

RELEASE IN FULL

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*New of ST-YMP*

TALBOTT-PRIMAKOV OCTOBER 8, 1997, PRIMAKOV'S OFFICE,  
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY.... MEMCON

*cc: Fear the  
Country  
[Signature]*

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARTICIPANTS: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR COLLINS, FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV, AND RUSSIAN INTERPRETER. MINISTER PRIMAKOV RECEIVED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AT 0930. THE MEETING LASTED JUST OVER TWO HOURS.

*- Bill Burns  
for Secte*

3. PRIMAKOV WELCOMED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, NOTING HE WAS JUST BACK FROM BAKU. MAMEDOV HAD BRIEFED HIM ON THE DINNER DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND MAMEDOV THE PREVIOUS EVENING. HE WANTED TO MOVE THE IRAN ISSUE TO CLOSURE. WITH THAT OBJECTIVE, HE HAD A PROPOSAL, HE STATED.

4. READING FROM A HANDWRITTEN PAPER, THE MINISTER STATED THAT YELTSIN HAD APPROVED A PROPOSAL AS FOLLOWS:

BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT AND IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINUING WORK OF THE WISNER-KOPTEV COMMITTEE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE FSB INVITES THE DIRECTOR OF THE FBI TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO FAMILIARIZE THE AMERICAN SIDE WITH THE OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS THAT EMERGED DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TRANSFER OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD ALREADY SIGNED THIS DOCUMENT AND THE MINISTER RESPONDED "HE HAD, THAT HE WOULD AWAIT THE U.S. DECISION." HE REITERATED THAT IT IS TIME TO PUT AN END TO THIS ISSUE.

5. FOLLOWING THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSAL, PRIMAKOV NOTED THAT "WE KNOW YOU HAVE ISRAELI SOURCES WHO SAY IRAN IS BUILDING MISSILES. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THIS IS DONE WITHOUT US. ISRAEL IS USING THIS TO PRESSURE RUSSIA." PRIMAKOV CONCLUDED THAT THIS IS WHAT HE HAD TO SAY. HE TOLD TALBOTT HE BELIEVES THAT THE PROPOSED KOVAYLOV MEETING WITH THE FBI DIRECTOR "CAN END THIS MATTER."

6. TALBOTT RESPONDED BY EXPRESSING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY'S CONCERN ABOUT THE IRAN MISSILE ISSUE, REMINDING PRIMAKOV OF WHAT THE SECRETARY HAD SAID AT THEIR MEETING IN NEW YORK AFTER THE DINNER OF THE EIGHT: THE ISSUE IS THE MOST SERIOUS CRISIS IN FIVE YEARS, WITH THE POTENTIAL TO WRECK MUCH OF WHAT WE'VE ACCOMPLISHED IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS

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APPARENT THAT PRIMAKOV WAS APPLYING HIMSELF SERIOUSLY TO THE IRAN ISSUE, AND THE PROPOSED AMERICAN MEETING WITH KOVALYOV WAS CLEARLY AN INDICATION OF SERIOUSNESS. TALBOTT ASKED AGAIN TO CLARIFY THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR THE FBI DIRECTOR TO VISIT MOSCOW WAS ALREADY APPROVED BY PRESIDENT YELTSIN. TALBOTT SAID IT WAS AN OPEN QUESTION WHO WAS THE MOST APPROPRIATE PERSON ON THE AMERICAN SIDE TO MEET WITH RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ON THIS SUBJECT. PRIMAKOV RESPONDED THAT "IT'S DONE" AND KOVALYEV WILL EXTEND AN INVITATION IN HIS OWN CHANNELS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT OF COURSE IT DID NOT HAVE TO BE THE FBI DIRECTOR, IT COULD BE THE DCI. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE SINCE THE IRAN MISSILE ISSUE IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. PRIMAKOV SAID IN THAT CASE, HE COULD CALL KOVALYOV AND SEE IF THE INVITATION MIGHT BE ISSUED TO THE DCI INSTEAD. THE MINISTER CONTINUED, STATING THAT "YOU SENT WISNER OUT ON THIS ISSUE AND WE AGREED. THEN I ASKED THAT YELTSIN AGREE TO SHOW OUR OPERATIONAL MATERIALS TO THE FBI OR IF YOU WANT THE CIA, BUT I CANNOT WORK IT OUT FOR YOU TO VISIT ALL THE FACTORIES OR SET UP VERIFICATION SYSTEMS EVERYWHERE. LET'S GET THIS ISSUE BEHIND US. IT IS BEGINNING TO HARM RELATIONS OR IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DO SO. I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT SOME ARE SAYING THAT YOU ARE TRYING TO CONTROL OUR FACTORIES." HE SAID SEVERAL TIMES "WE'RE GETTING FED UP WITH THIS AND I'M PERSONALLY GETTING FED UP WITH IT."

7. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY RESPONDED SAYING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP WORKING THE PROBLEM UNTIL WE FIND A COMMON SOLUTION. THE IRAN MISSILE ISSUE IS A GRAVE PROBLEM, BUT THE WISNER-KOPTEV MECHANISM HAS THE PROMISE OF BEING A SOLUTION, IF THE RUSSIAN SIDE IS PREPARED TO ACCELERATE AND INTENSIFY THE WORK OF THAT MECHANISM. TALBOTT SAID HE WOULD PASS TO WASHINGTON THE PROPOSAL ON A KOVALYOV MEETING, PERHAPS WITH THE DCI, ALONG WITH HIS PERSONAL RECOMMENDATION THAT THE PROPOSAL BE ACCEPTED AS LONG AS IT WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WHATEVER CONTACTS OCCURRED BETWEEN KOVALYOV AND THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN INTERLOCUTOR WOULD BE "SUPPLEMENTARY TO AND SUPPORTIVE OF" THE WISNER-KOPTEV MECHANISM, AND NOT IN ANY WAY A SUBSTITUTE FOR WISNER-KOPTEV. (MAMEDOV INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT: "DON'T WORRY! WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ANY SUCH THING. WISNER AND KOPTEV ARE GOING STEADY, BUT KOVALYOV AND TENET WILL JUST HAVE A ONE-NIGHT STAND.") AS FOR PRIMAKOV'S BEING "FED UP," TALBOTT SAID THAT HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT EXASPERATION AND FRUSTRATION ARE NOT THE ANSWER - HARD WORK IN GOOD FAITH, ALONG WITH A SHARED RECOGNITION OF THE CHALLENGE TO THE RELATIONSHIP AND TO COMMON INTERESTS, ARE THE ONLY

ANSWER.

8. PRIMAKOV REPLIED THAT THE KEY POINT IS THAT HE HAS DONE ALL HE SAID HE WOULD, BUT THAT NEVER SEEMS TO BE ENOUGH - "YOU KEEP ASKING FOR MORE; WE DON'T SEE WHAT YOU WANT HERE... I HAVE REPORTED TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN; I TOLD HIM THIS IS A SERIOUS ISSUE; I SAID WE NEED TO TRY TO PUT AN END TO IT. I THEN PROPOSED THAT WE ASK THE FSB TO SHARE THEIR MATERIALS AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDED 'OKAY, CALL THEM.'" PRIMAKOV CONTINUED THAT HE HAS NO DOUBT IRAN IS SEEKING TO BUILD MISSILES. HE SAID HE KNEW THIS WAS GOING TO HAPPEN AND HE KNOWS RUSSIA WILL NOT HELP. HE REPEATED AGAIN THAT THAT HELP "IS NOT FROM US." AT THIS POINT PRIMAKOV LEFT THE ROOM TO TRY TO CALL FSB DIRECTOR KOVALEV. ON HIS RETURN, HE PICKED UP, SAYING THAT KOVALEV WAS OUT OF THE CITY BUT HE WOULD GET TO HIM SOON. HE CONCLUDED THESE REMARKS BY SAYING THAT IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO TELL THE SVR WHAT IS BEING DONE, ESPECIALLY IF KOVALYOV EXTENDS THE INVITATION TO THE DCI.

9. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HONESTLY BELIEVES THAT IF WE RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, THE MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY WILL LOOK BACK ON THIS NOT AS A "NEAR DEATH EXPERIENCE" BUT AS A DEMONSTRATION OF OUR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH A VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE IN A NEW WAY. IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS STRONGER. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL HE HAD MADE WAS A BOLD STEP AND THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON. BUT THE IMPORTANT THING ABOUT A KOVALEV-TENET MEETING - LIKE THE NEXT ROUND OF THE WISNER-KOPTEV MECHANISM - IS NOT/NOT SIMPLY TO GET THESE PEOPLE TOGETHER BUT TO TRANSACT REAL BUSINESS IN REAL TIME, AND THAT MEANS WITH URGENCY.

10. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CONCLUDED THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON TO OBTAIN A RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL. PRIMAKOV REACTED, SAYING IF THE U.S. DID NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL, HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE AMERICAN PROCESS, THAT HE WOULD NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT THE ISSUE WAS BEING RESOLVED. TALBOTT REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOT A QUESTION OF SAYING WE HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE MINISTER'S PROPOSAL. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND THE MINISTER WANT TO END THE IRAN MISSILE PROBLEM, THAT THEY WANT TO PUT IT BEHIND US. THE WAY TO DO THAT IS TO EMPOWER FRANK WISNER AND YURI KOPTEV AND TO MAKE THE PROCESS THEY HAVE STARTED EFFECTIVE. THE WISNER-KOPTEV MEETING BEFORE THE JUST-CONCLUDED GCC MEETING HAD BEEN A "SOLID BEGINNING - BUT ONLY A

BEGINNING."

11. TALBOTT ASKED AS A FOLLOW-UP WHETHER KOPTEV WILL BE ABLE TO RECEIVE WISNER AGAIN THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 27. THE ACCELERATED TIMETABLE WILL BE A USEFUL SIGN OF SERIOUSNESS AND WILL HELP TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE LIMITED TIME WE HAVE TO GET A GRIP ON THE PROBLEM. IN THE MEANTIME, WE HOPE EVERYTHING CAN BE DONE TO ENSURE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO SAY THE NEXT MEETING IS SUCCESSFUL. SUCCESS SHOULD BE DEFINED AS SOLID, SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON IDENTIFYING PROBLEMATIC ACTIVITIES AND ESTABLISHING PROMPT, DEMONSTRABLE, VERIFIABLE CESSATION OF THAT ACTIVITY. (AT THIS POINT PRIMAKOV AGAIN LEFT THE ROOM TO TAKE A CALL AND RETURNED TO REPORT THAT KOVALEV WILL WRITE BUT WILL SEE ONLY AN OFFICIAL AT THE DIRECTOR LEVEL.)

12. PRIMAKOV AGAIN RAISED A CAUTION WITH REGARD TO WHO WOULD MEET KOVALEV. HE SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE, THE RUSSIAN SIDE IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE CONTACTS BUT A PROBLEM CAN ARISE IF THE U.S. HAS THE CIA AS THE COUNTERPART FOR KOVALEV. "YOU MAY GET A REQUEST FROM THE SVR CHIEF AT SOME POINT FOR MATERIALS THAT ARE GOING TO BE A PROBLEM FOR YOU. BUT THE DECISION IS YOURS." THE FSB WILL BE SHOWING MATERIALS THAT ARE THEIR OPERATIONAL DOCUMENTS. THAT IS "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATERIAL," SO THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE ARE QUITE COMPLICATED.

13. TALBOTT RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE WAS COMPLICATED FOR ALL CONCERNED, BUT THAT THE U.S. WAS DETERMINED TO LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED. HE REPEATED THAT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE KOVALEV INVITATION, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR PRIMAKOV TO COMMUNICATE TO YELTSIN AND OTHER RELEVANT OFFICIALS THE U.S. URGING FOR THE NEXT WISNER-KOPTEV MEETING TO TAKE PLACE THE WEEK OF OCT. 27. WISNER AND KOPTEV HAD HAD A PROMISING MEETING BUT THE PROCESS MUST NOT ONLY BE CONTINUED BUT STEPPED UP. OUR OBJECTIVE NOW IS TO TURN IT INTO A QUIET WORKING PROCESS THAT IS DEALING WITH A STRATEGIC PROBLEM WITH URGENCY AND SERIOUSNESS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL NEED TO FIND A WAY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CONTINUED, TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE PUBLICLY. IN DOING SO, HE SAID HE WOULD STATE THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE FOUND COMMON GROUND AND AGREED TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION, THAT WE ARE WORKING ON THAT GOAL TOGETHER, AND THAT WE ARE OBVIOUSLY WORKING ON THE ISSUE OF IRAN. AT THIS POINT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV SHOWED PRIMAKOV THE WISNER-KOPTEV REPORT TO PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN AND THE VICE PRESIDENT, POINTING OUT THAT THESE WERE THE PRINCIPLE POINTS KOPTEV AND

WISNER AGREED SHOULD BE MADE IN PUBLIC. (COMMENT: PRIMAKOV SEEMED TO BE SEEING THE WISNER-KOPEV JOINT REPORT FOR THE FIRST TIME. AT HIS WALNUT ROOM MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY IN NEW YORK, HE HAD PRODUCED A UNILATERAL KOPEV REPORT FROM WHICH HE HAD READ SELECTED PASSAGES INTENDED TO EXCULPATE RUSSIA AND DOWNPLAY WHATEVER TRANSFERS HAD TAKEN PLACE.)

14. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY THEN STATED HE MUST UNDERScore THE IRAN-LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF A GAZPROM CONTRACT WITH IRAN. IT WAS A MATTER BOTH OF CLINTON ADMINISTRATION POLICY AND OF U.S. LAW TO OPPOSE AND DISCOURAGE ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH IRAN THAT COULD ENABLE IRAN MORE RAPIDLY TO PURSUE ITS WMD AND BALLISTIC MISSILE ASPIRATIONS. PRIMAKOV REACTED WITH SOME HEAT, ACCUSING THE U.S. OF APPLYING A "DOUBLE STANDARD" TO RUSSIA VERSUS FRANCE AND OTHER EUROPEANS. HE SAID, "I UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU AGREED THAT YOU WON'T ACT AGAINST THE EU. IF THE U.S. TAKES ACTION AGAINST GAZPROM, YOU NEED TO BE CLEAR THAT IT WILL BE SEEN AS AN ANTI-RUSSIA ACT. RUSSIA CANNOT ACCEPT THE EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY THE U.S. IS EXERTING. IF THIS IS PURSUED, I CAN ASSURE YOU, HE CONCLUDED, THAT THERE ARE MANY IN THE DUMA ONLY TOO READY TO PASS LAWS OF THEIR OWN. AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN WILL HAVE GOOD REASON TO QUESTION MUCH OF WHAT HE HAS HEARD FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON GOING BACK TO VANCOUVER BUT CERTAINLY IN THEIR RECENT MEETINGS. HOW CAN THE U.S. SAY THAT IT SUPPORTS RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THAT IT REGARDS RUSSIA AS AN EQUAL, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME USING THIS DOUBLE STANDARD IN A DISCRIMINATORY AND PUNITIVE WAY? WE'RE GOING TO HAVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THAT'S OUR RIGHT. THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE'LL HELP THEM ACQUIRE MISSILES OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. QUITE THE CONTRARY. BUT THESE PRESSURE TACTICS YOU ARE USING, AND THE WAY YOU'RE USING THEM, ARE QUITE THREATENING TO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS."

15. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD BE EQUALLY CANDID: THERE IS A DIFFERENCE HERE BETWEEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF GAZPROM AND TOTAL, AND THIS DIFFERENCE TAKES US BACK TO THE ORIGINAL SUBJECT OF IRAN'S MISSILES. THE REALITY IS THAT UNLESS WE CAN FIND A WAY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE MISSILE ISSUE, GAZPROM WILL BE SEEN AND DEALT WITH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RUSSIA'S OVERALL ACTIVITY TOWARD IRAN, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM FRANCE'S. PRIMAKOV MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE IRAN MISSILE ISSUE IS A MAJOR AND EXACERBATING FACTOR IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT.

16. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS PREPARING TO SEND A SPECIALIST ON THE LAW, BILL RAMSAY,

TO MOSCOW TO CONSULT ABOUT ILSA AND ITS APPLICATION. PRIMAKOV RETORTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT "PUSH RUSSIA INTO A CORNER. IF YOU INSIST ON CHARGING US WITH HELPING WITH MISSILES, HOW DO WE GET OUT OF THE CORNER? WE NEED TO BRING AN END TO THE ISSUE, AND WE AGREE ON THAT. BUT IT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER IF YOU WANTED TO TRY TO DISRUPT RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN. IF YOU WANT TO FIGHT EUROPE ON THIS, SO BE IT, BUT DO NOT TAKE US ON OVER AN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH A NEIGHBOR. WE DECIDED TO GO FORWARD WITH THE BUSHEHR REACTOR AND WE ASKED YOU TO JOIN IN INSPECTING IT BUT YOU WON'T JOIN."

17. PRIMAKOV CONCLUDED THAT RUSSIA WILL SIMPLY NOT ACCEPT THE APPLICATION OF DOUBLE STANDARDS. "LOOK AT CYPRUS," HE CONTINUED. "WHY IS NO NOTICE GIVEN WHEN FRANCE SELLS MISSILES TO CYPRUS? BUT WHEN RUSSIA SELLS THE S-300 YOU JUMP ON US."

17. 18. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID, "THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO PUSH RUSSIA INTO A CORNER. TO THE CONTRARY, WE SEE THE WISNER-KOPTEV MECHANISM AS A MEANS OF GETTING OUT OF A CORNER IN WHICH RUSSIA HAS GOTTEN ITSELF AS A RESULT OF THE ACTIVITIES IN QUESTION. MORE GENERALLY, A BETTER METHAPHOR FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP IS TO SEE IT AS AN EFFORT TO STEER TOGETHER BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS. ON ONE SIDE, WE KNOW THERE ARE AREAS WHERE YOU SEE THE U.S., OR BELIEVE THE U.S., IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A WEAK RUSSIA. WE WANT TO AVOID THIS. BUT ON THE OTHER SIDE, THERE ARE ACTIVITIES AND FORCES AT WORK WHICH, IF NOT BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AND KEPT IN CHECK, WILL CONFIRM THE WORST SUSPICIONS ABOUT RUSSIA AND WHAT IT IS UP TO. WITH REGARD TO IRAN, YOU KEEP SAYING THAT NOTHING HAS TRANSPIRED THROUGH GOVERNMENT CHANNELS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN. EVEN BY PUTTING IT THAT WAY, YOU'RE IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THINGS ARE GOING ON THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS THAT GIVE RISE TO OUR CONCERNS. AND WHEN THIS SORT OF ACTIVITY COMES OUT, IT IS BOTH A STRATEGIC DANGER AND A POLITICAL DANGER. WE HAVE WORKED TO FIND A WAY TO DEFUSE THE MISSILE ISSUE IN THAT CONTEXT."

19. PRIMAKOV RETURNED TO THE FRAY. HE SAID HE WANTED TO REITERATE THAT RUSSIA WILL NOT DISRUPT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND WILL NOT HAVE THEM DISRUPTED. RUSSIA AND THE U.S. AGREED ON THE ISSUE OF MILITARY RELATIONS. THAT AGREEMENT IS FIRM, AND THERE WILL BE NO S-300 SALE TO IRAN, FOR EXAMPLE. WHEN IT COMES TO IRAN ACQUIRING MISSILES AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION "WE ARE NOT FOOLS. WE DON'T WANT TO CREATE THIS FOR A NEIGHBORING

COUNTRY. YOU DON'T SEEM TO BELIEVE THIS," HE CONTINUED. "IF YOU WANT KOPTEV-WISNER, OKAY, BUT WE ALSO KNOW WHEN THERE IS AN EFFORT TO PRESSURE US."

20. PRIMAKOV CONTINUED: "THE ISRAELIS DON'T LIKE THE U.S. TO HAVE A MORE BALANCED POLICY ABOUT THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS. THEREFORE THEY ARE RAISING IRAN AND THEN THEY RAISE RUSSIA. THIS IS AN EFFORT TO PRESSURE THE U.S." PRIMAKOV ALSO RENEWED THE CHARGE THAT THE U.S. IS PROVIDING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE TALIBAN. TALBOTT RESPONDED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL WE DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE. HE REITERATED THAT IT IS NOT AN ISSUE HERE OF ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH OR QUESTIONING THE WORD OF RUSSIA'S LEADERSHIP - RATHER IT IS A MATTER OF ESTABLISHING THE FACTS TOGETHER, AND BEING CANDID ABOUT WHAT WE SEE WITH OUR OWN EYES, AND SQUARING THOSE FACTS WITH RUSSIA'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE ASSURANCES THAT THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN TO THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT. THE FACT IS SOME RUSSIAN ENTITIES HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN PROVIDING IRAN WITH TECHNOLOGY OR MATERIEL THAT HAS ACCELERATED THEIR MISSILE PROGRAM. "THE BOTTOM LINE IS, EQUIPMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND PEOPLE ARE GOING TO IRAN AND SERVING THE IRANIAN MISSILE PROGRAM. WE NEED TO DEAL WITH IT.. YOU HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE OF TALIBAN WITH US. THE U.S. IS NOT PROVIDING ANY ASSISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN. WE ARE PREPARED TO TALK TO YOU FURTHER ON THAT." PRIMAKOV INJECTED, "CAN YOU GIVE US A FULL PICTURE ABOUT ISRAEL? ABOUT PAKISTAN? NO, OF COURSE YOU CAN'T." HE SAID, "BUT EVEN SO WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH YOU ON IRAN."

21. PRIMAKOV THEN READ FROM THE KOPTEV-WISNER REPORT TO CHERNOMYRDIN AND THE VICE PRESIDENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF INFORMATION BEING PROVIDED. HE SAID WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS BUT THE IMPRESSION IS THE U.S. IS TRYING TO BUILD PRESSURE AGAINST RUSSIA. WHEN TALBOTT RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE, NONETHELESS, IS REAL, PRIMAKOV PICKED UP ANOTHER REPORT. THIS ONE APPARENTLY FROM THE FSB. "WHAT DO YOU WANT CONCRETELY," PRIMAKOV ASKED. "WE HAVE AGREED TO KOPTEV-WISNER; THE FSB WILL INVITE EXPERTS." "YOU ASKED THAT WE NOT GIVE IRAN TECHNOLOGY, BUT WE WILL NOT DISRUPT ECONOMIC RELATIONS." THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CLOSED THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION BY NOTING AGAIN THAT HE HAD COME NOT JUST TO TALK ABOUT A PROBLEM BUT TO TALK ABOUT A SOLUTION AS WELL, AND THE SOLUTION WAS THE ACCELERATION, INTENSIFICATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE KOPTEV-WISNER PROCESS. THE PROPOSAL THE MINISTER HAD MADE REGARDING AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE FSB AND AN APPROPRIATE U.S. INTERLOCUTOR WAS CONSTRUCTIVE. WE WOULD GET BACK TO

HIM WITH OUR RESPONSE ON AN URGENT BASIS.

22. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY THEN ASKED ABOUT THE MINISTER'S TRIP TO BAKU. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT HE GOT BACK VERY LATE. HE HAD GONE TO BAKU TO PUSH THE AZERBAIJANIS TO RESPOND TO THE MINSK GROUP. HE HAD A COMMITMENT FROM ALIYEV TO PROVIDE HIS PROPOSALS IN WRITTEN FORM. PRIMAKOV COMMENTED THAT ALIYEV IS BASICALLY POINTED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE GROUP AROUND HIM - FORMIN HASANOV AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER QUALAZADE -- WANT TO BREAK OUT OF THE MINSK GROUP FRAMEWORK. PRIMAKOV EXPECTS TO GET AN ANSWER FROM YEREVAN TODAY (WEDNESDAY). THAT WILL COVER THE PROBLEM WITH STEPANOKERT (PRIMAKOV NOTED IN A GENERAL BACK AND FORTH THAT THE PROBLEM IN BAKU INVOLVED, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, EFFORTS BY HASANOV TO MOVE THE ISSUE OF SHUSHA, TO PART ONE OF THE MINSK GROUP DRAFT.) PRIMAKOV... CONTINUED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME GOOD NEWS FROM THE ARMENIAN SIDE WHEN TER PETROSSIAN GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 30 [CHECK DATE]. IT WAS A GOOD STATEMENT, PRIMAKOV SAID. TER PETROSSIAN SAID THERE IS NO MILITARY SOLUTION, THAT THE STATUS QUO IS NOT GOOD FOR ANYONE; THAT KARABAKH WILL NOT GET INDEPENDENCE FROM AZERBAIJAN OR ANNEXATION TO ARMENIA, THAT THERE IS NO PACKAGE SOLUTION, AND THAT WE WILL HAVE TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP. PRIMAKOV SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A COURAGEOUS... STATEMENT. IT WOULD BE A HELP IF THE U.S. WOULD ENCOURAGE THE DIASPORA TO BE MORE SUPPORTIVE.

24. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM OF DIFFICULT PRESSURE ON TER PETROSSIAN, INCLUDING FROM OUTSIDE. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE SHARED PRIMAKOV'S POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF TER PETROSSIAN'S RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS. ONCE AGAIN, IRAN WAS RELEVANT TO THE CONVERATION. THE ISSUE OF ARMENIA'S IRANIAN CONNECTIONS HAD THE POTENTIAL OF UNDERMINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ARMENIA IN THE U.S. PRIMAKOV COMMENTED THAT IF WE CAN GET STEP ONE OF THE MINSK PROJECT, THAT WILL BREAK THE TIES TO IRAN AND WILL LIFT BLOCKADES AT THE TURKISH BORDER. WHEN THE ANSWERS COME IN FROM ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN, PRIMAKOV SAID HE WOULD BE CORRELATING THEM TO SEE WHERE DIFFERENCES AND COINCIDENCES EXISTED. HE THOUGHT SOONER OR LATER IT WAS GOING TO COME DOWN TO HAVING TO PUSH NAGORNO-KARABAKH AS THE PARTY TO THE PROCESS WITH THE MOST UNACCEPTABLE, UNWORKABLE POSITIONS.

25. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD HELP IF PRESIDENT YELTSIN DISCUSSED NAGORNO-KARABAKH WITH CHIRAC WHEN HE VISITS STRASBOURG.

27. PRIMAKOV PICKED UP ON THE MENTION OF PRESIDENT



YELTSIN TO SAY THAT YELTSIN HAD BEEN VERY SATISFIED WITH THE MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AND WITH THE DOCUMENTS THAT EMERGED FROM THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ON START. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT HE HAD WORKED HERE TO ORGANIZE STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS THAT WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE WORK IN NEW YORK. NOW IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP THINGS ON TRACK. IN THAT CONNECTION IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THE U.S. COULD DO ITS BEST IN THE NATO HEARINGS THAT HAD BEGUN TUESDAY TO KEEP THOSE ON TRACK. PRIMAKOV SAID HE HAD TALKED TO DUMA CHAIRMAN SELEZNEV AND TOLD HIM HE WOULD TESTIFY TO THE DUMA ON THE DOCUMENTS FROM NEW YORK. HE AGREED THAT IT IS A GOOD IDEA FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV TO MEET THIS FALL TO TALK THROUGH ISSUES FOR THE SUMMIT NEXT YEAR.

27. AS A CONCLUDING WORD, PRIMAKOV SAID HE WANTED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO KNOW THAT YELTSIN IS IN GOOD FORM, FULLY IN CHARGE. HE HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH CHERNOMYRDIN. THINGS ARE TENSE WITH THE DUMA BUT SELEZNEV IS BEING CAREFUL. NOW YAVLINSKIY IS BEING STRONGLY CRITICAL. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY THANKED THE MINISTER FOR HIS SUMMARY AND SAID THAT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RELATIONSHIP ARE STILL SOUND, INCLUDING THE TIES BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS; SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ALSO FEELS THAT SHE AND PRIMAKOV HAVE DEVELOPED AN EXTREMELY GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP, ENABLING THEM ON BEHALF OF THEIR PRESIDENTS TO DEAL SERIOUSLY AND SUCCESSFULLY WITH EVEN THE TOUGHEST ISSUES. THEY'D DEMONSTRATED THAT IN THE WAY THEY'D HANDLED NATO-RUSSIA IN THE SPRING, AND NOW WE NEEDED TO APPLY THE SAME SORT OF RESOLVE TO THE IRAN MISSILE PROBLEM; WE NEED TO GET THROUGH A DIFFICULT PATCH. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING WITH PRIMAKOV IN PREPARING FOR A GOOD PRESIDENTIAL MEETING NEXT YEAR.

28. POST-SCRIPT: IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS MEETING, AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON, TALBOTT TELEPHONED PRIMAKOV AND SAID THAT THE DCI IS THE APPROPRIATE RECIPIENT OF THE KOVALEV INVITATION. LATER IN THE DAY, AFTER THE DEPUTY SECRETARY COMPLETED A MEETING WITH DEPUTY FM AFANSEVSKY, PRIMAKOV CAME OUT OF HIS OFFICE AND ASKED FOR A FEW MINUTES ALONE. PRIMAKOV SAID THAT KOVALEV HAD AGREED TO INVITE THE DCI, BUT THERE WERE "EXTREME SENSITIVITIES" ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE, "AND NOT JUST IN THE FBS," ABOUT HOW THE U.S. IN GENERAL AND THE DCI IN PARTICULAR WOULD "PLAY" THE VISIT. "IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE NO LEAKS WHATSOEVER. IF THERE ARE LEAKS, THEY WILL RUIN EVERYTHING, ESPECIALLY AFTER LEAKS WE'VE ALREADY SEEN THAT ARE CLEARLY INTENDED TO DISCREDIT NOT JUST KOPTEV BUT THE ENTIRE PROCESS THAT WE'RE TRYING

TO PUT IN PLACE HERE." TALBOTT SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY PRIMAKOV'S MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON AND THAT HE WAS SURE THE U.S. LEADERSHIP WOULD DO ITS PART TO MAKE SURE THAT BOTH THE WISNER-KOPTEV PROCESS AND THE TENET-KOVALYOV CONTACT SERVED THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF SOLVING THE IRAN PROBLEM AS WELL AS THE LARGER PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING U.S. RUSSIAN COOPERATION AND TRUST.