have at the moment: Iran missile cooperation.**

**YMP: I hope you remember that at our last meeting [in Tokyo in November] you mentioned one particular Iranian company to me.**

**ST: Yes, I remember it well. It was SANAM, and I saw it mentioned by PM Chernomyrdin in his telephone conversation with the Vice President.**

**YMP: Yes, that is right. The root of that mention was our conversation in Tokyo where you mentioned that particular Iranian company to me.**

**ST: Let me respond to your other points, but I do want to do justice to Iran missiles as well.**



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**On Iraq, we have had this conversation before. You stress one side of the dilemma, which is that there's a danger using force could, if we're not skilful, perhaps play into Saddam's hands since he might survive and the coalition might fragment. But that doesn't get you out of the other, more fundamental part of the dilemma, which is that without the credible threat of the use of force Saddam will definitely not comply. We have seen this more than once: diplomacy that is not backed by credible force will not work with him...**

**YMP (interrupting): There are two different issues. There is demonstration of willingness to use force and there is use of force itself.**

**ST: If Saddam does not think that at the end of the day, we are willing to use force, he will not do anything to comply with the UNSC resolutions. Without the credible threat of force, we'll be bluffing; and that means we must in fact be prepared to use force. Secretary Albright believes it is essential that we continue to work together to make sure that UNSCOM can do its work more effectively. Whatever adjustments we accept in UNSCOM, we must preserve the professional effectiveness of UNSCOM. What we cannot and will not do is anything that weakens the integrity and capability of UNSCOM. We will not do anything that would undermine the professionalism and technical side of what UNSCOM does.**

**As for your idea of closing files, we would not be willing, at this point, to go from an inspection regime to one of simply monitoring...**

**YMP: Even on the nuclear file?**

**ST: On any files. We simply have a different view on this. We do not believe the data support the notion of closing files. Moreover, we think it is a bad idea to be closing files while Saddam is making statements which seek to undermine the effectiveness of UNSCOM and that are clearly intended to flaunt the will of the international community.**

**I'm sure Madeleine will be interested in what you have said about the end of the cold war and zero sum thinking and your view — that the U.S. would be isolating itself if it were to use force — and how you don't want to see the U.S. weaken itself. She'll find that fascinating. As I've said already, we're aware that there are risks and costs associated with the use of force. But you must recognize that there is a greater danger on the other side: that, absent a credible threat of force, Saddam will continue to defy the Security Council and fail to abide by his obligations under existing resolutions.**

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**YMP:** I agree with you. It has been two months since my Geneva meeting with Madeleine and the other foreign ministers. We agreed that there would be an extraordinary session of UNSCOM which would take decisions about how to make the commission more effective. I agree that professionalism is important. But let's be frank. If professionalism was the criterion used to measure everything in the United Nations, whole continents would go unrepresented. Why exclude Russian, French and other experts from being accepted on the same professional level as U.S. experts? Do you believe that Russian experts would connive in ignoring Iraqi weapons of mass destruction? I can assure you that is not the case. In any event, what have we got to show for all of this? There was a recommendation that other experts, besides British and American experts be brought on board. I just don't understand why this has not happened. The Chinese are saying "the worse the better." We are not saying that about the current situation, but the Chinese are.

**ST:** We operate on the basis of a different principle: "the more effective the better," and we mean that from an objective, technical, scientific point of view — that is, for purposes of establishing the facts of what Saddam is hiding in all those facilities.

**YMP:** We are in favor of using a different approach to configure or constitute the inspection groups.

**ST:** We are in favor of preserving the integrity of the process and being careful not to politicize it. Let us see if there is any common ground that we can build on.

**YMP:** If you leave a perpetual Sword of Damocles hanging over Saddam's head it will only strengthen him at home. You know, Bush asked me whether I thought Saddam would survive Desert Storm. I told him that I thought he would survive. I turned out to be right.

**ST:** Let's turn to the Middle East Peace Process. You, not for the first time, are raising the concern that the U.S. is trying to monopolize the process...

**YMP (interrupting):** Not "trying," but monopolizing.

**ST:** Let me continue. The meetings between Netanyahu and U.S. officials are beginning today. I will convey your views to Madeleine. but I assure you: she recognizes that Russia is a Co-Sponsor of the peace process since Madrid and isn't trying to cut you out of the play. What you have to recognize is that Russia's relations with Israel are an important fact; if they were better, would make your position easier. In order to be a facilitator of the peace process, you've got to have credibility with all the parties; all the parties have to welcome your participation.

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**Let's face it — that's simply not the case with Russia.**

**In any event, let's see how this week goes. Then you and Madeleine should be able to share impressions.**

**YMP: If the U.S. succeeds this week, it will be a great achievement and we will support it. But if not, then we will have to think very carefully about next steps.**

**ST: On the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the question of the Baltic states: We need to establish the right channel between us to stay in touch in the weeks, months, and even years ahead. We should have our people talking with Deputy Minister Avdayev here and with Nikolay Nikolayevich Afanesevsky. Overall, we have noted the way you have handled the question of the Baltics in the past few days. I said in Oslo that Russia's approach and response have been "pragmatic." That's high praise, Yevgeny Maximovich.**

**As for the Charter itself, you must bear in mind that what it does and does not say are both important. You have some concerns and we should talk about them.**

**You have a dilemma in dealing with the Baltic states. We recognize that you have made some progress in reaching border agreements with the Baltic states. However, the more Russian officials make statements that the Balts must never be members of NATO — that their membership will be a disaster, etc. — the more the Baltic states will be inclined to seek NATO membership for anti-Russian reasons.**

**On the NATO-Russia PJC: I took on board what you said in Copenhagen about the PJC; we both have an interest in making sure that the PJC is full of real content.**

**YMP: I know that the infrastructure issue is a sensitive one, but is very important for us to understand what NATO means when it talks about "substantial" infrastructure. What does it mean?**

**ST: Leaving infrastructure aside for the moment, we need to use the period before the next PJC to make sure that it is as productive a discussion as possible. If you have complaints or believe we are doing things behind your back, you should let us know, and we'll give you our perspective on things.**

**Let me talk about START I for a second. Thank you for your letter to the Secretary on START I implementation. It was actually quite constructive. I think you'll probably get a reply before Secretary Cohen arrives in Moscow for his**

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meetings with Defense Minister Sergeyev. But we should not link START I implementation issues with START II. The President wants to come to Moscow and have a good summit with Boris Nikolayevich and hopes that Summit will be one of the high points of his second term.

You mentioned CFE briefly. I have one word in reply: Vienna. We should discuss all of this in Vienna where the talks on treaty adaptation are going on.

With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Conference Co-Chairs will meet in Paris in early February. You should send Boris Pastukhov there armed with all of the arguments you can muster for having the Co-Chairs visit Stepanakert. I am ready to go back, but only if I am convinced it will do some good. Perhaps Pastukhov did not report to you all the details of our last visit when Ghoukasian compared the co-chairs to the notorious "troikas" during Stalin's purges and accused of us of plotting the elimination of the N-K Armenians. I'm in no great hurry to be treated to another reception like that. We agree that we've got to support Ter-Petrosian. We understand that there is a real struggle going on between Ter-Petrosian and Kocharian right now.

YMP: Yes, I can tell you that Kocharian wants to be President of Armenia. Look, the N-K Armenians are an obstacle. Let's not beat around the bush about that. But what can we do? We have to face it and overcome it. I have been for a package agreement all along. Stepanakert was against it. Then we I proposed a step-by-step approach both Baku and Stepanakert were opposed.

ST: On the former Yugoslavia, I agree with some of what you said. It's a sad commentary that Krajisnik is not even the worst Serb we could end up with. But I also agree that we've got some movement in the right direction in the RS.

Now please let me turn to the principal subject that Madeleine wanted me to pursue with you. I have good and bad news on Iran missiles...

YMP: Let's start with the bad news.

ST: Okay. There are 86 U.S. Senators who are ready to impose sanctions on Russia because of this issue.

YMP: That would bring about the collapse of everything we are doing on this issue.

ST: We are continuing to work on this problem. Because of President Yeltsin's personal involvement in this process and the decisions he took on January 4, we

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may finally — belatedly — be putting a process in place that will meet our needs. You asked us for understanding and forbearance with regard to the domestic Russian context for START II ratification. You must understand that the Iran missile issue has aroused a great deal of strong feeling in the U.S., in public opinion, and in the Congress. And that's for good reason, given the threat that Iranian missiles would pose to the region as a whole — including Russia itself.

It would be extremely helpful — I'd say absolutely necessary — to have a public announcement of your government's intention to pursue catch-all legislation and a vigorous program of oversight and enforcement to prevent missile proliferation. It would be best if such a public statement could be made soon, by the end of the month at the latest.

**YMP:** It will happen. As part of the public campaign we have discussed with Wisner there will be a statement about the case of the company SANAM. I talked about the possibility of a statement with Chernomyrdin. We are doing things to stop this technology leakage. But what more do you want from us? We told you that there was nothing going to Iran via government channels, but that was not enough for you. You wanted us to stop all leakage of such technology. I spoke with Kovalyov about this for 15 minutes on the telephone earlier today. By the way, he is a good guy who is trying to do something on this matter. What more do you want us to do?

**ST:** Basically, I want you to do at a minimum what you just said you were planning to do — make a public announcement that you will pursue catch-all legislation and produce more public evidence that you're actually moving to put a stop to this activity. The more specific and detailed the announcement, the better.

**YMP:** I want to stress that we have every intention of pursuing legitimate economic ties and trade with Iran. We will not give that up. On the ballistic missile business we are doing our best to stop it.

**ST:** We don't want to see anyone helping Iran develop its energy resources. That goes for Russians as well as Europeans and Malaysians. Missile cooperation with Iran is in a different category. On that Russia is alone, isolated.

**YMP:** Don't say "Russia." It is not Russia as such but perhaps certain entities that are pursuing this. There may be some Americans as well. I don't know.

**ST:** You have hinted at this before. If there is anything you have to tell us let us know. I hope the Russian government will soon make a statement with as much detail as possible very soon.

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