Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia

Published online: 10 Feb 2015.

To cite this article: (2015) Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, The Military Balance, 115:1, 159-206, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2015.996357

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2015.996357

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Chapter Five
Russia and Eurasia

RUSSIA

Modernisation of the Russian armed forces, begun in 2008 under Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and merely adjusted under his successor Sergei Shoigu, continued in 2014. The appointment in May of a new Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General Oleg Salyukov, ended a period with no commander in office, but this was the only major personnel change during the year. It was also a year of relative organisational stability, although preparations began for the creation of a new Joint Strategic Command (OSK) North, based around the navy’s Northern Fleet. Shoigu announced in October that, as part of the expansion of Russia’s military presence in the Arctic, units would be stationed ‘along the entire Arctic Circle’ by the end of the year; Russia has, however, aspired to revive its Arctic presence for some years, as noted in recent issues of The Military Balance. However, much international attention focused on Russian activity in Ukraine, and the performance there, and actions, of its troops.

The practice of ‘snap inspections’ continued, although on a reduced scale. The inspections were first carried out in 2013. Analysis of shortcomings in that year’s inspections led to changes in 2014; in particular, the assessment that there was inadequate training of equipment crews – especially in those crews comprising soldiers serving their one-year conscription term – was addressed by intensifying the combat-training programme. Deficiencies in live-firing routines were dealt with by increasing, by a factor of five to six, munitions allocated for exercises and problems with vehicle handling were addressed by boosting, by a factor of two to three, the training hours allocated for combat-vehicle driving.

Exercises also revealed that the serviceability levels of military equipment were generally unsatisfactory. Serviceability in the air force and the navy was assessed at less than 55%, and in the land forces at less than 65%. This deficiency also led to remedial action. The Oboronservis state corporation, which repairs equipment and provides support functions for military units – and was the subject of corruption allegations linked to the resignation of Serdyukov (see The Military Balance 2013, p. 199) – was radically restructured. Its repair plants and bases became state-industrial corporations, reducing staff numbers from 130,000 to 30,000 in the process. At the same time, first-line equipment-repair and maintenance units were strengthened; some of these had been cut during previous reforms.

Experience in the large-scale redeployment of troops and equipment, which the Russian armed forces had acquired during strategic exercises and large-scale, snap combat-readiness inspections, was put to use in 2014 during the annexation of Crimea. Snap inspections simultaneously mounted in two military districts from 26 February to 3 March provided cover for the covert concentration of incursion forces, as well as providing diversionary political effect. In the fast-paced operation that followed, a mobile group of army special forces, airborne troops and Crimea-based naval infantry, plus motor-rifle and artillery units, was able to concentrate in a peninsula that has no land bridge to Russia. Resupply lines were also successfully established. (The Russian Black Sea Fleet had remained in Crimea under a 1997 agreement with Ukraine; fleet headquarters remain at Sevastopol.)

In comparison with their performance in the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Russian forces in Crimea benefited from improvements in personal equipment, logistics, personnel discipline, electronic-warfare capability and junior-commander training. The military capabilities, tactics, escalation control and integration of state instruments of power with information-warfare tools that the Crimea operation demonstrated – and, seen later, to some degree in eastern Ukraine – were linked by commentators with the earlier public explanation by Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov of the new nature of war, described as ‘non-linear’, ‘hybrid’ or ‘ambiguous’ warfare, among other terms (see pp. 17–20).

Nonetheless, too much focus on the new personal equipment, weapons, vehicles and tactical-communications equipment in evidence during the Crimea mission can be misleading. The troops involved in the operation mainly comprised elite special-operations groups from the Southern Military District
and the Airborne Assault Troops (VDV), which have long been given priority over regular ground forces in terms of training, equipment and funding. Therefore, lessons from the Crimea operation do not reflect the overall state of the Russian armed forces, for which change in these areas has been positive but less striking. Due to the chronic under-manning and conscription issues now characteristic of the Russian Army (see textbox, p. 163), even these elite formations could not be used in their entirety. On the whole, the operation was a test of elite units and special forces, and they performed well.

The annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine led to the worst political confrontation between Russia and the West since the Cold War. Inside Russia, it initiated an examination of existing defence doctrines. This officially began in August 2014 with the establishment of a working group to revise the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, last published in 2010. The new doctrine is expected to be more overtly inimical to NATO and the United States, and will inevitably also lead to changes in the classified State Defence Plan, which was adopted in 2013.

There was no announcement of a further increase in defence spending, not even on rearmament. Russia is facing a general economic slowdown as well as dealing with the effects of international sanctions imposed after its annexation of Crimea; under these conditions, even its current military plans present economic difficulties. By mid-2014, some individuals and sectors had been sanctioned, including sanctions revoking and denying licences for the export of defence and dual-use equipment to Russia, a move implemented by a number of states including the US, the UK and Germany, as well as the EU. Financially driven amendments were announced that affect long-term plans to re-equip Russia’s conventional forces, including the postponement of some programmes into the next funding period (2016–25), and there was a new emphasis on import substitution stemming from sanctions, as well as the loss of component and engine supplies from Ukraine (see textbox, p. 166).

**Land forces**

Last year’s *Military Balance* highlighted the latest changes to the structural reform of Russian ground forces, when two divisions were restored in the Western Military District and the 68th Army Corps was formed in the Russian Far East. The initial results of these changes forced broader revisions to earlier plans. Transitioning from ‘permanent-readiness’ brigades to full divisions with regimental structures proved difficult, primarily because divisions have a much larger establishment. This led Russian defence planners to consider a compromise structure, in which newly established divisional commands would combine two or three current brigades.

These apparently counter-intuitive reversals of earlier reform achievements have been interpreted as a concession to opponents of transformation within the armed forces. However, they have little relevance to the ad hoc battalion task groups that were formed and concentrated near the Ukrainian border during peaks in the confrontation in eastern Ukraine.

Experiments to subdivide ground-force brigades into ‘light’, ‘medium’ and ‘heavy’ were suspended, as implementation proved too difficult. In particular, planners found that the light brigades had to be further subdivided into ‘motor-rifle’, ‘mountain’ and ‘air-mobile’ units, failing to deliver the standardisation originally intended. Subsequently, a large proportion of the brigades intended to be ‘light’ were reassigned en masse from the land forces to the VDV.

(These were the three army air-assault brigades – the 11th, 56th and 83rd Brigades.) Nor has the formal subdivision into ‘medium’ and ‘heavy’ brigades taken place. Differentiation will instead continue on the basis of the type of armoured vehicles used – whether tracked or wheeled – in effect retaining the distinction between armoured and motor-rifle formations. At present it is intended that motor-rifle units will remain largely wheeled, and will be equipped with new infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) based on the Bumerang platform.

In anticipation of the new-design wheeled and tracked vehicle platforms that are due to be introduced in the next few years, re-equipment of the ground forces with newly manufactured armoured vehicles, including the T-90 main battle tank (MBT) or BMP-3 armoured IFV, slowed significantly. However, large-scale deliveries of the wheeled BTR-82A continued. This vehicle has an enhanced weapons fit, including the TKN-04GA day/night sight. Meanwhile, mass modernisation of the T-72B MBT fleet to the T-72B3 standard is also under way. Considerable effort is going into re-equipping the missile brigades, with Iskander replacing the Tochka-U tactical missile, bringing increased strike capability through improvements to range and accuracy.

The first public presentation of the new vehicle platforms is due to take place during the Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2015 in Moscow. The first models
should start to be delivered to the troops for trials in
the same year. Due to be unveiled at the parade are
a tank and a self-propelled gun based on the Armata
platform; a tracked armoured personnel carrier
(APC) and a tracked IFV based on the Kurganets-25
platform; and the Bumerang-based wheeled combat
vehicles intended to replace the BTR APC. Combined
with the Typhoon wheeled logistics vehicle platform,
which formed the basis for vehicles shown at the
2014 parade, these platforms are intended to shape
the capabilities of Russia’s land forces in the coming
decades.

Despite the impressive quantity of new equip-
ment due to take part in the 2015 parade (the plan is,
alysts believe, for 24 vehicles on the Kurganets-25
platform alone to be shown), all of the platforms will
be prototypes and as such not fully representative
of technical configuration or even final appearance.
The complexity of parallel development and testing of
whole new families of combat equipment has led to
inevitable delays in their production timetables (see
pp. 164–67).

**Air force**

Structural reform of the air force has been the most
controversial of the service reforms. The air force has
undergone three waves of major change: reorganisa-
tion into the ‘air base’ system (see The Military Balance
2012, p. 186) and two successive regroupings of these
bases into increasingly larger formations. It was
discovered during snap inspections, and a review of
the Serdyukov–Makarov ‘new look’ reforms, that the
resulting class-one ‘mega air bases’, dispersed over
four to seven airfields and combining different fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft types, were ineffective. The
overly cumbersome structure, compounded by a
weakened staff component in comparison to the pre-
reform aviation divisions and corps, failed to provide
sufficient command-and-control and combat readi-
ness. As a result, the reform was abandoned and the
original division–regiment structure reinstated.

Aerospace-defence brigades, however, retain their
post-2008 structure and army-aviation reform remains
incomplete, with ‘air bases’ retained alongside new
army-aviation brigades, which are continuing to be
formed. At present, army-aviation units report to
the Air and Air-Defence Forces Command in each
Operational Strategic Command.

Progress in delivering new equipment to the air
force has been far more successful. In 2013, 56 new
and upgraded fixed-wing aircraft, 122 helicopters
and two regiments’ worth of S-400 surface-to-air
missile systems were delivered. By the end of 2014,
the air force was due to receive another 220 fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft. Research work on the develop-
ment of the PAK DA future strategic bomber also
started in 2014. This new long-range aircraft will
reportedly be subsonic and of a ‘flying wing’ design
reminiscent of the US B-2 Spirit bomber. The current
target is to begin testing prototypes in 2019, for entry
into service in 2025.

Air-force testing of Russia’s fifth-generation PAK
FA combat aircraft is officially scheduled to begin in
2016, though ‘captive carry’ trials of air-to-air and
air-to-surface weapons on external hardpoints have
already begun. Despite intense lobbying by the mili-
tary-industrial complex, the defence ministry has not
yet expressed interest in developing or procuring a
lighter fifth-generation fighter based on concepts
proposed by the MiG design bureau. This project is
at an early stage and is being led by the bureau on its
own initiative, though efforts could be stepped up if a
foreign customer emerges.

The delivery of new, modern aircraft has exacer-
bated problems with the pace of delivery of precision-
guided air weapons. At present, new non-nuclear
munitions for long-range aviation, such as the Kh-101
and Kh-32 cruise missiles, have still not entered
service. The Kh-555 (AS-15C Kent) programme,
however, has been successful, allowing Shoigu to
announce a radical increase in long-range cruise
missile purchases. Analysts estimate that the number
of Kh-555s is projected to increase, by 2020, by a factor
of 30 from the current undisclosed figure.

The air force still lacks its own fleet of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). A number of domestically
produced UAV models are now in service, but the
vast majority of the more than 500 systems available
to the Russian armed forces are concentrated in the
land forces and the airborne troops. These are light
models for tactical reconnaissance, none of which
have strike capabilities. This situation should change
with the launch of development work on a family of
three strike UAVs (with a take-off weight of one
tonne, five tonnes and 20 tonnes) commissioned by
the defence ministry for the air force. MiG’s Skat
unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) concept
was superseded by a 20-tonne UCAV being devel-
oped by Sukhoi with MiG as a subcontractor, which
is planned to fly by 2018. UCAVs of this class have
a range and combat payload comparable to manned
strike aircraft.
Figure 7  Equipment Analysis: Russian Flanker Combat Aircraft Development

The Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker family has become a centrepiece of Russian tactical aviation. This comes after a difficult start; the prototype aircraft underwent complete redesign in the late 1970s to address performance shortcomings. The aircraft has developed from a single-role to a multi-role fighter with greatly improved combat performance including in the detection and engagement ranges of potential targets. Originally intended for the export arena, the Russian air force ordered 48 Su-35s in 2009, and deliveries should be completed during 2015. An additional order for a further 48 is widely anticipated. The Su-35 will see service likely well into the 2030s as a complement to the air force’s fifth-generation fighter, being developed under the Sukhoi T-50 programme.

**Sukhoi Su-35S Flanker** (introduced 2013)

- IRBIS passive electronically scanned array radar
- Revised airframe construction and materials compared to Su-27B
- Increased use of aluminium-lithium alloys and composites
- Digital cockpit
- OLS-35 infrared search and track
- 12 hardpoints for weapons carriage
- Increased vertical fin area
- KSU-35 digital flight control system
- Claimed detection range against a 3m$^2$ radar cross-section target 400–400km. 90km detection range against a 0.01m$^2$ RCS target
- 2 x 117S turbofan engines each rated at 14,500kg in afterburner, 8,800kg max dry power
- Thrust-vectoring nozzles
- OLS-35 infrared search and track, 90km plus detection range (target from rear)

**Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker** (introduced 1985)

- Analogue cockpit displays
- N001 Slotback radar
- Digital cockpit
- 2 x AL-31F turbofan engines each rated at 12,500kg in afterburner, 7,700kg max dry power
- Thrust-vectoring nozzles
- OLS-27 infrared search and track, 50km detection range (target from rear)
- 10 hardpoints for weapons carriage
- AL-31F engine – convergent/divergent nozzles
- Beryoza radar warning receiver
- Sorbtsiya electronic countermeasures (wing-tip pod mounted)

### Su-27
- Radar: N001 Slotback air-to-air only, detection range 80km (est.) against a 3m$^2$ radar cross-section target
- Analogue cockpit
- 2 x AL-31F turbofan engines each rated at 12,500kg in afterburner, 7,700kg max dry power
- OLS-27 infrared search and track, 50km detection range (target from rear)
- 10 hardpoints:
  - Short-range AAMs: R-73 (AA-11 Archer) short-range air-to-air missile, maximum range 90km
  - Medium-range AAMs: R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) family of semi-active, radar-guided, infrared guided and passive AAMs. Semi-active radar-guided R-27ER (AA-10C), max range against a fighter 60km, 90–100km against a large aircraft. Passive-homing R-27EP (AA-10F), 110km max range
  - No active radar-guided AAM
  - Air-to-Surface: mix of unguided bombs and rockets

### Su-35S
- Radar: IRBIS passive electronically scanned array multi-mode air-to-air and air-to-surface.
- Digital cockpit
- 2 x 117S turbofan engines each rated at 14,500kg in afterburner, 8,800kg max dry power
- Thrust-vectoring nozzles
- OLS-35 infrared search and track, 90km plus detection range (target from rear)
- 12 hardpoints:
  - R-73 and K-74M2 (R-73 upgrade), maximum range 40km
  - Alamo family plus R-77-1 (AA-12B Adder) active radar-guided medium-range AAM, max range 110km. Also possibly the K-77M, a further development of the basic R-77
  - Long-range AAM: R-37M (AA-13 Axehead) long-range radar-guided AAM (known as RVV-BD for export). This missile is being offered for the Su-35S. Max range is est. 280km (200km for RVV-BD)
- Air-to-Surface includes: Kh-38 family of medium-range air-to-surface missiles, Kh-31PM (AS-17C Krypton) anti-radiation missile, Kh-59M family (AS-18 Kazoo), variety of precision-guided bombs

© IISS
Personnel issues

The Russian armed forces continue to suffer the effects of personnel problems noted in *The Military Balance 2013*. Demographic pressure combined with the reduction in the conscript service term to one year, as well as ongoing challenges in recruiting professional servicemen and women, meant that at the beginning of 2014 the services were only 82% manned – a shortage of nearly 200,000 personnel. Despite exceeding contract-service recruitment targets for 2013, this problem persisted throughout 2014, leading to a reduction in 2014 recruitment plans.

The total number of contract-service soldiers was intended to reach 240,000 by the end of 2014. These mainly staff the combat sub-units of the Airborne Assault Troops (VDV) and other special-operations forces, although they also work on submarines and other complex or costly equipment. Support and artillery sub-units, however, remain largely conscript-manned, including those in VDV divisions. As a consequence, even elite formations are suffering from the introduction of the one-year conscription term. Special-forces units, for example, could not be deployed in full to Crimea in 2014, as they included a contingent of conscripts only drafted the previous autumn. These troops had been in the armed forces for less than six months at that point and had to remain behind. As a result, these units could field no more than two-thirds of their official strength.

Plans to increase the number of contract-service personnel to 350,000 by 2015 have been announced. This would require a recruitment campaign of unprecedented scale, bringing in 150,000 new contract-service personnel for the army within a year – significantly higher than both the 2013 and 2014 recruitment figures. The intention is to fill contract posts in the VDV, increase numbers in the land forces more broadly and put contract-service personnel in 75% of semi-skilled posts, such as combat-vehicle drivers and maintenance staff.

Strong Russian public support for operations in Crimea has boosted the armed forces’ popularity, adding to the prestige of military service, and contributed to much-improved morale and a renewed sense of purpose within the services. Furthermore, salary improvements have helped recruitment by providing highly competitive remuneration. Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that the ambitious recruitment plan can be fulfilled within one year. Analysts suggest that the long-established pattern of failing to meet unrealistic contract-recruitment targets will persist.

Meanwhile, improved results have been reported for conscription. The spring 2014 draft brought in 154,000 personnel, with an apparent 20% reduction in evasion. From autumn 2014, recruits with a higher level of education have the option of serving on superior contract terms for two years instead of completing the mandatory one-year conscription period.

Increased attention to training reserves was a major new initiative. A special Reserves Command was formed at the end of 2013 in each of the four military districts. These are responsible for the training and mobilisation of reservists as well as the maintenance of equipment at storage depots; and for using these reserves and equipment to deploy full-strength combat units during mobilisation. They are a major departure from the previous practice, whereby call-up offices and the commanders of active brigades and divisions were responsible for mobilisation. The new system should relieve these commanders of a number of associated tasks. It can also be seen as a response to changes in armed forces’ staffing in recent years, which has led to fewer trained reservists being available after conscript service, and therefore more care required in their management.

In addition, the new commands will be responsible for new types of reserves, such as a voluntary high-readiness reserve made up of those who have recently completed military service. In the first phase, in 2015, the defence ministry plans to recruit 8,600 of this type of reservist, primarily in specialist trades.
2013. This has forced a series of at least five further tests, to be carried out between 2014 and 2016.

The most significant modernisation projects in naval aviation are the replacement of the Su-24 Fencer ground-attack aircraft with the multi-role Su-30SM and the delivery of MiG-29K/KUB fighters to the Northern Fleet’s shipborne-aviation regiment. However, the planned delivery of several dozen helicopters for the new Mistral-class amphibious-assault ships’ air wings, including 32 navalised Ka-52K Hokums, is in doubt following the French decision to suspend the warship’s delivery amid pressure after the annexation of Crimea.

Strategic Rocket Forces
The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) remain the service least affected by Russia’s military transformation programme. Most of the changes experienced by the service have related to rearmament. Deputy Defence Minister Yurii Borisov confirmed in 2014 that research-and-development work was under way for the Sarmat, a new heavy, liquid-fuel, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This missile is viewed in Russia as a response to the deployment of foreign missile-defence systems. Its increased thrust-to-weight ratio should allow the use of different strike trajectories, making it harder and more expensive to intercept. However, such ICBMs are a distant prospect, with analysts assessing little progress likely before 2020. The SRF’s current focus is deploying the light, solid-fuel RS-24 Yars missile, in road-mobile and silo-based versions. Problems with serial production have been resolved, with three regiments at once scheduled to be re-equipped with Yars in 2014. The RS-26, a newer ICBM, is planned to enter service from 2015.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Defence Spending
As noted in The Military Balance 2014, the percentage of Russian GDP devoted to defence spending has been steadily increasing, and in 2014 it rose to almost 3.5% of GDP from 3.15% the previous year. According to the draft federal budget sent to the State Duma at the end of September, in 2015 there will be a large increase to more than 4.2% of GDP, falling to 3.7% in 2016 and 3.6% in 2017. The elevated level of military spending in 2015, an increase in real terms of more than 25%, is explained in part by a decision to dispense with state-guaranteed credits as a means of funding the state defence order, likely because economic sanctions have made external borrowing more difficult. The projected defence budget in 2015 will be R3.3 trillion (US$88.3bn), compared with R2.5tr (US$70bn) in 2014 and R2.1tr (US$66.1bn) in 2013.

State Armaments Programme
The current high spending levels can be explained almost entirely by Russia’s commitment to fund as fully as possible the ambitious State Armaments Programme to 2020, at least during the first five years (2011–15). From the outset it was envisaged that almost one-third of total funding (of more than R20tr, or around US$436.5bn) would be allocated during those five years; available evidence indicates that this will be achieved, notwithstanding the faltering Russian economy. It is possible that the Ukraine conflict and economic sanctions have reinforced the spending commitment for 2015, however some planned procurement for 2016 and 2017 has been postponed until a later date. The reason given was the inability of Russia’s defence industry to cope with the large volume of orders. While this is a plausible explanation, it is likely that there may also have been concerns that defence was becoming too heavy a burden on the state budget. Nonetheless, with such a large budgetary increase planned for 2015, the problem of limited defence-industrial capacity will likely be encountered during the year.

According to the armaments programme, by the end of 2020 at least 70% of equipment will be ‘modern’, although the precise definition of this remains unclear. To date, implementation has been uneven (see Table 4, p. 167). While the procurement of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has generally been successful, this has not been the case
for submarine-launched ballistic-missile development, due to problems with the Bulava missile and delays in building and commissioning new ballistic-missile submarines. In addition, the construction of attack submarines and large surface naval vessels has lagged behind schedule. Progressively greater numbers of new combat aircraft and helicopters have been received, and the introduction of the S-400 air-defence system has been proceeding steadily, though there are doubts whether the level of development of the new S-500 system will allow significant procurement before 2020. The ground forces have received little new equipment and much now depends on development of the new Armata-class heavy armoured-vehicle platform and the Kurganets and Bumerang vehicle families, scheduled to enter production in 2015–16.

An update of the existing State Armaments Programme to 2025 is under way, with the schedule for 2016–25 due for presidential approval by the end of 2015. The lack of an approved long-term economic forecast and long-term budget strategy has hampered this update. Before the Ukraine conflict, and the deterioration of relations with Western states, there was a clearly stated intention to moderate the pace of armaments renewal after 2020, with discussion about reorienting the defence industry towards modernising the civilian economy. However, the new strategic landscape may lead to a reinforced commitment to military modernisation, albeit at a more moderate pace than the past five years.

**Defence industry**

Russia’s defence industry is experiencing improved funding levels due to sustained increases in order volumes in recent years. Pay rates have been rising, permitting better retention and recruitment of new personnel. The workforce is once again expanding and the average age has been falling. Investment has increased sharply, boosted by both improved company earnings and funding under the classified programme entitled Development of the Defence-Industrial Complex to 2020, of which a new version is being drafted. Many industrial enterprises producing end-product armaments, especially those prioritised in the State Armaments Programme, are now undergoing major modernisation and re-equipment, mainly with imported machine tools and other capital
goods. In addition, the volume of research and development funding within, and for, the defence industry has increased significantly, and basic defence-sector research is being introduced within the framework of the Fund for Advanced Research, founded in October 2012.

Earnings from arms exports provided the principal source of funding for many defence industries until recently, with Russia second only to the US in terms of sales volume. In 2013, Russia reported US$15.7bn in ‘military-technical cooperation’, but of this total, end-product arms sales accounted for only around 60%, the rest being spares, components and military-services provision. However, with domestic procurement taking priority, some Russian companies are encountering capacity constraints, and it is likely that the growth of arms exports will moderate. Rosoboronexport, responsible for 85% of exports, is forecasting sales of little more than US$13bn over the next two to three years, similar to the export volume achieved in 2013.

In 2006, oversight of the defence industry was handed to the government’s Military-Industrial Commission (MIC). This commission, unlike its Soviet forerunner, was principally a coordinating body, with limited authority to resolve differences between the defence ministry and industry, or within the domestic arms industry itself. The MIC’s principal role is to develop plans for the modernization of the defence-industrial production base, and to work with other sectors of the economy to ensure that the military obtains the equipment and materiel it requires. The MIC is also responsible for developing a defence industrial policy and conducting research into new military technologies. However, its effectiveness has been limited by the lack of sustained funding and the lack of coordination with other government agencies.

The Ukraine crisis & Russia’s defence industry in 2014

The conflict in Ukraine posed new problems for Russia’s defence industry, in particular the decision by Ukraine’s new president, Petro Poroshenko, to prohibit all military cooperation with Russia. While the overall volume of Ukrainian military deliveries to Russia has been relatively modest, there are several major dependencies that could create difficulties. The most significant are Ukraine’s significant role as a supplier of engines for some Russian-built helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, the supply of power units for ships (including some of the new surface vessels now being built under the State Armaments Programme) and the role of Ukrainian enterprises in keeping Russia’s RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) heavy ICBMs in operational use. The Russian government has either adopted an import substitution programme to secure domestic production of military materiel currently supplied by Ukraine, or it has turned to Belarus to augment supply chains. Additionally, some Ukrainian aircraft- and shipbuilding-sector workers are reported to have transferred to Russia following the loss of their jobs, although the extent and impact that this influx of skilled labour will have on Russian defence production is unclear. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that Russia will need two to three years to achieve independence from Ukrainian inputs, but this is probably overly optimistic. Full import substitution will require billions of dollars’ worth of investment, and will likely take at least five to ten years to achieve.

Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on the defence sector – including measures against specific Russian companies – are unlikely to have a significant impact on the implementation of the State Armaments Programme, principally because there has been no far-reaching defence-industrial integration with Western states. More significant threats to Russia’s military-modernisation efforts are moves by the West to restrict its access to dual-use technologies. Russia’s defence industry will likely be hard hit by a cessation of European electronic-component imports, and may come to rely more heavily on China and other Asian producers for substitutes. Russia’s ambitious programme to modernise its defence-industrial production base will also be affected. With few exceptions, the domestic machine-tool industry is unable to produce the advanced equipment required. Consequently, Russian defence-industrial plants have been buying advanced machine tools and other production equipment in significant quantities from leading European, Japanese and US firms, and the state-owned arms manufacturer Rostec Corporation has been organising joint enterprises with some of these companies in Russia.
the defence sector itself. From 10 September 2014, responsibility for the MIC passed to the Presidential Administration, with President Vladimir Putin as chairperson, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin (previously chair) as deputy chair and Yurii Borisov, deputy defence minister for armaments, as secretary. It is likely that this move will lead to the MIC having powers similar to those enjoyed by its Soviet forerunner. Before this decision, two specialist agencies involved in arms acquisition – Rosoboronpostavka, which procures about a third of all military hardware for the defence ministry, and Rosoboronzakaz, which monitors all procurement activity – were dissolved and their powers transferred to the defence and industry ministries, and to other government departments. In effect, these measures restored key features of the Soviet system of arms procurement.

The previous defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, had attempted to change the arms acquisition system to enhance the power of the defence ministry as a customer, weakening the dominance of defence-industry suppliers – a legacy of the Soviet Union. He also began opening up the arms market to foreign participation, challenging the Soviet-era autarkic orientation. This new policy was symbolised by the 2011 contract to buy two Mistral-class amphibious-assault ships from France. Under the current minister, Sergei Shoigu, this partial internationalisation has been halted, with no new foreign deals, although some contracts that had been agreed were continued, such as the domestic manufacture under licence of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles. Recent political and strategic developments have served to reinforce this reversion to self-reliance.

## CENTRAL ASIA

The trend continues of growing Russian interest in Central Asian security. In May 2014, the Kazakh Parliament ratified the Joint Air-Defence Agreement with Russia. This had been signed in 2013, and headquarters are due to be located at Almaty. In October 2013, and after considerable delay, Tajikistan’s president Emomalii Rahmon signed a decree confirming a 30-year extension to the basing rights for Russia’s 201st Motor-RIfe Division. The division, with some 7,000 troops, is Russia’s largest foreign deployment, mainly at Dushanbe, though Russia maintains additional facilities in Tajikistan at Kulob and Qurghonteppa. Meanwhile, Moscow promised to assist in the modernisation of the Tajik armed forces by providing military-technical assistance. In February, Russia announced the reinforcement of Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan with four additional Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, to join the eight already there. Russia has also tried to professionalise the deployment, by shifting its staffing structure away from conscripts towards contract soldiers. Kyrgyzstan did not offer the United States an extension for its Air Transit Center at Manas, and the base closed on 3

---

Table 4: Russian Arms Procurement 2011–13 & Approximate State Armaments Programme 2020 Objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014 State Defence Order</th>
<th>Total to 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>400+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBMs</td>
<td>20*</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td>15*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Satellites*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>100+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed-wing aircraft</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>850*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which combat aircraft</td>
<td>16*</td>
<td>30*</td>
<td>45*</td>
<td>90*</td>
<td>450*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90*</td>
<td>1,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which combat helicopters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>350*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAVs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-400 air-defence systems (divisions)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic nuclear submarines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-role nuclear submarines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel-electric submarines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 to 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface combat ships*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,300+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskander missile systems (brigades)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimates

Total number, excluding failed launches; *Mainly frigates and corvettes

---

[Downloaded by [RFE/RL Prague Library], [Mr Martina Boudova] at 01:21 11 February 2015]
June 2014 after providing support to US operations in Afghanistan for more than 12 years. There is speculation as to whether the US is seeking alternative basing rights in Uzbekistan, but for the time being a facility at Romania's Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base has replaced those offered at Manas.

Central Asian states have not publicly expressed strong views on Russian intervention in Ukraine. Kazakhstan, with a 6,800km border with Russia and a 25% ethnic-Russian population, is probably the most uneasy; however it is in a very different geopolitical situation to Ukraine and has a close economic relationship with Russia through the emerging Eurasian Economic Union. Kazakhstan’s concerns are partly economic – sanctions that weaken the Russian economy indirectly weaken its own. The Tenge was devalued in February 2014 and additional delays to production in the Kashagan oil field, in the Kazakh zone of the Caspian Sea, could affect confidence in the economy. Downturns in the Russian economy also particularly affect Tajikistan, where approximately 50% of GDP consists of remittances provided by migrant labour in Russia.

The impact of the end of NATO’s combat operations in Afghanistan and the drawdown of personnel and equipment continue to be discussed in Central Asia. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, bordering Afghanistan, may feel the effect of any ongoing instability more than Kazakhstan; though the greatest impact will be felt in Tajikistan, where a porous 1,400km border with Afghanistan makes combating narcotics trafficking a particular challenge. In June 2014 there was further unrest in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, with disturbances related to the narcotics trade, prompting fears of action by Tajik security forces, as happened in 2013.

Russia continues to promote the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a means of reaching low-level security agreements in Central Asia. However, the disparity in economic wealth between the five Central Asian states has led to differing national military capabilities, and the programme of CSTO summits, meetings and exercises places demands on the limited resources of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. (Uzbekistan suspended membership in 2013 and Turkmenistan has never been a member.) Exercise scenarios are generally anti-terrorist-related, though it remains unlikely, analysts assess, that KSOR (the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force) will assist Tajikistan with Afghan border control. In September 2014 President Vladimir Putin submitted to the Duma for ratification a 2009 agreement to create, according to Moscow, ‘a secure command system for the forces and resources of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation collective security system’.

In autumn 2014, Kazakhstan’s Peacekeeping Brigade (KAZBRIG) exercised for the first time in Europe. A company-level deployment was rehearsed, using Kazakh C-295 transport aircraft, and interoperability training with NATO units took place during the Steppe Eagle exercise at Joint Multinational Command Training Centre Hohenfels, Germany. Late in 2013, Kazakhstan passed a law to enable the deployment of Kazakh personnel on UN missions, and, with ambitions for non-permanent UN Security Council membership in 2017, the country retains a desire to improve capability through engagement with NATO.

The third biennial Kazakhstan Defence Equipment Exhibition took place in May 2014, with representatives of 208 companies from 28 countries participating. The defence ministry demonstrated Kazakhstan’s land and air capabilities, which are still based on Russian-built equipment, and made clear an ambition to improve the armed forces’ equipment. The goal to develop joint ventures between state-owned Kazakhstan Engineering and Western companies to enable technology transfer continues, but excessive levels of bureaucracy and a number of high-profile corruption cases, most noticeably with the conviction of a deputy minister of defence, have resulted in companies from outside the Commonwealth of Independent States exercising caution.

UKRAINE

The crisis in Ukraine during 2014 altered the European security landscape, bringing to the fore antagonism between Russia and the West not seen since the Cold War. The broader political and economic factors that had for some years fed this growing distrust on the geopolitical level are analysed in Strategic Survey 2014 (pp. 151–64), but the crisis began as a domestic political dispute in Ukraine in response to the government’s failure to sign an expected Association Agreement with the EU and culminated in a cycle of escalating violence that led on 19–20 February to some 70 anti-government protesters being killed.

As state authority collapsed, President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev, even though a 21 February agreement brokered by the EU and Russia, designed to return Ukraine to the 2004 constitution, meant he
could have stayed in power until at least December. In a constitutionally controversial move, parliament voted on 22 February to remove him from office and change the government, but this new administration significantly shifted the balance of internal Ukrainian regional representation. Two-thirds of Yanukovych’s administration hailed from Ukraine’s south and east. By contrast, 60% of the new administration came from the west of Ukraine.

Russia’s leadership regarded events in Kiev as a coup, and feared that this new administration would move Ukraine rapidly towards EU and NATO membership. Moscow was also concerned for the future of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, headquartered at Sevastopol in Crimea. For President Vladimir Putin, the ‘interests of the Russian nation and the Russian state’ were at stake.

The seizure of Crimea

The Russian decision to deploy force to Crimea was driven by fear of losing its Black Sea Fleet base, but it was also an attempt to coerce Kiev into accommodating broader Russian demands. On 27–28 February, ostensibly pro-Russia militiamen, described as ‘local self-defence forces’, seized the parliament building in Simferopol. However, ‘it was obvious that the operation to seize the Crimean parliament was carried out by an unidentified but very professional special task force’, according to analysts at Moscow’s Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Larger groups of unidentified troops in unmarked uniforms, who took up posts outside Ukrainian military bases and key infrastructure locations, were also clearly well equipped, organised and highly trained; these were also Russian troops, a presence that was denied...
by Moscow until April. Nearly all, analysts believe, were from elite special-operations groups from the Southern Military District and the Airborne Assault Troops (VDV), some inserted covertly in advance, with others subsequently deployed in waves of rotary- and fixed-wing airlift. Personnel were also despatched from the naval infantry units co-located with the Black Sea Fleet.

Ukrainian military personnel at bases in Crimea were instructed by the Russian troops to defect, disarm or surrender but, though warning shots were fired, neither side engaged in combat. Russian troops were evidently under instruction to exercise fire-control and, as far as possible, secure objectives without bloodshed. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops reportedly received conflicting or no orders from a ministry in Kiev that was doubtless struggling to come to terms with the surprise operation, as well as working to unpick details about the strength, objectives and broader intent of the invading force; all this amid a revolutionary situation in the capital and a newly installed cabinet. Internationally, Ukrainian defence officials had to contend with the cognitive dissonance created by the continual, if increasingly unconvincing, denials from Moscow that the so-called 'little green men' were in fact Russian troops.

Under intense pressure, some Ukrainian troops defected while others disarmed and eventually left Crimea. Some Ukrainian helicopters had managed to leave Belbek air base, but other aircraft could not because the runway had been blocked. These included MiG-29 combat aircraft; over half of Ukraine’s MiG-29 fleet had been stationed at Belbek. The Russians later allowed some of these aircraft to leave by road convoy, while other military supplies, including armoured vehicles and naval vessels, were also returned to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Coast Guard was able to withdraw most of its fleet from Crimea, but naval vessels were blockaded, and most seized by Russia. A number of Ukrainian installations held out for nearly a month, but, hemmed in by tight Russian (and pro-Russia militia) blockades, they had all fallen by 25 March, when the last naval vessel, the Cherkassy, was seized by Russian commandos.

**Conflict in Ukraine’s east**

A contentious plebiscite on 16 March, in which a reported 97% of voters backed union with Russia, was ‘held under the watchful eye of Russian servicemen in unmarked uniforms’. It was followed five days later by Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Growing diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia after this, coupled with intensified Western overtures to Ukraine, led Moscow to ratchet up pressure on Kiev. Snap military inspections were launched just over the border at the end of March, where Russian forces remained encamped, in strength, for some time.

In early April, an insurrection began to gather steam in the east, and armed separatists and pro-Russian activists seized government buildings in cities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Kiev launched an ‘anti-terrorist’ operation in response, deploying the regular armed forces and the newly created (and poorly trained) national guard, supported by paramilitary groups. **Strategic Survey 2014** notes that ‘the decision to designate [the insurgency] a terrorist movement was likely to deepen the civil conflict’, given that many in the east reportedly viewed the Kiev government as illegitimate or at least unrepresentative.
The emergence of a pro-Russian separatist movement in eastern Ukraine in 2014, centred in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and supported by armed militia, has led to bitter military confrontation with forces loyal to Kiev. Slovyansk, some 150km west of Luhansk, marked the most westerly extent of separatist gains by April. The city was retaken in early July 2014 as the government’s initially faltering counter-offensive gained strength. By the first week in August, state forces had effectively surrounded Luhansk, while there was heavy fighting between government and separatist forces in Donetsk. Now under heavy pressure themselves, the separatists were able to launch an offensive in the far south of the Donetsk region at the end of August, seizing Novoazovsk and advancing toward Mariupol on the coast. This was part of a broader effort – with significant Russian support – to push back the Ukrainian armed forces and to regain as much territory as possible. Government forces pulled back from Luhansk airport at the beginning of September while fighting continued throughout October despite a 5 September truce, including around Donetsk and its airport. In early November both NATO and the OSCE reported new sightings of unmarked military columns with heavy weaponry inside separatist-held areas.

Map 5  Conflict in Eastern Ukraine

of the country as a whole. This problem was exacerbated by Ukrainian tactics of engaging urban areas with long-range unguided munitions before sending in troops. During the conflict, they employed long-range artillery, mortars and multiple-barrel rocket launchers. However, the tactics used on both sides had negative consequences. Indeed, both government and rebel forces made much use of artillery before ground assaults; a reflection, perhaps, of their shared Soviet military heritage. Human Rights Watch (HRW) also alleged the use of cluster munitions by Ukrainian forces, though HRW later said that ‘there are also serious allegations that pro-Russian rebel forces, and possibly Russia itself, have used cluster munitions in
eastern Ukraine. All parties to the conflict in eastern Ukraine have access to similar weapons, so it is not always possible to draw definitive conclusions with respect to specific attacks.’

Negative consequences also arose from the relative lack of training and professional discipline on the part of irregular forces. Amnesty International chronicled human-rights abuses perpetrated by the volunteer battalions in areas formerly held by separatists, while it also said there was ‘no doubt that summary killings and atrocities are being committed by both pro-Russian separatists and pro-Kyiv forces in Eastern Ukraine’. However, it was difficult to get a sense of the scale of abuses, the report continued, and there was much exaggeration.

The insurgent groups of what eventually became the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics undoubtedly had many locals in their ranks, including former regional Interior Ministry troops, but they were also bolstered by significant numbers of Russian nationals; some of these were, according to Moscow, either ex-military or serving personnel volunteering during their leave. The long-time ‘defence minister’ of the Donetsk rebel group was a Russian citizen who had left the Russian intelligence service only months earlier.

The rebels’ rapid acquisition of military hardware raised interest. Once government troops departed from military bases in the east, separatists would have had access to remaining weapons, ammunition and armour, but weapons were also seized from government troops and volunteer fighters.

Reports of Russian military-intelligence presence among the rebels continued throughout the spring, but, initially, there was little in the way of hard, open-source evidence to directly connect Moscow to operations in east Ukraine until reports emerged of Russian armour in rebel-held areas. These reports had increased in frequency by mid-year, at the same time as government forces seemed to be gaining the upper hand in parts of the east. On 5 July rebels left a command centre at Slovyansk and a month later fighting broke out in Donetsk, Luhansk having been encircled two days before. On 17 July Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down, coming down near the town of Hrabove in Donetsk Oblast and killing nearly 300 people onboard. The aircraft was widely believed to have been brought down by an advanced surface-to-air missile system, possibly a Buk, and allegations persisted that the engagement was conducted from within rebel-held areas.

As Ukrainian forces continued to advance on the rebels, evidence of direct Russian involvement grew. Alleged Russian servicemen were shown, as prisoners, on Ukrainian television on 26 August (Moscow said they crossed the border by mistake), while IISS analysis of imagery at the same time assessed that some main battle tanks seen in separatist hands were likely to be Russian. The variant shown, the T-72BM, was only operated by Russian ground forces. Government gains seemed to force Moscow’s hand, and reports of direct involvement grew dramatically after 27 August, when a new front opened up in the south, near Novoazovsk on the Sea of Azov. In the subsequent weeks, there were also press reports of ‘secret’ burials in Russia of servicemen killed on operations and there was an information clampdown there on coverage of military funerals that might be linked to combat deaths in Ukraine. Other reports pointed to formed units being despatched from Russia. A Financial Times article on 22 October carried the following quote from an alleged Russian serviceman in Luhansk: ‘They gave us an order: who wants to go volunteer? And we put our hands up like this,’ he said, mocking someone being forced to put their hand up.’

The late-August counter-offensive seemed designed to split Ukrainian forces and involved, it appeared, new Russian firepower. Reports emerged of Ukrainian personnel coming under fire from artillery allegedly positioned across the Russian border, while on 28 August NATO released satellite imagery including alleged Russian self-propelled artillery, and support vehicles, arrayed in firing positions in Ukraine itself.

Ukraine also began to boost defence funding, using novel crowd-funding methods (see p. 173), and equipment availability improved, with maintenance plants beginning to repair previously unserviceable equipment. Integrated air and ground operations were conducted, as at Donetsk airport in May. However, opposition forces’ adaptation to this developing capability, in the form of the employment of air-defence screens that shot down some Ukrainian helicopters and transport aircraft, meant that Ukrainian forces also had to keep changing tactics.

The ebb and flow of conflict in Ukraine’s east was restrained, but not halted, by a ceasefire signed on 5 September. The period of conflict from February 2014 will have given Ukraine’s armed forces pointers for the future: tactics and doctrines that had dominated since the 1990s, mainly inherited from the Soviet-era, have generally been unsuited to the current fighting amid urban areas and among populations. As time
progressed, many of Kiev’s ground operations were conducted either by special forces or by limited numbers of combat-ready general forces, but most prominently by irregular forces formed as volunteer battalions – some of these from rightist groups and others financed by the country’s tycoons. Conventional army and interior-ministry structures were often employed to carry out combat support or combat service support tasks. Volunteer battalions were nominally subordinated to either the defence or interior ministries, but this seemed a formality, as many operated with little coordination with, or support from, formal government forces. Regularising these groups and their tactics will be a significant challenge for a government struggling with a multi-faceted crisis.

Future training and force development could focus on more flexible regular formations, able to conduct coordinated operations with the national guard and volunteer battalions. Although some older equipment is being brought out of store to replace attrition losses, Kiev will likely, in the long run, look to procure equipment suitable for modern requirements. This could include mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles and equipment that has demonstrated its effectiveness during 2014, such as precision artillery rockets.

**Defence economics**

Even before the Crimea crisis erupted, Ukraine’s economy was faltering due to a combination of high levels of state intervention in markets, a challenging business climate and poor domestic macro-economic policymaking. Declining investment levels, weak external demand and tight monetary policy – employed to defend the Ukrainian Hryvnia exchange-rate peg – combined to draw the economy into recession in mid-2012, where it remained as the crisis began in March 2014. As the year progressed, growing political uncertainty slowed domestic consumption and industrial production levels; overall economic contraction in 2014 was projected to be -6.5%. Capital flight placed downward pressure on the pegged exchange rate, which was abandoned in February 2014 as the international reserves required to defend it were depleted. Despite a US$17 billion IMF loan facility agreed in April, the collapsing currency reached record lows over the course of the year, placing strain on the banking sector and raising the possibility that the government might default on its external-debt obligations.

Ukraine prioritised its defence budget amid this broader economic pressure, and reduced health, agriculture and welfare budgets in order to augment defence spending. The existing budget law for 2014 was revised in March to allocate around UAH40.53bn (US$5.59bn) towards defence and security (including funding for the interior ministry), which the government claimed as a 15.6% nominal increase over 2013 levels. This was supplemented by a UAH6.9bn (US$611 million) general budget reserve fund and a UAH5bn (US$442m) special defence and security reserve fund, bringing total defence and security outlays in 2014 to UAH52.4bn (US$4.64bn). Separately, in March, the defence ministry established a ‘Support the Ukrainian Army’ fund for private citizens and business to contribute donations via text messages or bank transfers, which would fund medical and logistics support. By November 2014, this had raised UAH151m (US$13.4m). In addition, there were numerous reported instances of small-scale, non-governmental assistance provided by local residents or business groups to supply their local battalions with equipment (e.g. ammunition, bullet-proof vests), although much of this remains undocumented, and there were also international initiatives to supply non-lethal equipment to Ukraine. Overall, most of these funding increments are estimated to have been channelled towards the land, air and joint forces; expenditure on land and air forces more than doubled in 2014, and spending on joint forces increased by around 77%. By contrast, allocations to the navy fell by more than a fifth. Despite these efforts, in July the finance minister stated that high operational and maintenance spending had meant that the government was running out of funds to pay salaries, and in response proposed new tax measures and subsidy reforms to expand the fiscal space available in the national budget.

Longer-term funding increases were announced later in 2014: in August the president announced that some US$3bn (around UAH34bn) would be assigned to re-equip the army, while in September the finance minister proposed an allocation of UAH63bn (US$4.88bn) for defence and security in the draft 2015 budget. Then, in October, the government announced – as part of its ‘Strategy 2020’ programme – that it was planning a fivefold increase in the defence budget by 2020, to 5% of GDP, financed by new taxes on salaries, goods and housing. However, Ukraine has in the past underspent its initially planned budgetary allocations, and in the current climate it is difficult to estimate the degree to which these aspirations reflect realistic budgetary projections.
Armenia

Armenian Dram d 2013 2014 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>4.27tr</td>
<td>4.59tr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>10.4bn</td>
<td>11.1bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def bdgt [a]</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>188bn</td>
<td>194bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA (US)</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>458m</td>
<td>470m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US$1=d 409.63 412.81

[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military pensions

Population 3,060,927

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0 – 14</th>
<th>15 – 19</th>
<th>20 – 24</th>
<th>25 – 29</th>
<th>30 – 64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capabilities

Given continuing tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the armed forces’ main focus is territorial defence. Armenia is a CSTO member, and Russia provides national air defence from a leased base. Conscription continues, but there is also a growing cohort of professional officers. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin, and serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft has been a problem for the air force. While overall military doctrine remains influenced strongly by Russian thinking, overseas deployments, including to ISAF in Afghanistan, have enabled personnel to learn from international counterparts. The country aims to develop its peacekeeping contingent into one brigade with NATO standards, so that Armenia can deploy a battalion capable of self-sustainment and interoperability with NATO forces. However, defence ties with Russia continue on a broad range of issues, and both countries signed a cooperation agreement in 2014. Armenia completed a Strategic Defence Review in May 2011 and has also signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO.

ACTIVE 44,800 (Army 41,850 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,850) Paramilitary 4,300

Conscript liability 24 months.

RESERVES some mob reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 22,900; 18,950 conscripts (total 41,850)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised
1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn)
1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn)
1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)
1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt)

Other
1 indep MR trg bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde
1 MRL bde
1 AT regt
1 AD bde
2 AD regt
1 (radio tech) AD regt
1 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 109; 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 101 T-72

AIFV 98; 75 BMP-1; 6 BMP-1K; 5 BMP-2; 12 BRM-1K

APC (M) 130; 8 BTR-60; 100 look-a-like; 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80

ARTY 232

SP 38: 122mm 10 251; 152mm 28 253
TOWED 131: 122mm 69 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36; 2 D-1; 34 D-20
MRL 51: 122mm 47 BM-21; 273mm 4 WM-80
MOR 120mm 12 M120

AT • MSL • SP 22: 9 9P148; 13 9P149

AD

SAM

SP 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)

TOWED S-75 Devina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Gao)

MANPAD 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)

GUNS

SP ZSU-23-4

TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

UAV Light 15 Krunk

Radar • LAND 6 SNAR-10

MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 12: 8 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B); 4 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)

AEV MT-LB

ARV BREhMD; BREM-1

Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100

1 Air & AD Joint Command

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable

ATK 15: 13 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UBK Frogfoot

TPT 3: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; FAX 1 A319CJ

TRG 14: 4 L-39 Albatros; 10 Yak-52
HELICOPTERS
ATK 7 Mi-24P Hind
ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K Hind; 2 Mi-24R Hind (cbt spt)
MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)
C2 2 Mi-9 Hip G (cbt spt)
TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
SAM • SP S-300/S-300PM (SA-10/SA-20)

Paramilitary 4,300
Ministry of Internal Affairs
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
4 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIFV 55: 5 BMD-1; 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K; 5 BRM-1K
APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152

Border Troops
Ministry of National Security
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIFV 43: 5 BMD-1; 35 BMP-1; 3 BRM-1K
APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70

DEPLOYMENT
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Specific legislation: ‘Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia’
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: by the president, in accordance with ‘Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia’ (Article 5 (2) (1)). Also, under Art. 55 (13) of constitution, president can call for use of armed forces (and National Assembly shall be convened). (Also Art. 81 (3) of constitution.)

AFGHANISTAN
NATO • ISAF 121

LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 1

SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 36

UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 2

FOREIGN FORCES
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan
Bulgaria OSCE 1
Czech Republic OSCE 1
Poland OSCE 1
Russia 3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 SAM bty with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
Sweden OSCE 1
Ukraine OSCE 1

Azerbaijan AZE

ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)

Paramilitary 15,000
Conscript liability 17 months, but can be extended for ground forces.

RESERVE 300,000
Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 56,850
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
5 corps HQ
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
4 MR bde
Light
19 MR bde
Other
1 sy bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 arty trg bde
1 MRL bde
1 AT bde
1 engr bde
1 sigs bde
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 433: 95 T-55; 244 T-72; 94 T-90S
AIFV 218: 20 BMD-1; 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 100 BMP-3; 15
BRM-1; 7 BTR-80A
APC 568
APC (T) 336 MT-LB
APC (W) 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70
PPV 90: 45 Matador; 45 Matador
ARTY 542
SP 87: 122mm 46 2S1; 152mm 24: 6 2S3; 18 2S19 Msta-S;
155mm 5 ATMOS-2000; 203mm 12 2S7
TOWED 207: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm
42: 18 2A36; 24 D-20
GUN/MOR 120mm 36: 18 2S9 NONA; 18 2S31 Vena
MRL 100+: 122mm 52+: 43 BM-21; 9+ IMI Lynx; 128mm
12 RAK-12: 220mm 6 TOS-1A; 300mm 30 9A52 Smerch
MOR 120mm 112: 5 CARDOM; 107 PM-38
AT • MSL • MANPATS
9K11 Malutka (AT-3 Sagger);
9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); Spike-LR
AD • SAM • SP
2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-
11 Gadfly)
MANPAD 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail); 9K34 Strela-3; (SA-14
Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24
Grinch)
MSL • SSM 
9M79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
RADAR • LAND
SNAR-1 Long Trough/SNAR-2/6 Pork Trough (arty); Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big Fred
(veh, arty); GS-13 Long Eye (veh)
UAV • ISR • Medium 3 Aerostar
AEV MT-LB
MW Bocena

Navy 2,200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
CORVETTES • FS 1 Kusar (ex-FSU Petya II) with 2 RBU
6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm gun
PSO 1 Lugu (Woodnik 2 Class) (FSU Project 888; additional
trg role)
PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1
Shelon (ex-FSU Project 1388M)
PB 3: 1 Araz (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 Bryza (ex-FSU Project 722);
1 Poluchat (ex-FSU Project 368)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MHC 4: 2 Yeugenya (FSU Project 1258); 2 Yakhont (FSU
Sonya)

AMPHIBIOUS 6
LSM 3: 1 Polnochny A (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT;
180 troops); 2 Polnochny B (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6
MBT; 180 troops)
LCU 1 Vydra† (FSU) (capacity either 3 AMX-30 MBT or
200 troops)
LCM 2 T-4 (FSU)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4
AGS 1 (FSU Project 1047)
YTB 2
YTD 1

Air Force and Air Defence 7,900

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 regt with MiG-21 Fishbed; Su-17 Fitter; Su-24 Fencer;
Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frogfoot B

TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Yak-40 Codling

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regt with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 44 combat capable
FTR 14 MiG-29 Fulcrum
FGA 11: 4 MiG-21 Fishbed (1 more in store); 4 Su-17 Fitter;
1 Su-17U Fitter; 2 Su-24 Fencer†
ATK 19: 16 Su-25 Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UB Frogfoot B
TPT 4: Medium 1 An-12 Cub; Light 3 Yak-40 Codling
TRG 40: 2 L-29 Delfin; 12 L-39 Albatros

HELICOPTERS
ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind
MRH: 20+ Mi-17-IV Hip
TPT 20: Medium 13 Mi-8 Hip; Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
UAV • ISR • Medium 4 Aerostar
AD • SAM S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Neva (SA-
3 Goa); S-200 Vega (SA-5 Gammon) static; S-300PM/PMU2
(SA-20 Gargoyle)
MSL • AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)

Paramilitary £15,000

Border Guard £5,000
Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIFV 168 BMP-1/2
APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80
ARTY • MRL 122mm 3 T-122
HELICOPTERS • ATK 24 Mi-35M Hind
Coast Guard
The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the State Border Service.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
PBF: 8; 1 Osa II (FSU Project 205); 2 Shaldag V; 2 Silver Ships 48ft; 3 Stenka
PB: 2 Baltic 150; 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ARS 1 Iva (FSU Vikhr)

Militia 10,000+
Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

DEPLOYMENT
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By parliament upon proposal by president (Art. 109, No. 28)

AFGHANISTAN
NATO • ISAF 94

FOREIGN FORCES
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan

Belarus BLR

Belarusian Ruble r 2013 2014 2015
GDP r 637tr 820tr
US$ 71.7bn 77.2bn
per capita US$ 7,577 8,195
Growth % 0.9 0.9
Inflation % 18.3 18.6
Def exp r 6.05tr
US$ 681m
US$1=r 8,879.99 10,630.36

Population 9,608,058

Age 0 – 14 15 – 19 20 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 64 65 plus
Male 7.9% 2.5% 3.4% 4.3% 23.9% 4.5%
Female 7.5% 2.4% 3.3% 4.1% 26.5% 9.7%

Capabilities

The primary role of the armed forces is to protect territorial integrity. The announcement that a Russian air base will be set up in Belarus in 2016, housing Su-27 combat aircraft, will provide additional air capability within the country. Much of the military inventory consists of ageing Soviet-era equipment. Air-combat capabilities could be bolstered by plans to upgrade its Su-27’s and there are also plans to procure UAVs. The Belarusian defence relationship with Russia includes regular joint exercises, and Minsk could notionally support a regional joint operation with Moscow. However, with the exception of the 5th Spetsnaz Bde, ground-force capability is probably limited – although snap inspections began at the start of 2014 to try and improve readiness. In 2014 Moscow approved the donation of an unknown number of S-300PM SAM systems to Belarus. Minsk is exploring defence-industrial cooperation with Russia, but capacity limitations in the Belarusian defence industry will limit substantive cooperation. Belarus is currently under EU and US sanctions and an arms embargo is in place.

ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 16,500 Air 15,000 Special Operations Forces 6,000 Joint 10,500) Paramilitary 110,000
RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 16,500

Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh. Main battle tanks are usually placed at around 200–300 in number, with similar numbers for armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces, with small numbers of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation. Available personnel number estimates are between 18,000–20,000. (See p. 491.)
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
2 comd HQ (West & North West)
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
2 mech bde
2 mech bde(-)
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bde
2 MRL regt
2 engr regt
1 NBC regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 515: 446 T-72; 69 T-80
AIFV 1,011: 875 BMP-2; 136 BRM-1
APC • APC (T) 50 MT-LB
ARTY 957
SP 434: 122mm 198 2S1; 152mm 236: 108 2S3; 116 2S5; 12 2S19 Farm
TOWED 152mm 180: 48 2A36; 132 2A65
GUN/MOR 120mm 48 2S9 NONA
MRL 234: 122mm 126 BM-21; 220mm 72 9P140 Uragan;
300mm 36 9A52 Smerch
MOR 120mm 61 2S12
AT • MSL
SP 236: 126 9P148 Konkurs; 110 9P149 Shturm
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
RADAR • LAND GS-13 Long Eye/SNAR-1 Long Trough/ SNAR-2/6 Pork Trough (arty); some Small Fred/Small Yawn/ SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty)
MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 96: 36 FROG/9M79 Tochka (SS- 21 Scarab); 60 Scud
AEV MT-LB
VLB MTU

Air Force and Air Defence Forces 15,000
Flying hours 15 hrs/year
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
2 sqn with MiG-29/UB Fulcrum
GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B
TRANSPORT
1 base with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty
TRAINING
Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Some (cbr sqn) sqn with Mi-6 Hook; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24K Hind G2; Mi-24R Hind G1; Mi-26 Halo
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable
FTR 38 MiG-29/UB Fulcrum
FGA (21 Su-27P/UB Flanker B/C non-operational)
ATK 34 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B
TPT 13: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid (+9 civ Il-76 available for mil use); Medium 3 An-12 Cub; Light 8: 1 An-24 Coke; 6 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
TRG Some L-39 Albatros
HELICOPTERS
ATK 49 Mi-24 Hind
ISR 20: 8 Mi-24K Hind G2; 12 Mi-24R Hind G1
TPT 168: Heavy 43; 29 Mi-6 Hook; 14 Mi-26 Halo;
Medium 125 Mi-8 Hip
MSL
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
SARH R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A)

Air Defence
AD data from Uzal Baranovitch EW radar
FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE
1 bde with S-200 (SA-5 Gammon)
1 bde with S-200 (SA-5 Gammon); S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
1 bde with S-300V(SA-12A Gladiator/SA-12B Giant)
1 bde with 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly)
1 bde with 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 9K332 Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet)
2 bde with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
2 regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
1 regt with S-200 (SA-5 Gammon)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AD • SAM
SP 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); S-300V(SA-12A Gladiator/ SA-12B Giant); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); 12 9K332 Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet)
TOWED S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
STATIC S-200 (SA-5 Gammon)

Special Operations Forces 6,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
2 (mobile) mech bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC • APC (W) 192: 39 BTR-70; 153 BTR-80
ARTY • TOWED 122mm 48 D-30
AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)

Joint 10,500 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff)
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty gp
1 MRL bde
2 SSM bde
2 engr bde
1 EW unit
1 ptn bridging regt
2 sigs bde

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**APC • APC (T)** 20 MT-LB
**ARTY**
- SP 152mm 70 2S5
- TOWED 152mm 90 2A65
- 300mm 36 9A52 Smerch

**MSL • TACTICAL • SSM**
- 96: 36 FROG/9M79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); 60 Scud

**Paramilitary** 110,000

**Border Guards** 12,000

**Militia** 87,000

**Ministry of Interior Troops** 11,000

**DEPLOYMENT**

**LEBANON**
- UN • UNIFIL 2

**SOUTH SUDAN**
- UN • UNMISS 4 obs

**UKRAINE**
- OSCE • Ukraine 1

**FOREIGN FORCES**

Russia 1 fr flt with 5 Su-27 Flanker; 1 A-50 Mainstay; 4 SAM units with S-300 (SA-10 Grumble)

**Georgia GEO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Georgian Lari</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lari</td>
<td>26.8bn</td>
<td>29.2bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>16.1bn</td>
<td>16.1bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population** 4,935,880

**Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0 – 14</th>
<th>15 – 19</th>
<th>20 – 24</th>
<th>25 – 29</th>
<th>30 – 64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Capabilities**

Georgia’s armed forces continue to make efforts to address lessons from the conflict with Russia in 2008, which revealed significant shortcomings in key areas, including reservist organisation, communications, anti-armour and air-defence capabilities. A substantial amount of US-supplied equipment was destroyed or captured in the conflict, and Georgia lost a number of its Russian-origin T-72 MBTs. The Israeli short-range Spyder system was subsequently acquired to bolster the air-defence capability and rapid-reaction special forces have improved capabilities through training and exercising. A 2012 enhanced defence-cooperation agreement with the US will provide training in cyber defence, border security, military-education development and counter-insurgency operations. Moves are under way to generate a pool of four-year-contract servicemen to boost professionalisation. Current plans call for the small air force – comprising Soviet-era ground-attack aircraft, combat-support helicopters and transport and utility helicopters – to merge with the army. Georgia deployed personnel to ISAF in Afghanistan, and has aspirations for NATO membership. Training activity involves international forces, including the US.

**ACTIVE 20,650** (Army 17,750 Air 1,300 National Guard 1,600) Paramilitary 11,700

Conscript liability 18 months

**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Army** 14,000; 3,750 conscript (total 17,750)

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**SPECIAL FORCES**
- 1 SF bde

**MANOEUVRE**
- Light
  - 5 inf bde

**AMPHIBIOUS**
- 2 mne bn (1 cadre)

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
- 2 arty bde
- 1 engr bde
- 1 sigs bn
- 1 SIGINT bn
- 1 MP bn

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**
- 1 med bn

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**MBT**
- 123: 23 T-55; 100 T-72

**RECCE**
- 4+ Didgori-2

**AIFV**
- 72: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2; 1 BRM-1K

**APC**
- 199+: 69+: Lazika; 66 MT-LB
- 120+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 8+ Didgori-1; 3+ Didgori-3; 65 Ejder

**PPV**
- 10 Cougar

**ARTY**
- 240

**SP**
- 67 152mm 66: 32 DANA; 20 2S1; 13 2S3; 1 2S19; 203mm 1 2S7

**TOWED**
- 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36; 10 2A65

**MRL**
- 122mm 37: 13 BM-21; 6 GRADLAR; 18 RM-70

**MOR**
- 120mm 65: 14 2S12; 33 M-75; 18 M120
AT €50
MSL €10
GUNS €40
AD • SAM • SP 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); Spyder
MANPAD Grom; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Graff); 9K36
Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)

Air Force 1,300 (incl 300 conscript)
1 avn base, 1 hel air base

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable
ATK 12: 3 Su-25 Frogfoot; 7 Su-25K Frogfoot A; 2 Su-25UB
Frogfoot B
TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 1 Tu-134A Crusty (VIP); 2
Yak-40 Codling
TRG 9 L-29 Delfin

HELICOPTERS
ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind
TPT 29 Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 12 Bell 205 (UH-
1H Iroquois)

UAV • ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450
AD • SAM 1–2 bn 9K37 Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly), 8 9K33
Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko) (two bty), 6-10 9K33 Osa-AKM
updated SAM systems.

National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon
Army

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
1 inf bde

Paramilitary 11,700

Border Guard 5,400

Coast Guard
HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard
in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Guard,
within the Ministry of the Interior.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
PBF 6: 4 Ares 43m; 1 Kaan 33; 1 Kaan 20
PB 15: 1 Akhmeta; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC); 1
Kutaiz (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 Point; 7 Zhitik (3 ex-UKR)
(up to 20 patrol launches also in service)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Vyдра
(ex-BLG)
LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT • YTL 1

Ministry of Interior Troops 6,300

AFGHANISTAN
NATO • ISAF 755; 1 mtn inf bn

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
NATO • ISAF 140; 1 inf coy

SERBIA
OSCE • Kosovo 4

UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE
CONTROL
Following the August 2008 war between Russia and
Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared
themselves independent. Data presented here represents
the de facto situation and does not imply international
recognition as sovereign states.

FOREIGN FORCES
Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1
MR bde; 40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-
21; some S-300 SAM; some att hel); 1 mil base at Djava/
Tsikhivini (S. Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP-
2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

Kazakhstan

KAZ

Kazakhstani Tenge t

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.3t</td>
<td>40.3t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>35.3t</td>
<td>40.3t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>232bn</td>
<td>226bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def bdgt</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>348bn</td>
<td>363bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>2.29bn</td>
<td>2.03bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>1.8m</td>
<td>1.5m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US$1=t 152.13 178.68

Population 17,948,816

Ethnic groups: Kazakh 51%; Russian 32%; Ukrainian 5%; German
2%; Tatar 2%; Uzbek 13%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0 – 14</th>
<th>15 – 19</th>
<th>20 – 24</th>
<th>25 – 29</th>
<th>30 – 64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capabilities

Kazakhstan’s armed forces are small and reliant on Soviet-
era equipment. A 2011 Military Doctrine identified both
internal and external security concerns, and risks from
regional instability, but there were few force-structure
changes detailed, with much focus on the development
of Kazakhstan’s defence industry. Kazakhstan maintains a
close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced through
its membership of the CSTO and SCO. Moscow operates
a radar station at Balkash, and seeks to include Kazak-
stan in a regional air-defence network for the CSTO. As
such, Russia is aiming to provide S-300PS air-defence sys-
tems gratis from its own stocks and in May 2014 a Joint
Air-Defence Agreement was ratified. In the army, air-mo-
bile units are held at the highest level of readiness, with
other units at lower levels. There are ongoing efforts to im-
prove the navy and the air force, with modest procurement
projects under way. Airlift is being improved, with joint
ventures and production envisaged with European com-
panies for rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft
and continued receipt of the C-295. However, airworthi-
ness remains problematic. The navy, meanwhile, is seek-
ing to procure its first corvette from overseas designs.

ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000
MoD 4,000) Paramilitary 31,500
Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 20,000
4 regional cmd: Astana, East, West and Southern

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 tk bde
Mechanised
4 mech bde
Air Manoeuvre
4 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bde
1 SSM unit
3 cbr engr bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 300 T-72
RECEE 100: 40 BRDM; 60 BRM
AIFV 652: 500 BMP-2; 107 BTR-80A; 43 BTR-82A; 2 BTR-
3E
APC 357
APC (T) 150 MT-LB
APC (W) 207: 190 BTR-80; 17 Cobra

ARTY 602
SP 246: 122mm 126: 120 2S1; 6 Sensitive; 152mm 120 2S3
TOWED 150: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 50 2A65;
(122mm up to 300 D-30 in store)
GUN/MOR 120mm 25 2S9 Anona
MRL 118: 122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 300mm 18 Lynx
(with 50 msl); (122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 180
9P140 Uragan all in store)
MOR 63 SP 120mm 18 CARDOM 120mm 45 2B11/M120
AT
MSL
SP 3 BMP-T
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Misit (AT-6 Spiral)
GUNS 100mm 68 MT-12/T-12

MSL • SSM 12 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
AEV MT-LB

Navy 3,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
PCG 1 Kazakhstan with 2 quad Inchr with 3424 Uran
(SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASH,M, 1 Glibka Inchr with SA-N-
10 Gimlet SAM
PBF 5: 3 Sea Dolphin; 2 Saygak;
PB 15: 4 Almaty; 3 Archangel; 1 Dauntless; 4 Sardar; 1 Turk
(AB 25); 2 Zhuk (of which 1 may be operational)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik

Coastal Defence
MANOEUVRE
Other
1 coastal defence bde

Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence)
Flying hours 100 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
2 sqn with MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with MiG-27 Flogger D; MiG-23UB Flogger C
2 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot

TRANSPORT
1 unit with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless,
1 sqn with An-12 Cub, An-26 Curl, An-30 Clank, An-72
Cooler

TRAINING
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros

ATTACK HELICOPTER
5 sqn with Mi-24V Hind

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H); EC145; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-
17V-5 Hip; Mi-26 Halo

AIR DEFENCE
Some regt with S-75M Vokhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-125
Neva (SA-3 Goa); S-300 (SA-10 Grumble); 2K11 Krug
(SA-4 Ganef); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gunmon); 2K12 Kub
(SA-6 Gainful)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 122 combat capable
FTR 55: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 41
MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound
FGA 53: 24 MiG-27 Flogger D; 4 MiG-23UB Flogger C; 21
Su-27 Flanker; 4 Su-27UB Flanker
ATK 14: 12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot
ISR 1 An-30 Clank
TPT 15: Medium 2 An-12 Cub: Light 12; 6 An-26 Curl,
2 An-72 Cooler; 2 C-295; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 1 Tu-154
Careless

TRG 17 L-39 Albatros

HELICOPTERS
ATK 40+ Mi-24V Hind (first 9 upgraded)
MRH 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip
Kyrgyzstan maintains one of the smaller armed forces in Central Asia, with ageing land equipment, limited air-combat capabilities and no navy. A new military doctrine was enacted in July 2013, setting out possible threats to the state and plans to reform the armed forces. The reform plans promise, among other things, modern armed forces with enhanced command-and-control, effective military logistics and a modern air-defence system, adding the term ‘mobilisation readiness’. In general, combat readiness remains low with large numbers of poorly trained conscripts within the armed forces. For these reasons, Kyrgyzstan has a close strategic relationship with Russia, being a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Moscow maintains a modest presence of strike and transport aircraft in Kant air base, which it has leased since 2003, and in February 2014 Russia announced that four additional Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft would be based there. Kyrgyzstan did not offer the US an extension for its presence at Manas air base, which closed in June 2014.

**ACTIVE 10,900** (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) **Paramilitary 9,500**

**Conscript liability 18 months**

### ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

#### Army 8,500

**FORCES BY ROLE**

- **SPECIAL FORCES**
- 1 SF bde
- **MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
- 2 MR bde
- 1 (mtn) MR bde
- **COMBAT SUPPORT**
- 1 arty bde
- 1 AD bde

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

- **MBT**
  - 150 T-72
- **RECCE**
  - 30 BRDM-2
- **AIFV**
  - 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2
- **APC (W)**
  - 35; 25 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80
- **ARTY 246**
  - SP 122mm 18 2S1
  - TOWED 141: 100mm 18 M-1944; 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 16 D-1
  - GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 Anona
  - MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan
  - MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120
- **AT • MSL • MANPATS**
  - 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel)
- **RCL 73mm SPG-9**
- **GUNS**
  - 100mm 18 MT-12/T-12
- **AD • SAM • MANFAD**
  - 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)
  - 48
- **GUNS**
  - 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4
  - TOWED 57mm 24 S-60

### Paramilitary 9,500

**Government Guard**

**500**

**Internal Security Troops**

**20,000** Ministry of Interior

**Presidential Guard 2,000**

**State Border Protection Forces**

**9,000** Ministry of Interior

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**

**HEL • TPT • Medium 1 Mi-171**

### Deployment

**WESTERN SAHARA**

UN • MINURSO 2 obs

### Kyrgyzstan KGZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kyrgyzstani Som s</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>s</td>
<td>350bn</td>
<td>391bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>7.23bn</td>
<td>7.65bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def bdgt [a]</td>
<td>s</td>
<td>4.91bn</td>
<td>4.87bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA (US)</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>101m</td>
<td>95m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$1=s</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.45</td>
<td>51.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Population 5,604,212**

**Ethnic groups:** Kyrgyz 56%; Russian 17%; Uzbek 13%; Ukrainian 3%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0–14</th>
<th>15–19</th>
<th>20–24</th>
<th>25–29</th>
<th>30–64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Air Force 2,400

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER
1 regt with L-39 Albatros*

FIGHTER/TRANSPORT
1 (comp avn) regt with MiG-21 Fishbed; An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip

AIR DEFENCE
Some regt with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 33 combat capable
FGA 29 MiG-21 Fishbed
TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl
TRG 4 L-39 Albatros*

HELICOPTERS
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip
AD • SAM
SP 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
TOWED S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)

Paramilitary 9,500

Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers)

Interior Troops 3,500

National Guard 1,000

DEPLOYMENT

LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 3 obs

MOLDOVA
OSCE • Moldova 1

SERBIA
OSCE • Kosovo 1

SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 2 obs

SUĐAN
UN • UNAMID 2 obs
UN • UNISFA 1 obs

UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 4

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia €500 Military Air Forces: 5 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip

Moldova MDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moldovan Leu L</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>100bn</td>
<td>108bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>7.97bn</td>
<td>7.74bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>2,239</td>
<td>2,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def exp</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>303m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>24m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def bdgt [a]</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>304m</td>
<td>355m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>24m</td>
<td>25m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$1=L</td>
<td>12.59</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[a] Excludes military pensions

Population 3,583,288

Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0 – 14</th>
<th>15 – 19</th>
<th>20 – 24</th>
<th>25 – 29</th>
<th>30 – 64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capabilities

Moldova has limited military capability and mainly Soviet-era equipment. Its conscript-based armed forces’ primary focus remains the disputed territory of Transnistria, though the country is also looking to develop further its capacity to contribute to peacekeeping and crisis-management missions in a multinational context. Moldovan forces are deployed in small numbers on UN operations and the country is developing units for interoperability with NATO. Implementing the recommendations of the 2011 Strategic Defence Review, carried out with UK support, is a priority, though funding problems mean this could prove a challenge. Russia continues to station an army garrison as well as a ‘peacekeeping’ contingent in Transnistria, and in early 2014 conducted exercises in the territory. Following the annexation of Crimea and Moldova’s developing ties with the West, this presence is additionally problematic. The strategic and military implications of the June 2014 signing of an association agreement with the EU are as yet unclear.

ACTIVE 5,350 (Army 3,250 Air 800 Logistic Support 1,300) Paramilitary 2,400

RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Light
3 mot inf bde
1 mot inf bn
184  THE MILITARY BALANCE 2015

Other
1 gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bn
1 engr bn
1 NBC coy
1 sigs coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECE 5 BRDM-2
AIFV 44 BMD-1

APC 157
APC (T) 62: 9 BTR-D; 53 MT-LB
APC (W) 95: 11 BTR-80; 84 TAB-71

ARTY 148
TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 52: 21
2A36; 31 D-20

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 Anona
MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan
MOR 59: 82mm 52; 120mm 7 M-120

AT
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12
AD • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11
S-60
RADAR • LAND 4: 2 ARK-1; 2 SNAR-10

Air Force 800 (incl 250 conscripts)

FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
2 sqn with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler; Mi-8PS
Hip; Yak-18

AIR DEFENCE
1 regt with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 6: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler
1 Yak-18

HELICOPTERS
MRH 4 Mi-17-1V Hip H
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8PS Hip
AD • SAM 3 S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)

Paramilitary 2,400
Ministry of Interior

OPON 900 (riot police)
Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Constitution: Codified constitution (1994)
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the parlia-
ment (Art. 66)

CÔTE D’IVOIRE
UN • UNOCI 4 obs

LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 2 obs

SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 41

SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 1

UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 9

FOREIGN FORCES
Czech Republic OSCE 1
Estonia OSCE 1
France OSCE 1
Germany OSCE 1
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 1
Poland OSCE 1
Russia £1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers) Military Air
Forces 7 Mi-24 Hind/Mi-8 Hip
Spain OSCE 1
Sweden OSCE 1
Switzerland OSCE 1
Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)
United Kingdom OSCE 1
United States OSCE 3

Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Rouble r</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP r</td>
<td>66.8tr</td>
<td>72.7tr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>2.1tr</td>
<td>2.06tr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ [a]</td>
<td>3.5tr</td>
<td>3.6tr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| per capita US$   | 14,591 | 14,317 |
| Growth %         | 1.3 | 0.2 |
| Inflation %      | 6.8 | 7.4 |
| Def bdgt US$     | 66.1bn | 70bn |
| US$ [a]          | 110bn | 121bn |

| US$1=r           | MER 31.84 | 35.33 |
| PPP              | 19.12 | 20.42 |

[a] PPP estimate

Population 142,470,272
Ethnic groups: Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%;
Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0–14</th>
<th>15–19</th>
<th>20–24</th>
<th>25–29</th>
<th>30–64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capabilities

The various strands of Russian military modernisation
described in previous editions of The Military Balance
continue. Some of these measures were successfully tested
during the Russian military seizure of Crimea in 2014. New infantry equipment, communications and Tigr light-
armoured vehicles were observed during this operation,
as was electronic-warfare equipment. But the operation
did not reflect the effect of reform on the broader force; troops
in Crimea were initially mainly VDV and special forces,
reflective of the higher levels of training, command-and-
control, equipment and funding that these forces have
enjoyed. The tactics displayed showed an integrated use of
special forces, rapid mobility and electronic-warfare tools,
coupled with deniability and deception that demonstrated
the ‘non-linear’ warfare discussed by a top Russian
military official, described by some in the West as ‘hybrid
warfare’. The concurrent rapid mobilisation of the Western
and Southern Military districts, which brought a reported
40,000 troops to assembly areas close to the Ukrainian
border, also apparently proceeded smoothly. These
‘snap inspections’ in most Military Districts continued.
Some were huge in scale, and Russia continues to use
these to identify areas for improvement. Although most
conventional combat capability was not tested in 2014,
the standing and morale of the Russian armed forces will
have been boosted by the Crimea operation. (See pp. 159-67.)

ACTIVE 771,000 (Army 230,000 Navy 130,000 Air
148,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces 80,000 Airborne
32,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Command
and Support 150,000) Paramilitary 489,000

Conscript liability 12 months.

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)
Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve
obligation to age 50.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces £80,000 (incl
personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)

Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 12:
3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 Stingray)
strategic SLBM
6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU Sineva (SS-N-23
Skiff) strategic SLBM (of which 1 vessel in repair
following a fire; expected return to service 2014)
1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve with capacity for 20
Bulava (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing)
2 Borey with capacity for 16 Bulava (SS-N-X-32) SLBM
(missiles not yet operational), (1 additional unit with
expected ISD 2014/15)

Strategic Rocket Force Troops
3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers
organised in 12 divs. Launcher gps normally with 10
silos (6 for RS-20/SS-18), or 9 mobile Inchr, and one
centre control

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MSL • STRATEGIC 378

ICBM 378: 54 RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) (mostly mod 5, 10
MIRV per msl); 160 RS-12M (SS-25 Sickle) (mobile
single warhead); 40 RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod
3, 6 MIRV per msl); 60 RS-12M Topol-M (SS-27M1)
silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M Topol-M (SS-
27M1) road mobile (single warhead); 42 RS-24 Yars
(SS-27M2; £3 MIRV per msl); 4 RS-24 Yars (SS-27M2; £3
MIRV per msl) silo-based

Long-Range Aviation Command

FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER
1 sqn with Tu-160 Blackjack
3 sqn with Tu-95MS Bear

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

BBR 78: 16 Tu-160 Blackjack each with up to 12 Kh-
55 SM (AS-15A/B Kent) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS6
(Bear H-6) each with up to 6 Kh-55/SM (AS-15A/B Kent)
nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS16 (Bear H-16) each with
up to 16 Kh-55 (AS-15A Kent) nuclear ALCM; (Kh-102
likely now in service on Tu-95MS)

Aerospace Defence Forces

Formations and units to detect missile attack on the RF
and its allies, to implement BMD, and to be responsible
for military/dual-use spacecraft launch and control

Space Command

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 74

COMMUNICATIONS 35: 3 Mod Globus (Raduga-1M);
9 Strela; 19 Rodnik (Gonets-M); 4 Meridian

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 33 GLONASS
ELINT/SIGINT 4: 1 Kondor; 1 Liana (Lotos-S); 1 Persona;
1 Tselina-2;

EARLY WARNING 2 Oko

RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations
in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan).
It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi,
(St Petersburg); Armavir, (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk,
(Murmansk); Mishelevka, (Irkuts); Kaliningrad;
Pechora, (Komi); Yeniseysk, (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul,
(Altayski); Orsk, (Orenburg) and Gorodets/Kovylkino
(OTH)

Aerospace Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE
3 AD bde HQ
8 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM (SA-20
Gargoyle)
4 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-
22 Greyhound)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AD • SAM • SP 222: 150 S-300PS/PM (SA-10 Grumble/
SA-20 Gargoyle); 48 S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 24 96K6
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (ABM-3 Gazele); (32 51T6 (ABM-4 Gorgon) in store; possibly destroyed)
RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow)

Army £230,000; (incl conscripts)
Transformation process continues; 4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk)), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command.

FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
10 army HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
7 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
1 recce bde
Armoured
1 (4th) tk div (2 tk regt, 1 arty regt)
3 tk bde (1 armd recce bn; 3 tk bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 MR bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
Mechanised
2 (2nd & 201st) MR div (2 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
28 MR bde (1 recce regt; 3 MR regt; 2 arty regt; 1 MR bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
2 MR bde (4–5 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn)
3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 MR bn; 1 arty bn)
1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 AD bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT
8 arty bde
4 MRL bde
1 MRL regt
4 SSIM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)
5 SSIM bde with 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab — to be replaced by Iskander-M)
9 AD bde
4 engr bde
1 MP bde
5 NBC bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
10 log bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 2,600; 1,300 T-72B/BA; 400 T-72B3; 550 T-80BV/U; 350 T-90/T-90A; (17,500 in store: 2,800 T-55; 2,500 T-62; 2,000 T-64A/B; 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90)
RECCCE 1,200+: 100+ Dozor, 100+ Tigr, 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store)
AIFV 5,125+: 500 BMP-1; 3,000 BMP-2; 500+ BMP-3; 700 BRM-1K; 275 BTR-80/A/82A; 150 BTR-82AM; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2)
APC 6,000+
APC (T) 3,500+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB; (2,000 MT-LB in store)
APC (W) 2,500: 800 BTR-60; 200 BTR-70; 1,500 BTR-80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store)
ARTY 4,180+
SP 1,500: 122mm 150 2S1; 152mm 1,350: 800 2S3; 100 2S5; 450 2S19; (4,300 in store: 122mm 2,000 2S1; 152mm 1,950: 1,000 2S3; 850 2S5; 150 2S19; 203mm 320 2S7)
TOWED 150: 152mm 150 2A65; (12,415 in store: 122mm 8,150; 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); 130mm 650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36; 600 2A65; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 M-1943; 100 ML-20 M-1937; 203mm 40 B-4M)
GUN/MOR 180+
SP 120mm 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34
TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 850+ 122mm 550 BM-21; 220mm 200 9P140 Uragan; some TOS-1A; 300mm 100 9A52 Smerch; (3,220 in store: 122mm 2,420; 2,000 BM-21; 420 9P138; 132mm 100 BM-13; 220mm 700 9P140 Uragan)
MOR 1,500
SP (240mm 430 2S4 in store)
TOWED 1,500: 800 2B14; 120mm 700 2S12; (2,200 in store: 120mm 1,900; 1,000 2S12; 900 PM-38; 160mm 300 M-160)

AT
MSL
SP BMP-T with 9K120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral 2); 9P149 with 9K114 Shтурм (AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2 with 9K123 Khrisantema (AT-15 Springer)
MANPADS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K112 Kobra (AT-8 Songster); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shтурм (AT-6 Spiral); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K116 Bastion/ Basnya (AT-10 Stabber); 9K119 Reflex/Svist (AT-11 Sniper); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)

RCL 73mm SPG-9
RL 105mm RPG-29

GUNS • TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12; (100mm 2,000 T-12/MT-12 in store)

AD
SAM 1,570+
SP 1,570+: 350+ 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); 400 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8B Gecko); 400 9K35M3 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 120+ 9K330/9K331 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet); 250+ 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison)
MANPAD 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)

GUNS
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60

UAV • Heavy Tu-143 Reys; Tu-243 Reys/Tu-243 Reys D; Tu-300 Karshun Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2
MSL • SRBM 120: 70 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); 50 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone); (some Scud in store)

AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IRM; MT-LB
ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A
VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2
MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2

RESERVES
Cadre formations

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 tk bde
Mechanised
13 MR bde
NAVY €130,000; (incl conscripts)
4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 59

STRATEGIC • SSBN 12:
3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29R Volna (SS-N-18 Stingray) strategic SLBM
6 Defin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU Sineva (SS-N-23 Skiff) strategic SLBM (1 expected to return to service by end-2014 following repair)
1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve for training with capacity for 20 Bulava (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing)
2 Borey with capacity for 16 Bulava (SS-N-X-32) SLBM (missiles not yet operational); (1 additional vessel with expected ISD 2014/15)

TACTICAL 47

SSGN 9:
8 Antyey (Oscar II) (of which 3 in reserve/repair) with 2 12-cell Inchr with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipureck) AShM, 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 4 single 533mm TT
1 Yasen (Graney) with 1 octuple VLS with 3M55 Oryx AShM; 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30) SLCM; 8 single 533mm TT

SSN 17:
2 Schuka-B (Akula II) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT
8 Schuka-B (Akula I) (of which 2 in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT (one further boat leased to India for 10 years from 2012)
2 Kondor (Sierra II) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT
1 Barracuda (Sierra I) (in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, RPK-2 (SS-N-15 Starfish) and T-53 HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) AShM and T-65 HWT
4 Schuka (Victor III) (of which 1 in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, 2 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT

SSK 21:
15 Paltus (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-53 HWT
5 Varshavanka (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels under construction)
1 Lada (AIP fitted) with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels in build)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 35

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Orel (Kuznetsov) with
1 12-cell VLS with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipureck) AShM, 4 sextuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 Udav 1, 8 CADS-N-1

Kortik CIWS with 3M31 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 6 AK630 CIWS (capacity 18-24 Su-33 Flanker D FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R Helix AW hel)

CRUISERS 6

CGHMN 2:
2 Orlan (Kirov) with 10 twin VLS with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipureck) AShM, 2 twin Inchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 12 octuple VLS with Fort/Fort M (SA-N-6 Grumble/SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 octuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000 Udav 1, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3, 6 CADS-N-1 Kortik CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 3 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (1 non-operational; undergoing extensive refit and expected return to service in 2017)

CGHM 4:
1 Berkot-B (Kara)† (scheduled to be decommissioned), with 2 quad Inchr with Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 2 twin Inchr with 4K60 Shstorm (SA-N-3 Goblet) SAM, 2 twin Inchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000, 2 twin 76mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
3 Atlan (Slava) with 8 twin Inchr with Vulkan (SS-N-12 mod 2 Sandbox) AShM, 8 octuple VLS with Fort/Fort M (SA-N-6 Grumble/SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 single Inchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 6 AK650 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (1 currently non-operational; expected return to service in 2015)

DESTROYERS 18

DDGMN 17:
8 Sarych (Sovremenny) (of which 3 in reserve/repair) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 twin Inchr with 3K90 Urgani/9K37 Yesh (SA-N-7 Gadfly/SA-N-12 Grizzly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
8 Fregat (Udaloy I) each with 2 quad Inchr with Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 8 octuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet SAM), 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
1 Fregat (Udaloy II) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 8 octuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet SAM), 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)

DDGM 1:
1 Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin) mod with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 twin Inchr with Volnya (SA-N-1 Goi) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 twin 76mm gun
FRIGATES 10

FFGM 6:
2 Jastreb (Neustrashimy) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 4 octuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 6 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000, 2 CADS-N-1 Kortik CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW) (3rd vessel launched, but production halted in 1997; unclear status)
1 Steregushchiy (Project 20380) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 Kortik CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
3 Steregushchiy (Project 20381) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 1 12-cell VLS with 3K96 Redut SAM, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 Kortik CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (4 additional vessels in build, of which two are improved Steregushchiy II)

FFG 4:
1 Gepard with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 176mm gun
1 Gepard with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14 Kaliber (SS-N-30) LACM, 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Burevestnik (Krizak I mod†) with 1 quad Inchr with Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) ASHM/ASW, 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm guns
1 Burevestnik (Krizak II) each with 1 quad Inchr with RPK-3 Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) ASHM/ASW, 2 twin Inchr with 10 Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 100mm guns

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 84
CORVETTES 48
FSGM 17:
2 Grad Sviyazhsk (Bayan-M) with 1 octuple VLS with 3M55 Onyx ASHM; 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30) LACM, 2 sextuple Inchr with 3M47 Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM; 1 AK630-M2 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (6 additional vessels in build)
2 Siwuch (Dergach) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
12 Ovod (Nanuchka III) with 2 triple Inchr with P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko), 1 76mm gun
1 Ovod (Nanuchka IV) with 2 triple Inchr with 3M55 Onyx (SS-N-26) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko), 1 76mm gun
FSM 31:
3 Albatros (Grisha III) with 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 twin 57mm gun
18 Albatros (Grisha V) with 1 twin Inchr with Osa M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 76mm gun
3 Astrakhan (Bayan) with 1 sextuple Inchr with 3M47 Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse), 1 A-215 Grad-M 122mm MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
7 Parchim II with 2 quad Inchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCF 25:
6 Molnya (Tarantal II) with 2 twin Inchr with P-15M Termit (SS-N-2C/D Styx) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
19 Molnya (Tarantal III) with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PBM 7 Grachonok with 1 quad Inchr with 3M47 Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse), (original design was as diving tender)
PHG 3 Vekhr (Matka) with 2 single Inchr with P-15M Termit (SS-N-2C/D Styx) ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PHT 1 Sokol (Mukha) with 2 quad 406mm TT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 53
MHO 2 Rubin (Gorya) with 2 twin Inchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
MSO 11: 10 Akvamaren (Natya): 1 Agat (Natya II) (all with 2 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 RBU1200 Uragan, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
MSC 25: 23 Yakhont (Sorya) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad Inchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 2 Project 1258 (Yezyurka)
MHI 15: 9 Sapfir (Lida) with 1 AK630 CIWS; 3 Project 696 (Tolya); 3 Malakhit (Olya)

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 20:
4 Tapir (Alligator) with 2-3 twin Inchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
12 Project 775 (Ropucha I) with 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)
3 Project 775M (Ropucha II) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)
1 Tapir (Alligator) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B; 13 MBT; 300 troops) (vessel launched in 2012; expected ISD end-2013)

LANDING CRAFT 25
LCU 11:
2 Dyugon (3 more in build)
9 Project 11770 (Serno) (capacity 100 troops)
LCM 7 Akula (Ondatra) (capacity 1 MBT)

LCAC 7:
2 Zhergan (Aist) with 2 twin AK630 CIWS (capacity 4 lt tk)
2 Pomornik (Zubr) with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T)
3 Kalmar (Lebed) (capacity 2 lt tk)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 626

SSAN 7: 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch); 1 Losharik (one further vessel under construction); 2 Project 1851 (Paltus); 3 Kashalot (Uniform)

SSA 1 Sarov

ABU 12: 8 Kashtan; 4 Sura

AE 2: 1 Muna; 1 Dubna

AEM 3: 2 Amga; 1 Lama

AG 3: 2 Vytryagole; 1 Potok

AGB 4 Dobrynina Mixitich

AGE 2: 1 Tchusovoy; 1 Zvezdochka (2 more vessels under construction)

AGI 11: 2 Alpinist; 1 Balzam; 3 Moma; 5 Vishnya

AGM 1 Marshal Nedelin

AGOR 6: 1 Akademik Krylov; 2 Sibiriyaev; 2 Vinograd; 1 Seliger

AGS 21: 3 BGK-797; 6 Kamenka; 9 Onega; 3 Vaygach

AGSH 1 Samara

AGSI 50: 8 Biya; 25 Finik; 7 Moma; 12 Yug

AH 3 Ob +

AK 2 Bira

AOL 13: 2 Dubna; 5 Uda; 6 Altay (mod)

AOR 5 Boris Chilikin

AORL 3: 1 Kaliningradneft; 2 Olekma

AOS 1 Luza

AR 13 Amur

ARC 7: 4 Emba; 3 Klasma

ARS 14: 4 Mikhail Rudenskiy; 10 Goryn

AS 1 Project 2090 (Malina)

ASR 2: 1 Nepal; 1 Alogez

ATF 62: 1 Alexander Piskunov; 2 Baklazhan; 5 Kutom; 3 Ingul; 2 Neftegaz; 14 Okhtenskiy; 18 Prometey; 1 Prut; 3 Sliv; 3 Sorum

AWT 2 Manych

AXL 12: 10 Petrushka; 2 Smolny with 2 RBU 2500, 2 twin 76mm guns

YDG 28: 15 Bereza; 13 Pelym

YDT 91: 40 flamingo; 20 Nyryat 2; 28 Yelva; 3 Project 11980

YGS 60 GPB-480

YO 36: 5 Khobi; 30 Toplive; 1 Konda

YPB 30 Bolsa

YPT 12 Shelon

YTB 60: 3 PE-65; 2 Project 745MB/S; 9 Project 16609; 11 Stividor; 35 Sidehole

YTR 42: 27 Pozharny; 15 Morkov

Naval Aviation €28,000

4 Fleet Air Forces

Flying hours 60+ hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot

1 sqn (forming) with MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum

1 sqn with Su-27 Flanker

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

1 regt with Su-24MR/04 Fencer

1 sqn with Su-24MR/04 Fencer

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

2 sqn with Il-18D; Il-20RT Coot A; Il-22 Coot B; Il-38/Il-38N May*

8 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix

1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze A

2 sqn with Tu-142MR/02 Bear F/J*

1 unit with Ka-31R Helix

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Be-12 Mail*; Mi-8 Hip

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12PS Curl; An-26 Curl; Tu-134

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12BK Curl; An-24RV Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Cooler; An-140

2 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134

TRAINING

1 sqn with Su-30SM; L-39 Albatros

1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip

EQUIMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 136 combat capable

FTR 40: 2 MiG-29K Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29KUB Fulcrum; 18 Su-33 Flanker D; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

FGA 31: 28 Su-24M Fencer; 3 Su-30SM

ATK 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot

ASW 27 Tu-142M/04S Bear F/J

MP 26: 3 Be-12 Mail*; 1 Il-18D; 22 Il-38/Il-38N May*

ISR 8 Su-24MR Fencer E*

SAR 3 An-12PS Cub

EW * ELINT 4: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 2 Il-22 Coot B

TPT 50: Medium 2 An-12BK Curl; Light 46: 1 An-24RV Coke; 27 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Cooler; 2 An-140; 10 Tu-134; 14 PAX 2 Tu-154M Careless

TRG 4 L-39 Albatros

HELICOPTERS

ASW 83: 63 Ka-27 Helix; 20 Mi-14 Haze A

EW 8 Mi-8 Hip J

AEW 2 Ka-31R Helix

SAR 56: 16 Ka-27PS Helix D; 40 Mi-14PS Haze C

TPT 1 Medium 36: 28 Ka-29 Helix; 4 Mi-8T Hip; 4 Mi-8MT Hip

MSL

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt)

ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter); Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)

AAM * IR R-27/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); SARH R-27/R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo)

Naval Infantry (Marines) €20,000

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (fleet) SF bde (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)

2 (fleet) SF bde (cadre) (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 MR bde

1 MR bde (forming)

1 MR regt

5 indep naval inf bde

1 indep naval inf regt
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 arty regt
1 SSN bde with 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)

AIR DEFENCE
2 SAM regt with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); Strela-1/0
Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher)
1 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
1 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 200 T-72/T-80
RECCE 60 BRDM-2 each with 9K11 Malutka (AT-3
Sagger)
AIFV 300 BMP-2
APC 800
  APC (T) 300 MT-LB
  APC (W) 500 BTR-80
ARTY 365
  SP 263: 122mm 113: 95 2S1; 18 2S19; 152mm 150: 50
  2A36; 50 2A65; 50 2S3
GUN/MOR 66
  SP 120mm 42: 12 2S2 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S
  TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 122mm 36 BM-21
AT
MSL
  SP 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2
  with 9K123 Khrisanterma (AT-15 Springer)
MANPATS 9K11 Malutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K113
  Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
GUNS 100mm T-12
AD
SAM
  SP 86: 20 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 50 Strela-1/Strela-10
  (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher); 8 S-300PS (SA-10
  Grumble); 8 S-400 (SA-21 Grozvler)
  MANPAD 9K32 Shturm (SA-7 Grail)
GUNS 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4
MSL • SRBM 12 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)

Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops 2,000

FORCES BY ROLE
COASTAL DEFENCE
  3 AshM bde
  2 AshM regt
  1 indep AshM bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARTY • SP 130mm c36 A-222 Bereg
  AshM 36+: 24 3K60 Bal (SS-C-6 Sennight); 12 K-300P
  Bastion (SS-C-5 Stooge); some 4K44 Redut (SS-C-1 Sepul)
  some 4K51 Rubezh (SS-C-3 Styx)

Military Air Forces €148,000 (incl conscripts)
  Flying hours 60 to 100 hrs/year (combat aircraft)
  120+ (transport aircraft)
HQ at Balashikha, near Moscow. A joint CIS Unified Air
  Defence System covers RUS, ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK,
  TKM, UKR and UZB. The Russian Air Force is currently
  undergoing a period of restructuring, both in terms of
  general organisation as well as air-base and unit structure.

FORCES BY ROLE
BOMBER
  4 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR Backfire C
  3 sqn with Tu-95MS Bear
  1 sqn with Tu-160 Blackjack

FIGHTER
  1 regt with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
  1 regt with MiG-29SMT/UBT Fulcrum
  1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
  1 regt with MiG-31; Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
  1 regt with MiG-31; Su-27SM2; Su-30M2
  4 sqn with MiG-31 Foxhound
  2 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
  1 regt with MiG-31BM; Su-24M/M2/MR
  1 regt with Su-27SM2 Flanker; Su-35S Flanker; Su-30M2
  1 regt with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2
  1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM

GROUND ATTACK
  1 regt with Su-25M2/2M Fencer
  2 sqn with Su-24M/M2 Fencer
  8 sqn with Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot
  1 regt with Su-34 Fullback; Su-24M/M2 Fencer

GROUND ATTACK/ISR
  1 regt with Su-34 Fullback; Su-24MR Fencer*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
  1 sqn with Mi-8PPA Hip

ISR
  2 regt with Su-24MR Fencer*
  1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer*
  1 flt with An-30 Clank

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
  1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay

TANKER
  1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M Midas

TRANSPORT
  6 regt/sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Carl; Tu-134
  Crusty; Tu-154 Careless; Mi-8 Hip
  1 regt with An-124 Condor; Il-76MD Candid
  1 regt with An-12BK Cub; Il-76MD Candid
  1 sqn with An-22 Cock
  3 regt with Il-76MD Candid

ATTACK HELICOPTER
  1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35
  Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip
  2 sqn with Ka-52A Hokum B
  4 sqn with Mi-24 Hind
  3 sqn with Mi-28N Havoc B
  1 sqn with Mi-35 Hind

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
  17 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo

AIR DEFENCE
  8 AD bde HQ
  4 regt with 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly/SA-17
  Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)
  17 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM (SA-20)
  2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-
  22 Greyhound)
### Equipment by Type

**Aircraft** 1,201 combat capable

- **BBR** 141: 63 Tu-22M3/M Backfire C; 31 Tu-95MS6 Bear; 31 Tu-95MS16 Bear; 16 Tu-160 Blackjack
- **FTR** 420: 120 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 30 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 100 MiG-31B/31BS Foxhound; 50 MiG-31BM Foxhound; 100 Su-27 Flanker; 20 Su-27UB Flanker
- **FGA** 345: 28 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum; 100 Su-24M Fence; 50 Su-24M2 Fence; 47 Su-27SM2 Flanker; 14 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 14 Su-30M2; 15 Su-30SM; 46 Su-34 Fullback; 25 Su-35S Flanker
- **ATK** 215: 150 Su-25 Frogfoot; 50 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB Frogfoot
- **ISR** 86: 4 An-30 Clank; 80 Su-24MR Fence*; 2 Tu-214ON
- **ELINT** 32: 15 Il-20M Coot A; 5 Il-22 Coot B; 12 Il-22M Coot B
- **AEW&C** 22: 15 A-50 Mainstay; 3 A-50U Mainstay; 4 Il-76SKIP (Be-796 – telemetry aircraft)
- **C2** 6: 2 Il-76KVP; 4 Il-86KVP Maxdome
- **TKR** 15: 5 Il-78 Midas; 10 Il-78M Midas
- **TPT** 432: **Heavy** 123: 9 An-124 Condor; 4 An-22 Cock; 110 Il-76MD/MD Candid; **Medium** 65 An-12BK Cub; **Light** 226: 115 An-26 Curl; 25 An-72 Coaler; 5 An-140; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 Crusty; **PAX** 18 Tu-154 Careless
- **TRG** 198: 150 L-39 Albatros; 48 Yak-130 Mitten

**Helicopters**

- **ATK**
- **C2**
- **TKR**
- **TPT**
- **TRG**
- **UAV**
- **SAM**
- **SP**
- **AD**
- **MSL**

**Ammunition**

- **SAM**
- **SP**
- **AD**
- **SAM**
- **SP**
- **AD**
- **SAM**

**Special Operations Forces** £1,000

**Forces by Role**

**Special Forces** 2 SF unit

### Russian Military Districts

**Western Military District**

HQ at St Petersburg

**Army**

**Forces by Role**

**Command** 2 army HQ

**Special Forces** 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

**Manoeuvre**

- Air Manoeuvre
  - 4 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt)
  - 1 indep AB bde
  - 3 air aslt bde

**Forces by Type**

**RECCE** Tigr

- **AIFV** 1,165: 100 BMD-1; 1,000 BMD-2; 10 BMD-3; 30 BMD-4; 25 BTR-80A
- **APC**
  - **APC (T)** 700 BTR-D
- **ARTY** 600+
  - **TOWED** 122mm 150 D-30
  - **GUN/MOR**
    - **SP** 120mm 250 259 NONA-S (500 in store: 120mm 500 259 NONA-S)
  - **MOR**
    - **TOWED** 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23
  - **AT**
    - **MSL**

**RCL** 73mm SPG-9

**RL** 105mm RPG-29

**GUN**

- **SP** 125mm 36+ 2525

**AD**

- **SAM**
  - **SP** 150 BTR-ZD
- **MANPAD** 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grose); 9K333 Verba; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Grenlin)
  - **ARV** BREM-D; BREEH-M

**Special Operations Forces** £1,000

**Forces by Role**

**Special Forces**
2 SSM bde with *Iskander-M*
1 SSM bde with *Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)*
2 AD bde
1 engr bde
1 MP bde
1 NBC bde

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**
2 log bde

**Reserves**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
**MANOEUVRE**
- Armoured
- 1 tk bde
- Mechanised
- 2 MR bde

**Northern Fleet**

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**
**SUBMARINES** 33
- STRATEGIC 9 SSBN (one to transfer to PF)
- TACTICAL 24: 4 SSGN; 13 SSN; 7 SSK

**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS** 11: 1 CV; 2 CGHMN (one non-operational); 1 CGHM (in repair); 7 DDGHM

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 9: 3 FSGM; 6 FSM

**MINE WARFARE** 12: 1 MHO (in repair); 3 MSO; 8 MSC

**AMPHIBIOUS** 4 LST

**Naval Aviation**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
**FIGHTER**
- 2 sqn with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot

**ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**
- 1 sqn with II-20RT Coot A; II-38 May*; Tu-134
- 3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
- 1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**
**AIRCRAFT**
- FTR 18 Su-33 Flanker D
- ATK 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot
- ASW 13 Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J
- EW • ELINT 3: 2 II-20RT Coot A; 1 II-22 Coot B
- MP 14 II-38 May*
- TPT 9: 8 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134

**HELICOPTERS**
- ASW Ka-27 Helix A
- TPT Ka-29 Helix B; Mi-8 Hip

**Naval Infantry**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
- 1 MR bde
- 1 MR bde (forming)
- 1 naval inf bde
- 1 naval inf regt

---

**Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
**COASTAL DEFENCE**
- 1 ASHM bde

**Baltic Fleet**

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**
**SUBMARINES • TACTICAL** 3 SSK: 1 *Lada*; 2 *Paltus* (Kilo)
**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS** 8: 2 DDGHM; 6 FFGHM
**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 20: 4 FSGM; 7 FSM; 8 PCFG; 1 PBM
**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES** 15: 4 MSC; 11 MHI

**AMPHIBIOUS** 13: 4 LST; 2 LCU; 5 LCM; 2 LCAC

**Naval Aviation**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
**FIGHTER**
- 1 sqn with Su-27 Flanker

**GROUND ATTACK/ISR**
- 1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer

**ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**
- 1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix

**TRANSPORT**
- 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
- 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**
**AIRCRAFT**
- FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
- FGA 10 Su-24M Fencer
- ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer* 
- TPT 8: 6 An-26 Curl; 2 Tu-134 Crusty

**HELICOPTERS**
- ASW Ka-27 Helix
- TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip

**Naval Infantry**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
- 1 MR bde
- 1 MR regt
- 1 naval inf bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
- 1 arty bde
- 1 SSM bde with *Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)*

**AIR DEFENCE**
- 1 SAM regt

---

**Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
**COASTAL DEFENCE**
- 1 ASHM regt
### Military Air Force

#### 1st Air Force & Air Defence Command

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**FIGHTER**
- 1 regt with MiG-29SMT 
  Fulcrum
- 1 regt with MiG-31 Foxhound; Su-27 Flanker
- 1 regt with Su-27 Flanker

**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR**
- 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR Fencer

**GROUND ATTACK/ISR**
- 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback; Su-24MR Fencer

**ISR**
- 1 flt with A-30 Clank

**ELECTRONIC WARFARE**
- 1 sqn with Mi-8PPA Hip

**TRANSPORT**
- 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty

**ATTACK HELICOPTER**
- 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip
- 2 sqn with Mi-24 Hind

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
- 3 sqn with Mi-8 Hip

**AIR DEFENCE**
- 1 regt with 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)
- 7 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle)

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
- **FTR** 160: 51 MiG-31 Foxhound; 109 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
- **FGA** 102: 28 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum; 44 Su-24M/M2 Fencer; 24 Su-34 Fullback
- **ISR** 38: 4 An-30 Clank; 10 MiG-25RB Foxbat* 24 Su-24MR Fencer*
- **TPT** 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134

**HELICOPTERS**
- **ATK** 58+: 12 Ka-52A Hokum B; 30 Mi-24 Hind; 12 Mi-28N Havoc B; 4+ Mi-35 Hind
- **EW** 10 Mi-8PPA Hip
- **TPT** Medium 50 Mi-8 Hip

**AD • SAM • SP** 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); S-300PS/PM (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)

**Airborne Troops**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**SPECIAL FORCES**
- 1 (AB Recce) SF regt

**MANOEUVRE**
- Air Manoeuvre
- 3 AB div

**Central Military District**
- HQ at Yekaterinburg

### Army

#### FORCES BY ROLE

**COMMAND**
- 2 army HQ

**SPECIAL FORCES**
- (Spetsnaz) SF bde

**MANOEUVRE**
- Armoured
- 1 tk bde
- Mechanised
- 1 (201st) MR div
- 7 MR bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
- 2 arty bde
- 1 MRL bde
- 2 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
- 2 AD bde
- 1 engr bde
- 2 NBC bde

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**
- 2 log bde

**Reserves**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
- 3 MR bde

### Military Air Force

#### 2nd Air Force & Air Defence Command

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**FIGHTER**
- 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
- 2 sqn with MiG-31 Foxhound

**GROUND ATTACK**
- 2 sqn with Su-24 Fencer

**ISR**
- 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E

**TRANSPORT**
- 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip

**ATTACK HELICOPTER**
- 2 sqn with Mi-24 Hind

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
- 2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo

**AIR DEFENCE**
- 6 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
- FTR 73 MiG-31 Foxhound
- FGA 26 Su-24M Fencer
- ISR 13 Su-24MR Fencer E
- TPT 36 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-154 Careless

**HELICOPTERS**
- ATK 24 Mi-24 Hind
- TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 Halo; 40 Mi-8 Hip

**AD • SAM • SP** S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
Airborne Troops
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB bde

Southern Military District
HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
2 army HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
1 recce bde
Mechanised
6 MR bde
1 MR bde (Armenia)
1 MR bde (Abkhazia)
1 MR bde (South Ossetia)
3 (lt/mt) MR bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 MRL bde
1 MRL regt
1 SSM bde with Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)
2 AD bde
1 engr bde
1 NBC bde
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
2 log bde

Black Sea Fleet
The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in the Crimea, at Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletsy Bay.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 2 SSK (also 1 Som (Tango) in reserve)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5: 2 CGHM; 1 DDGM; 2 FFGM
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20: 4 FSGM; 6 FSM; 1 PHM; 5 PCFG; 3 PBM; 1 PHT
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9:
1 MHO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC
AMPHIBIOUS 9: 8 LST; 1 LCU

Naval Aviation
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
1 regt with MiG-29 Fulcrum
1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum (Armenia)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 regt with Su-27 Flanker; Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2

GROUND ATTACK
6 sqn with Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot
1 regt with Su-34 Fullback; Su-24M Fencer

ISR
1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E

TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip

ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Ka-52A Hokum B
3 sqn with Mi-28N Havoc B
1 sqn with Mi-35 Hind

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo

AIR DEFENCE
1 regt with 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly)
### Forces by Role

#### Ground Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANOEUVRE</td>
<td>MANOEUVRE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE SUPPORT</td>
<td>SERVICE SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESERVES</td>
<td>RESERVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 MR Bde</td>
<td>8 MR Bde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 regt with Su-27M2 Flanker</td>
<td>1 regt with Su-27M2 Flanker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 regt with MiG-31 Foxhound: Su-27SM2 Flanker</td>
<td>1 regt with MiG-31 Foxhound: Su-27SM2 Flanker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 regt with Su-25F Frogfoot: Su-35M</td>
<td>1 regt with Su-25F Frogfoot: Su-35M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Naval Infantry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3rd Air Force &amp; Air Defence Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Air Defence regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ASBM regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ASBM regt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Naval Aviation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3rd Air Force &amp; Air Defence Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 AB div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 air ass div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Forces by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hip</td>
<td>TPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPT</td>
<td>Dz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Dz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Dz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencer</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBM</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKT</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulcrum</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wessex</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Naval Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>195</td>
<td>3rd Air Force &amp; Air Defence Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Eastern Military District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fencer</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSM</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSM</td>
<td>FSM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Russia and Eurasia**
Paramilitary 489,000

Federal Border Guard Service £160,000
Directly subordinate to the president; now reportedly all contract-based personnel

Forces by Role

Manoeuvre
Air Manoeuvre
2 air aslt bde

Airborne Troops

Equipment by Type

Air Defence
2 regt with 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)
3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle)
1 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)

Helicopters

ATK 44: 20 Ka-52A Hokum B; 24 Mi-24 Hind
TPT 60: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 56 Mi-8 Hip

AD • SAM • SP 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); S-300PS/PM (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)

Army

Federal Agency for Special Construction (MOD) £50,000

Federal Communications and Information Agency £55,000

Forces by Role

Manoeuvre
Other
4 paramilitary corps
28 paramilitary bde

Federal Protection Service £10,000–30,000 active
Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt)

Forces by Role

Manoeuvre
Mechanised
1 mech inf regt
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB regt
Other
1 (Presidential) gd regt

Federal Security Service 4,000 active (armed)

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
Some cdo unit (including Alfa and Vympel units)

Interior Troops 170,000

FORCES BY ROLE
7 Regional Commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus, Volga, Eastern, North-Western and Siberian
MANOEUVRE
Other
3 (55th, 59th & ODOM) paramilitary div (2-5 paramilitary regt)
18 (OBROM) paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)
2 indep paramilitary bde (OB/OMBR)
102 paramilitary regt/bn (incl special motorised units)
11 (special) paramilitary unit
Aviation
8 sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 9
AIFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-1/BMP-2/BTR-80
ARTY 35
TOWED 122mm 20 D-30
MOR 120mm 15 PM-38
AIRCRAFT TPT 23: Heavy 9 Il-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 12 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Cooler
HELICOPTERS • TPT 70: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 60 Mi-8 Hip

Railway Troops (MOD) 20,000
4 regional commands

FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
10 (railway) tpt bde

Cyber

Until 2003, activities within the cyber domain were the responsibility of the Russian SIGINT agency, FAPSI. In 2003, this agency was abolished and its responsibilities divided between the defence ministry and the internal security service (FSB). The first official doctrinal statement on the role of the Russian military in cyberspace, the ‘Conceptual Views on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information Space’, was released at the end of 2011, and described cyber-force tasks with little correlation to those of equivalent commands in the West. In particular, the document contains no mention of the possibility of offensive cyber activity. It is also entirely defensive in tone, and focuses on force protection and prevention of information war, including allowing for a military role in negotiating international treaties governing information security. Following a mixed performance in the information aspects of the armed conflict with Georgia in 2008, there was discussion about creating ‘Information Troops’, whose role would include cyber capability; but this initiative was publicly scorned by the FSB. In January 2012, then-CGS Makarov gave a different picture of the three main tasks for any new command: ‘disrupting adversary information systems, including by introducing harmful software; defending our own communications and command systems’; and ‘working on domestic and foreign public opinion using the media, Internet and more’. The third task is a reminder that, unlike some other nations with advanced cyber capabilities, Russia deals in cyber warfare as an integral component of information warfare. Operations in Crimea in early 2014, and in the wider information space concerning the conflict in Ukraine, demonstrate that Russian thinking and capacity has matured in these areas. In Crimea, Russian troops demonstrated integrated use of EW and SOF capabilities, as well as wider use of cyberspace and strategic communications to shape an effective information campaign targeted as much at domestic as foreign audiences.

DEPLOYMENT

ARMENIA
3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 sqn with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 AD bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 AD bty with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)

BELARUS
1 htr flt with 5 Su-27 Flanker; 1 A-50 Mainstay; 4 SAM units with S-300 (SA-10 Grumble); 1 radar station at Baranovichi (Volga system; leased); 1 naval comms site

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2

CÔTE D’IVOIRE
UN • UNOCI 11 obs

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UN • MONUSCO 28 obs

GEORGIA
7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; some S-300 SAM; some atk hel); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

KAZAKHSTAN
1 radar station at Balkash (Dnepr system; leased)

KYRGYZSTAN
c500; 5 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip spt hel

LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 3 obs

MIDDLE EAST
UN • UNTSO 4 obs

MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRI
c1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/ AIFV/APC; 7 Mi-24 Hind; some Mi-8 Hip
SERBIA
OSCE • Kosovo 1

SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 3; 2 obs

SUDAN
UN • UNISFA 1 obs

SYRIA
1 naval facility at Tartus

TAJIKISTAN
5,000; 1 mil base with (1 201st) MR div; 40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 80 BTR-80; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12/12 9P140 Uragan); 4 Mi-8 Hip

UKRAINE
Crimea: 20,000; 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty bde; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 20 BTR-80 APC: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 SAM bn with S-300PM; 1 AShM unit with K-300P Bastion; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system)
Donetsk/Luhansk: 300+ (reported)
OSCE • Ukraine 16

WESTERN SAHARA
UN • MINURSO 11 obs

---

**Tajikistan TJK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tajikistani Somoni Tr</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tr</td>
<td>40.5bn</td>
<td>46.6bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>8.5bn</td>
<td>9.16bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>per capita</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inflation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Def bdgt [a]</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tr</td>
<td>923m</td>
<td>946m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>194m</td>
<td>186m</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FMA (US)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$</td>
<td>0.8m</td>
<td>1.5m</td>
<td>0.7m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[a] Defence and law enforcement expenses

---

**ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300, Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Paramilitary 7,500**

**Conscript liability 24 months**

---

**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Army 7,300**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**

Mechanised
3 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 air aslt bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde
1 SAM regt

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**

**TPT**

Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty

**TRG**

4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52

**HELICOPTERS**

ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H

**Air Force/Air Defence 1,500**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**TRANSPORT**

1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty

**ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**

1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**

**TPT**

Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty

**TRG**

4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52

**HELICOPTERS**

ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H

**Paramilitary 7,500**

**Interior Troops 3,800**

**National Guard 1,200**

**Capabilities**

The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than token forces and most equipment is of Soviet origin, with no significant procurement plans in place. The paucity of military capability partially reflects that the primary security concern remains internal and border security, with the country sharing an extended border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s membership of the CSTO provides a security guarantee and, along with Dushanbe’s defence relationship with Moscow, this is reinforced by the presence in Tajikistan of Russia’s largest overseas military base (since the annexation of Crimea brought Sevastopol under Russia’s direct administration). Given the overall weaknesses of the Tajik armed and security forces – which include limited special-forces training and personnel issues revolving around high numbers of conscripts and low planning capacity – low-level militant activity linked to drug trafficking could continue to burden and challenge the armed forces.

---

Downloaded by [RFE/RL Prague Library], [Mr. Martina Boudova] at 01:21 11 February 2015
Emergencies Ministry 2,500
Border Guards

DEPLOYMENT

UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 1

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 5,000; 1 mil base with (1 (201st) MR div; 40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 80 BTR-80; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12/12 9P140 Uragan); 4 Mi-8 Hip

Turkmenistan TKM

Turkmen New Manat TMM 2013 2014 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TMM</th>
<th>US$</th>
<th>TMM</th>
<th>US$</th>
<th>TMM</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>116bn</td>
<td>40.8bn</td>
<td>135bn</td>
<td>47.5bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,157</td>
<td>8,203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def exp</td>
<td>€1.75bn</td>
<td>€612m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA (US)</td>
<td>0.69m</td>
<td>0.1m</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population 5,171,943
Ethnic groups: Turkmen 77%; Uzbek 9%; Russian 7%; Kazak 2%

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 13.4% 4.9% 5.3% 5.1% 19.1% 1.8%
Female 13.0% 4.8% 5.2% 5.1% 19.9% 2.4%

Capabilities

Turkmenistan’s largely conscript-based armed forces are poorly equipped and remain reliant on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine. The country declared neutrality in 1999 and enshrined this principle in its 2009 Military Doctrine. Delivery of around 30 T-90S MBTs, ordered from Russia in 2011, has yet to be finalised. The air force has a limited number of combat aircraft and helicopters, though availability is uncertain. Airlift is modest, and insufficient to deliver substantial military effect overseas, or even across the country. There are plans to strengthen coastal naval forces by 2015, and some assets have already been procured, leading to a moderate improvement in the Caspian Sea naval presence. Military capability is believed to be limited by low levels of training and availability of spare parts.

ACTIVE 22,000 (Army 18,500 Navy 500 Air 3,000)
Conscript liability 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 18,500
5 Mil Districts

FORECES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
3 MR div
2 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 air aslt bn
Other
1 MR trg div

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 MRL regt
1 AT regt
1 SSdn bde with Scud
2 SAM bde
1 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 680: 10 T-90S; 670 T-72
RECCE 170 BRDM/BRDM-2
AIFV 942: 930 BMP-1/BMP-2; 12 BRM
APC (W) 829 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

ARTY 570
SP 56: 122mm 40 2S1; 152mm 16 2S3
TOWED 269: 122mm 180 D-30; 152mm 89: 17 D-1; 72 D-20

GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 Anona

MRL 131: 122mm 65: 9 9P138; 56 BM-21; 220mm 60
9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch

MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 PM-38

AT
MSL • MANPADS 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 (AT-6 Spiral)

GUNS 100mm 72 MT-12/T-12
AD • SAM 53+
SP 53: 40 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 13 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)

MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Graal)‡

MSL • SSM 10 SS-1 Scud

Navy 500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19
PCFG 2 Edermen (RUS Molnya) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E Uran ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 76mm gun

PCC 4 Archangelsk

PBF 12: 5 Grif-T; 5 Dearsan 14: 2 Sobol

PB 1 Point

Air Force 3,000

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum; Su-17 Fitter; Su-25MK Frogfoot

TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26 Carl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind

Downloaded by [RFE/RL Prague Library], [Mr Martina Boudova] at 01:21 11 February 2015
TRAINING
1 unit with Su-7B Fitter A; L-39 Albatros

AIR DEFENCE
Some sqn with S-75 Divina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 94 combat capable
FTR 24: 22 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
FGA 68: 3 Su-7B Fitter A; 65 Su-17 Fitter B
ATK 2 Su-25MK Frogfoot (41 more being refurbished)
TPT • Light 1 An-26 Curl
TRG 2 L-39 Albatros

HELICOPTERS
ATK • Hind
TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip

AD • SAM 50 S-75 Divina (SA-2 Guideline)/S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)/S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)

Ukraine

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 64,000
Includes both Land Forces and 8th Army Corps. Ground combat in the east is conducted by a mixture of regular and national guard units, and irregular formations.

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND
1 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES
2 SF regt

MANOEUVRE
Armoured
2 tk bde
Mechanised
9 mech bde
1 mtn bde
Aviation
2 avn bde
1 avn regt

COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bde
3 MRL regt
1 SSM bde
3 AD regt
4 engr regt
1 EW regt
1 CBRN regt
4 sigs regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 700 T-64BV/BM; (10 T-84 Oplot; 165 T-80; 600 T-72; 650 T-64; 20 T-55 all in store)

RECCE 450 BRDM-2

AIFV 1,249: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2; 200 BMP-1; 900 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; 115 BRM-1K

APC 490
APC (T) 15 BTR-D
APC (W) 360: up to 10 BTR-4; 5 BTR-60; 235 BTR-70; 110 BTR-80

ARTY 1,862
SF 528+: 122mm 240 2S1; 152mm 288: 35 2S19 Farm; 235 2S3; 18 2S5; 203mm 257 (up to 90 in store)
LANDING CRAFT 3
LCAC 1 Pomornik (Zubr) with 2 quad Inchr with
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS,
(capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))
LCU 2
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 30
AG 2
AGI 2 Muna
AGS 1 Biya
AKL 1
AO 2 Toplivb
AWT 1 Sudak
AXL 3 Petrushka
YDT 13: 1 Yecla; 12 other
YTM 2
YTR 2 Pozharny
ZY 1 Sokal

Naval Aviation £1,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable
ASW 1 Be-12 Mail
TPT • Light 2 An-26 Curl
HELICOPTERS
ASW 3 Mi-14 Haze
TPT • Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix-B

Naval Infantry £500

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE

Air Forces 45,000
Flying hours 40 hrs/yr

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
4 bde with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-27 Flanker
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 bde with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot
ISR
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E*
TRANSPORT
3 bde with An-24; An-26; An-30; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty
TRAINING
Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Some sqn with Mi-8; Mi-9; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

AIR DEFENCE
11 bde/regt with 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11); S-300P/PS/PT
(SA-10)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 202 combat capable
FTR 116: 80 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 36 Su-27 Flanker
FGA 34 Su-24 Fencer
ATK 29 Su-25 Frogfoot
ISR 25: 2 An-30 Clank; 23 Su-24MR Fencer E*
TPT 43: Heavy 18 Il-76 Candid; Light 25: 3 An-24 Coke;
20 An-26 Curl; 2 Tu-134 Crusty
TRG 37 L-39 Albatros
HELICOPTERS
C2 4 Mi-9
TPT 33: Medium 30 Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
AD • SAM • SP 322: 250 S-300P/PS/PT (SA-10 Grumble);
72 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly)

MLS
ASM: Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt);
Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge);
ARM: Kh-58 (AS-11 Killer); Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler);
Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle)
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
SARH R-27 (AA-10A Alamo)

Airborne Forces €5,500
FORCES BY ROLE:
MANOEUVRE
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB bde
3 air mob bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIFV 75: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2
APC 136
APC (T) 25 BTR-D
APC (W) 111: 1 BTR-60; 110 BTR-80
ARTY 118
TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30
GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 Anona
MOR 120mm 24 2S12

Paramilitary
National Guard €33,000
Ministry of Internal Affairs; 6 territorial cmd

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Some tk bn
Mechanised
Some mech bn
Light
Some lt inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT T-64; T-72 (reported)
AIFV BTR-3; 50 BTR-4
APC
APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80
PPV Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan

Border Guard n.k.

Maritime Border Guard
The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border
Guards and is not part of the navy.

FORCES BY ROLE
PATROL
4 (cutter) bde
2 rvn bde
MINE WARFARE
1 MCM sqn

TRANSPORT
3 sqn
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 trg div
1 (aux ships) gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26
PCFT 6 Stenka with 4 single 406mm TT
PCT 3 Pauk I with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200,
1 76mm gun
PHT 1 Muravey with 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm
gun
PB 12: 11 Zhuk; 1 Orlan (seven additional vessels
under construction)
PBR 4 Shmel

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1
AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 Camp; Light An-24
Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler
HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 Helix A

Civil Defence Troops n.k.
(Ministry of Emergency Situations)

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
4 paramilitary bde
4 paramilitary regt

DEPLOYMENT
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Constitution: Codified constitution (1996)
Specific legislation: ‘On the procedures to deploy Armed
Forces of Ukraine units abroad’ (1518-III, March 2000).
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: Parliament
authorised to approve decision to provide military
assistance, deploy troops abroad and allow foreign military
presence in Ukraine (Art. 85, para 23); Also, in accordance
with Art. 7 of the specific legislation (above), president is
authorised to take a decision to deploy troops abroad and
at the same time to submit a draft law to the Parliament of
Ukraine for approval.

AFGHANISTAN
NATO • ISAF 10

ARMENIA/azerbaijan
OSCE • Minsk Conference 1

CÔTE D’IVOIRE
UN • UNOCI 40; 1 hel ft

CYPRUS
UN • UNFICYP 2

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UN • MONUSCO 254; 10 obs; 2 atk hel sqn; 1 hel sqn

LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 177; 2 obs; 1 hel sqn
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Following the overthrow of Ukraine’s President Yanukovich in February 2014, the region of Crimea requested to join the Russian Federation after a referendum regarded as unconstitutional by the new Ukrainian government. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition.

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia Crimea: 20,000; 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty bde; 80 BMP-2; 20 BTR-80; 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 SAM bn with S-300PM; 1 AshM unit with K-300P Bastion; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system)

Donetsk/Luhansk: 300+ (reported)

Uzbekistan UZB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uzbekistani Som s</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>119tr</td>
<td>142tr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>56.8bn</td>
<td>63.1bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def exp</td>
<td>$</td>
<td>$3.33tr</td>
<td>$2.15bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA (US)</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>2.7m</td>
<td>1.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$1= s</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,094.66</td>
<td>2,249.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population 28,929,716

Ethnic groups: Uzbek 73%; Russian 6%; Tajik 5%; Kazakh 4%; Karakalpak 2%; Tatar 2%; Korean <1%; Ukrainian <1%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0–14</th>
<th>15–19</th>
<th>20–24</th>
<th>25–29</th>
<th>30–64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capabilities

Uzbekistan’s conscript-based armed forces are the most capable in Central Asia, and better equipped than those of its immediate neighbours. In contrast to other Central Asian states, Uzbekistan maintains an ambivalent strategic relationship with Russia; although it uses mainly Soviet-era equipment, maintains bilateral defence ties and is a member of the SCO, it suspended its membership of the CSTO in mid-2012. The relationship with Russia may strengthen, though, after the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan leaves a potentially unstable country with multiple security concerns on Uzbekistan’s border. As part of an agreement covering transit rights for US and UK military equipment returning from Afghanistan, the Uzbek armed forces will receive some military equipment, although the type and amount are unclear. Fixed-wing airlift is limited, but there is substantial rotary-wing lift, allowing for deployment across the country’s challenging...
topography. Flying hours are reported to be low, with logistical and maintenance shortcomings affecting the availability of aircraft.

**ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)**

Paramilitary 20,000

*Conscript liability 12 months*

---

**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Army 24,500**

4 Mil Districts; 2 op cmd; 1 Tashkent Comd

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

**MANOEUVRE**

Armed

1 tk bde

Mechanised

11 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bde

1 AB bde

Mountain

1 lt mtn inf bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

3 arty bde

1 MRL bde

---

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**

**MBT**

30 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum

**FGA**

74: 26 Su-17M (Su-17MZ)/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ) Fitter C/G; 23 Su-24 Fencer; 25 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

**ATK**

20 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot

**EW/Tpt**

26 An-12 Cub (med tpt)/An-12PB Cub (EW)

**ELINT/TRANSPORT**

11 Su-24MP Fencer F *

**ELINT/Tpt**

13 An-26 Curl (lt tpt)/An-26RKR Curl (ELINT)

**TPT • Light**

2: 1 An-24 Coke; 1 Tu-134 Crusty

**TRG**

5 L-39 Albatros (9 more in store)

**HELICOPTERS**

**ATK**

29 Mi-24 Hind

**C2**

2 Mi-6/A Ya Hook C

**TPT**

79 Heavy: 27: 6 Mi-6 Helo; 1 Mi-26 Hal; Medium 52 Mi-8 Hip

**AD • SAM 45**

**TOWED**

S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)

**STATIC**

S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)

**MSL**

ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)

ARM Kh-25P (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilder)

AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)

---

**FOREIGN FORCES**

**Germany 100; some C-160 Transall**
Table 5  Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia and Eurasia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation (Current)</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity (Current)</th>
<th>Prime Nationality</th>
<th>Prime Contractor</th>
<th>Order Date</th>
<th>First Delivery Due</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-90S</td>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UKBTM</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa’ar 62 OPV</td>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>AUS</td>
<td>Israel Shipyards</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>For Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-300PM</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>RUS Government surplus</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>Donation of four batteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-82A</td>
<td>AIFV</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>RUS VPK</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Follow-on to original 2012 order. Part of an eight ac MoU. First ac in test</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-295M</td>
<td>Lt tpt ac</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Int’l (Airbus Defence &amp; Space)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Heavy tracked universal combat platform programme. Serial production scheduled to commence 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulava (SS-N-X-32)</td>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS MITT</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>In development. For Borey-class SSBNs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-72B3</td>
<td>MBT upgrade</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS UKBTM</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Upgrade of existing T-72 fleet. First delivered to Western Military District in 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armata</td>
<td>AFV</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS UKBTM</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Heavy tracked universal combat platform programme. Serial production scheduled to commence 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurganets-25</td>
<td>AFV</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS KMZ</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Medium tracked universal combat platform programme. Serial production scheduled to commence 2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumerang</td>
<td>AFV</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS VPK</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Improved wheeled universal combat platform programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-82A</td>
<td>AIFV</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS VPK</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Improved BTR-80A series; first production models delivered to Southern Military District in 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borey-class</td>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>RUS Sevmash Shipyard</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Second vessel commissioned Dec 2013. Third in sea trials. 16 SLBM launch tubes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borey-A-class</td>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>RUS Sevmash Shipyard</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Two vessels laid down so far. Pricing dispute continues and will be reviewed in 2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varshavyanka-class (Kilo)</td>
<td>SSK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>RUS Admiralty Shipyards</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>First vessel commissioned Aug 2014. Fifth and sixth laid down late Oct 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lada-class</td>
<td>SSK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>RUS Admiralty Shipyards</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>First vessel accepted in 2010. Construction on further two boats suspended in 2011 but resumed in 2012/13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Gorshkov-class</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>RUS Severnaya Verf Shipyard</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>First vessel in trials as of late 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steregushchiy-class</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>RUS Severnaya Verf Shipyard/ Komotovolsk Shipyard</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Third vessel delivered to Baltic Fleet May 2013; fourth vessel delivered Jun 2014. Two more in build for Pacific Fleet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia and Eurasia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity (Current)</th>
<th>Contract Value</th>
<th>Prime Nationality</th>
<th>Prime Contractor</th>
<th>Order Date</th>
<th>First Delivery Due</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved Steregushchiy-class</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Severnaya Verf Shipyard</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>First of class laid down Feb 2012. Second of class laid down Jul 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Grigorovich-class (Krivak IV)</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Yantar Shipyard</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Six vessels in build for Black Sea Fleet. First vessel launched Mar 2014. ISD expected Nov 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostok-class (Mistral)</td>
<td>LHD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>US$1.2bn</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>DCNS/STX</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>Contract suspended by France Sep 2014 citing Russian actions in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-160 Blackjack</td>
<td>Bbr ac upgrade</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Upgrade of Blackjack fleet, programme lagging behind original schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-29K Fulcrum D</td>
<td>Ftr ac</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (MiG)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>20 MiG-29K and four MiG-29KUB. For navy. Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-29SMT Fulcrum</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>R17bn (US$470m)</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (MiG)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Eight to be delivered in 2015 and remainder in 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-30M2</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Sukhoi)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-30SM</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Sukhoi)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Twelve for navy and 60 for air force. Deliveries under way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-34 Fullback</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Sukhoi)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-35S Flanker</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>See notes</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Sukhoi)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Part of combined order for 48 Su-35S, 12 Su-27SM3 and four Su-30 worth US$2.5bn. Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-76MD-90A</td>
<td>Hvy tpt ac</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>US$4bn</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Aviastar-SP</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>First ac rolled out Jun 2014; delivery due by end of 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka-52 Hokum B</td>
<td>Atk hel</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>US$4bn</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Russian Helicopters (Kamov)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-28N Havoc</td>
<td>Atk hel</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Russian Helicopters (Rostvertol)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Follow-up to 2005 order for 67. Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-8AMTSh Hip Med tpt hel</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Russian Helicopters (Ulan-Ude)</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Deliveries began in late 2010 and are ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-8MTV-5 Hip Med tpt hel</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Russian Helicopters (Kazan)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>First batch delivered Oct 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Almaz-Antey</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>Deliveries ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Almaz-Antey</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>One bde set delivered. May be succeeded by Buk-M3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-400 Triumph (SA-21 Growler)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Almaz-Antey</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Seventh regt deployed 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-300V4 (SA-23 Gladiator/Giant)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Almaz-Antey</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Three battalion sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K66 Pantsir-S1</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>KBP Instrument Design Bureau</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Delivery in progress to S-400 regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9K720 Iskander</td>
<td>SRBM/ LACM</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>KBM</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ballistic and cruise missile variants. In service with four brigades by late 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ukraine (UKR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity (Current)</th>
<th>Contract Value</th>
<th>Prime Nationality</th>
<th>Prime Contractor</th>
<th>Order Date</th>
<th>First Delivery Due</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BTR-4</td>
<td>APC (W)</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>UKR</td>
<td>KMDB</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Being delivered to national-guard units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>