


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Chapter Five

Russia and Eurasia

RUSSIA

Modernisation of the Russian armed forces, begun in 2008 under Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and merely adjusted under his successor Sergei Shoigu, continued in 2014. The appointment in May of a new Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief, Colonel-General Oleg Salyukov, ended a period with no commander in office, but this was the only major personnel change during the year. It was also a year of relative organisational stability, although preparations began for the creation of a new Joint Strategic Command (OSK) North, based around the navy's Northern Fleet. Shoigu announced in October that, as part of the expansion of Russia's military presence in the Arctic, units would be stationed 'along the entire Arctic Circle' by the end of the year; Russia has, however, aspired to revive its Arctic presence for some years, as noted in recent issues of *The Military Balance*. However, much international attention focused on Russian activity in Ukraine, and the performance there, and actions, of its troops.

The practice of 'snap inspections' continued, although on a reduced scale. The inspections were first carried out in 2013. Analysis of shortcomings in that year's inspections led to changes in 2014; in particular, the assessment that there was inadequate training of equipment crews – especially in those crews comprising soldiers serving their one-year conscription term – was addressed by intensifying the combat-training programme. Deficiencies in live-firing routines were dealt with by increasing, by a factor of five to six, munitions allocated for exercises and problems with vehicle handling were addressed by boosting, by a factor of two to three, the training hours allocated for combat-vehicle driving.

Exercises also revealed that the serviceability levels of military equipment were generally unsatisfactory. Serviceability in the air force and the navy was assessed at less than 55%, and in the land forces at less than 65%. This deficiency also led to remedial action. The Oboronservis state corporation, which repairs equipment and provides support functions for military units – and was the subject of corruption allegations linked to the resignation of Serdyukov

(see *The Military Balance 2013*, p. 199) – was radically restructured. Its repair plants and bases became state-industrial corporations, reducing staff numbers from 130,000 to 30,000 in the process. At the same time, first-line equipment-repair and maintenance units were strengthened; some of these had been cut during previous reforms.

Experience in the large-scale redeployment of troops and equipment, which the Russian armed forces had acquired during strategic exercises and large-scale, snap combat-readiness inspections, was put to use in 2014 during the annexation of Crimea. Snap inspections simultaneously mounted in two military districts from 26 February to 3 March provided cover for the covert concentration of incursion forces, as well as providing diversionary political effect. In the fast-paced operation that followed, a mobile group of army special forces, airborne troops and Crimea-based naval infantry, plus motor-rifle and artillery units, was able to concentrate in a peninsula that has no land bridge to Russia. Resupply lines were also successfully established. (The Russian Black Sea Fleet had remained in Crimea under a 1997 agreement with Ukraine; fleet headquarters remain at Sevastopol.)

In comparison with their performance in the 2008 conflict in Georgia, Russian forces in Crimea benefited from improvements in personal equipment, logistics, personnel discipline, electronic-warfare capability and junior-commander training. The military capabilities, tactics, escalation control and integration of state instruments of power with information-warfare tools that the Crimea operation demonstrated – and, seen later, to some degree in eastern Ukraine – were linked by commentators with the earlier public explanation by Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov of the new nature of war, described as 'non-linear', 'hybrid' or 'ambiguous' warfare, among other terms (see pp. 17–20).

Nonetheless, too much focus on the new personal equipment, weapons, vehicles and tactical-communications equipment in evidence during the Crimea mission can be misleading. The troops involved in the operation mainly comprised elite special-operations groups from the Southern Military District

and the Airborne Assault Troops (VDV), which have long been given priority over regular ground forces in terms of training, equipment and funding. Therefore, lessons from the Crimea operation do not reflect the overall state of the Russian armed forces, for which change in these areas has been positive but less striking. Due to the chronic under-manning and conscription issues now characteristic of the Russian Army (see textbox, p. 163), even these elite formations could not be used in their entirety. On the whole, the operation was a test of elite units and special forces, and they performed well.

The annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine led to the worst political confrontation between Russia and the West since the Cold War. Inside Russia, it initiated an examination of existing defence doctrines. This officially began in August 2014 with the establishment of a working group to revise the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, last published in 2010. The new doctrine is expected to be more overtly inimical to NATO and the United States, and will inevitably also lead to changes in the classified State Defence Plan, which was adopted in 2013.

There was no announcement of a further increase in defence spending, not even on rearmament. Russia is facing a general economic slowdown as well as dealing with the effects of international sanctions imposed after its annexation of Crimea; under these conditions, even its current military plans present economic difficulties. By mid-2014, some individuals and sectors had been sanctioned, including sanctions revoking and denying licences for the export of defence and dual-use equipment to Russia, a move implemented by a number of states including the US, the UK and Germany, as well as the EU. Financially driven amendments were announced that affect long-term plans to re-equip Russia's conventional forces, including the postponement of some programmes into the next funding period (2016–25), and there was a new emphasis on import substitution stemming from sanctions, as well as the loss of component and engine supplies from Ukraine (see textbox, p. 166).

Land forces

Last year's *Military Balance* highlighted the latest changes to the structural reform of Russian ground forces, when two divisions were restored in the Western Military District and the 68th Army Corps was formed in the Russian Far East. The initial results of these changes forced broader revisions to earlier plans. Transitioning from 'permanent-readiness'

brigades to full divisions with regimental structures proved difficult, primarily because divisions have a much larger establishment. This led Russian defence planners to consider a compromise structure, in which newly established divisional commands would combine two or three current brigades.

These apparently counter-intuitive reversals of earlier reform achievements have been interpreted as a concession to opponents of transformation within the armed forces. However, they have little relevance to the ad hoc battalion task groups that were formed and concentrated near the Ukrainian border during peaks in the confrontation in eastern Ukraine.

Experiments to subdivide ground-force brigades into 'light', 'medium' and 'heavy' were suspended, as implementation proved too difficult. In particular, planners found that the light brigades had to be further subdivided into 'motor-rifle', 'mountain' and 'air-mobile' units, failing to deliver the standardisation originally intended. Subsequently, a large proportion of the brigades intended to be 'light' were reassigned en masse from the land forces to the VDV. (These were the three army air-assault brigades – the 11th, 56th and 83rd Brigades.) Nor has the formal subdivision into 'medium' and 'heavy' brigades taken place. Differentiation will instead continue on the basis of the type of armoured vehicles used – whether tracked or wheeled – in effect retaining the distinction between armoured and motor-rifle formations. At present it is intended that motor-rifle units will remain largely wheeled, and will be equipped with new infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) based on the *Bumerang* platform.

In anticipation of the new-design wheeled and tracked vehicle platforms that are due to be introduced in the next few years, re-equipment of the ground forces with newly manufactured armoured vehicles, including the T-90 main battle tank (MBT) or BMP-3 armoured IFV, slowed significantly. However, large-scale deliveries of the wheeled BTR-82A continued. This vehicle has an enhanced weapons fit, including the TKN-04GA day/night-sight. Meanwhile, mass modernisation of the T-72B MBT fleet to the T-72B3 standard is also under way. Considerable effort is going into re-equipping the missile brigades, with *Iskander* replacing the *Tochka-U* tactical missile, bringing increased strike capability through improvements to range and accuracy.

The first public presentation of the new vehicle platforms is due to take place during the Victory Day Parade on 9 May 2015 in Moscow. The first models

should start to be delivered to the troops for trials in the same year. Due to be unveiled at the parade are a tank and a self-propelled gun based on the *Armata* platform; a tracked armoured personnel carrier (APC) and a tracked IFV based on the *Kurganets-25* platform; and the *Bumerang*-based wheeled combat vehicles intended to replace the BTR APC. Combined with the *Typhoon* wheeled logistics vehicle platform, which formed the basis for vehicles shown at the 2014 parade, these platforms are intended to shape the capabilities of Russia's land forces in the coming decades.

Despite the impressive quantity of new equipment due to take part in the 2015 parade (the plan is, analysts believe, for 24 vehicles on the *Kurganets-25* platform alone to be shown), all of the platforms will be prototypes and as such not fully representative of technical configuration or even final appearance. The complexity of parallel development and testing of whole new families of combat equipment has led to inevitable delays in their production timetables (see pp. 164–67).

Air force

Structural reform of the air force has been the most controversial of the service reforms. The air force has undergone three waves of major change: reorganisation into the 'air base' system (see *The Military Balance 2012*, p. 186) and two successive regroupings of these bases into increasingly larger formations. It was discovered during snap inspections, and a review of the Serdyukov–Makarov 'new look' reforms, that the resulting class-one 'mega air bases', dispersed over four to seven airfields and combining different fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft types, were ineffective. The overly cumbersome structure, compounded by a weakened staff component in comparison to the pre-reform aviation divisions and corps, failed to provide sufficient command-and-control and combat readiness. As a result, the reform was abandoned and the original division–regiment structure reinstated.

Aerospace-defence brigades, however, retain their post-2008 structure and army-aviation reform remains incomplete, with 'air bases' retained alongside new army-aviation brigades, which are continuing to be formed. At present, army-aviation units report to the Air and Air-Defence Forces Command in each Operational Strategic Command.

Progress in delivering new equipment to the air force has been far more successful. In 2013, 56 new and upgraded fixed-wing aircraft, 122 helicopters

and two regiments' worth of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems were delivered. By the end of 2014, the air force was due to receive another 220 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Research work on the development of the *PAK DA* future strategic bomber also started in 2014. This new long-range aircraft will reportedly be subsonic and of a 'flying wing' design reminiscent of the US B-2 *Spirit* bomber. The current target is to begin testing prototypes in 2019, for entry into service in 2025.

Air-force testing of Russia's fifth-generation *PAK FA* combat aircraft is officially scheduled to begin in 2016, though 'captive carry' trials of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons on external hardpoints have already begun. Despite intense lobbying by the military-industrial complex, the defence ministry has not yet expressed interest in developing or procuring a lighter fifth-generation fighter based on concepts proposed by the MiG design bureau. This project is at an early stage and is being led by the bureau on its own initiative, though efforts could be stepped up if a foreign customer emerges.


The delivery of new, modern aircraft has exacerbated problems with the pace of delivery of precision-guided air weapons. At present, new non-nuclear munitions for long-range aviation, such as the Kh-101 and Kh-32 cruise missiles, have still not entered service. The Kh-555 (AS-15C *Kent*) programme, however, has been successful, allowing Shoigu to announce a radical increase in long-range cruise missile purchases. Analysts estimate that the number of Kh-555s is projected to increase, by 2020, by a factor of 30 from the current undisclosed figure.

The air force still lacks its own fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A number of domestically produced UAV models are now in service, but the vast majority of the more than 500 systems available to the Russian armed forces are concentrated in the land forces and the airborne troops. These are light models for tactical reconnaissance, none of which have strike capabilities. This situation should change with the launch of development work on a family of three strike UAVs (with a take-off weight of one tonne, five tonnes and 20 tonnes) commissioned by the defence ministry for the air force. MiG's *Skat* unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) concept was superseded by a 20-tonne UCAV being developed by Sukhoi with MiG as a subcontractor, which is planned to fly by 2018. UCAVs of this class have a range and combat payload comparable to manned strike aircraft.


Figure 7 Equipment Analysis: Russian *Flanker* Combat Aircraft Development

The Sukhoi Su-27 *Flanker* family has become a centrepiece of Russian tactical aviation. This comes after a difficult start; the prototype aircraft underwent complete redesign in the late 1970s to address performance shortcomings. The aircraft has developed from a single-role to a multi-role fighter with greatly improved combat performance including in the detection and engagement ranges of potential targets. Originally intended for the export arena, the Russian air force ordered 48 Su-35S in 2009, and deliveries should be completed during 2015. An additional order for a further 48 is widely anticipated. The Su-35S will see service likely well into the 2030s as a complement to the air force's fifth-generation fighter, being developed under the Sukhoi T-50 programme.


Sukhoi Su-35S *Flanker E* (introduced 2013)



Sukhoi Su-27 *Flanker B* (introduced 1985)



Su-27	Su-35S
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radar: N001 <i>Slotback</i> air-to-air only, detection range 80km (est.) against a 3m² radar cross-section target • Analogue cockpit • 2 x AL-31F turbofan engines each rated at 12,500kg in afterburner, 7,700kg max dry power • OLS-27 infrared search and track, 50km detection range (target from rear) • 10 hardpoints: <p>Short-range AAMs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • R-73 (AA-11 <i>Archer</i>) short-range air-to-air missile, maximum range 30km <p>Medium-range AAMs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • R-27 (AA-10 <i>Alamo</i>) family of semi-active, radar-guided, infrared guided and passive AAMs. • Semi-active radar-guided R-27ER (AA-10C), max range against a fighter 60km, 90–100km against a large aircraft. Passive-homing R-27EP (AA-10F), 110km max range • No active radar-guided AAM • Air-to-Surface: mix of unguided bombs and rockets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radar: IRBIS passive electronically scanned array multi-mode air-to-air and air-to-surface. Claimed detection range against a 3m² radar cross-section target 350–400km. 90km detection range against a 0.01m² RCS target • Digital cockpit • 2 x 117S turbofan engines each rated at 14,500kg in afterburner, 8,800kg max dry power. Thrust-vectoring nozzles • OLS-35 infrared search and track, 90km plus detection range (target from rear) • 12 hardpoints: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • R-73 and K-74M2 (R-73 upgrade), maximum range 40km • <i>Alamo</i> family plus R-77-1 (AA-12B <i>Adder</i>) active radar-guided medium-range AAM, max range 110km. Also possibly the K-77M, a further development of the basic R-77 <p>Long-range AAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • R-37M (AA-13 <i>Axehead</i>) long-range radar-guided AAM (known as RVV-BD for export). This missile is being offered for the Su-35S. Max range is est. 280km (200km for RVV-BD) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Air-to-Surface includes: Kh-38 family of medium-range air-to-surface missiles, Kh-31PM (AS-17C <i>Krypton</i>) anti-radiation missile, Kh-59M family (AS-18 <i>Kazoo</i>), variety of precision-guided bombs



Navy

According to the State Armaments Programme to 2020, the navy will focus on nuclear-submarine construction in the medium term. This primarily concerns two projects: eight *Borey*-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines equipped with the *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) ballistic missile, and seven *Yasen*-class multi-purpose, nuclear-powered attack submarines equipped with cruise missiles. In addition, construction of several 'special-purpose' nuclear submarines is planned. These highly clas-

sified programmes include the Project 210 *Losharik* and Project 09851 *Khabarovsk*, which will be crewed entirely by officers and used for special operations of an undisclosed nature. It seems unlikely that these ambitious plans will be implemented on schedule, given the difficulties already experienced in building 50 or so major surface warships, and the time it has taken to complete those submarines that have gone into service in recent years. Nor is the main armament ready for the *Borey*-class boats, as demonstrated by the failure of the *Bulava* test launch in September

Personnel issues

The Russian armed forces continue to suffer the effects of personnel problems noted in *The Military Balance 2013*. Demographic pressure combined with the reduction in the conscript service term to one year, as well as ongoing challenges in recruiting professional servicemen and women, meant that at the beginning of 2014 the services were only 82% manned – a shortage of nearly 200,000 personnel. Despite exceeding contract-service recruitment targets for 2013, this problem persisted throughout 2014, leading to a reduction in 2014 recruitment plans.

The total number of contract-service soldiers was intended to reach 240,000 by the end of 2014. These mainly staff the combat sub-units of the Airborne Assault Troops (VDV) and other special-operations forces, although they also work on submarines and other complex or costly equipment. Support and artillery sub-units, however, remain largely conscript-manned, including those in VDV divisions. As a consequence, even elite formations are suffering from the introduction of the one-year conscription term. Special-forces units, for example, could not be deployed in full to Crimea in 2014, as they included a contingent of conscripts only drafted the previous autumn. These troops had been in the armed forces for less than six months at that point and had to remain behind. As a result, these units could field no more than two-thirds of their official strength.

Plans to increase the number of contract-service personnel to 350,000 by 2015 have been announced. This would require a recruitment campaign of unprecedented scale, bringing in 150,000 new contract-service personnel for the army within a year – significantly higher than both the 2013 and 2014 recruitment figures. The intention is to fill contract posts in the VDV, increase numbers in the land forces more broadly and put contract-service personnel in 75% of semi-skilled posts, such as combat-vehicle drivers and maintenance staff.

Strong Russian public support for operations in Crimea has boosted the armed forces' popularity, adding to the

prestige of military service, and contributed to much-improved morale and a renewed sense of purpose within the services. Furthermore, salary improvements have helped recruitment by providing highly competitive remuneration. Nevertheless, it remains unlikely that the ambitious recruitment plan can be fulfilled within one year. Analysts suggest that the long-established pattern of failing to meet unrealistic contract-recruitment targets will persist.

Meanwhile, improved results have been reported for conscription. The spring 2014 draft brought in 154,000 personnel, with an apparent 20% reduction in evasion. From autumn 2014, recruits with a higher level of education have the option of serving on superior contract terms for two years instead of completing the mandatory one-year conscription period.

Increased attention to training reserves was a major new initiative. A special Reserves Command was formed at the end of 2013 in each of the four military districts. These are responsible for the training and mobilisation of reservists as well as the maintenance of equipment at storage depots; and for using these reserves and equipment to deploy full-strength combat units during mobilisation. They are a major departure from the previous practice, whereby call-up offices and the commanders of active brigades and divisions were responsible for mobilisation. The new system should relieve these commanders of a number of associated tasks. It can also be seen as a response to changes in armed forces' staffing in recent years, which has led to fewer trained reservists being available after conscript service, and therefore more care required in their management.

In addition, the new commands will be responsible for new types of reserves, such as a voluntary high-readiness reserve made up of those who have recently completed military service. In the first phase, in 2015, the defence ministry plans to recruit 8,600 of this type of reservist, primarily in specialist trades.

2013. This has forced a series of at least five further tests, to be carried out between 2014 and 2016.

The most significant modernisation projects in naval aviation are the replacement of the Su-24 *Fencer* ground-attack aircraft with the multi-role Su-30SM and the delivery of MiG-29K/KUB fighters to the Northern Fleet's shipborne-aviation regiment. However, the planned delivery of several dozen helicopters for the new *Mistral*-class amphibious-assault ships' air wings, including 32 navalised Ka-52K *Hokums*, is in doubt following the French decision to suspend the warship's delivery amid pressure after the annexation of Crimea.

Strategic Rocket Forces

The Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) remain the service least affected by Russia's military transformation programme. Most of the changes experienced by the service have related to rearmament. Deputy Defence Minister Yuri Borisov confirmed in 2014 that research-and-development work was under way for the *Sarmat*, a new heavy, liquid-fuel, silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This missile is viewed in Russia as a response to the deployment of foreign missile-defence systems. Its increased thrust-to-weight ratio should allow the use of different strike trajectories, making it harder and more expensive to intercept. However, such ICBMs are a distant prospect, with analysts assessing little progress likely before 2020. The SRF's current focus is deploying the light, solid-fuel RS-24 *Yars* missile, in road-mobile and silo-based versions. Problems with serial production have been resolved, with three regiments at once scheduled to be re-equipped with *Yars* in 2014. The RS-26, a newer ICBM, is planned to enter service from 2015.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Defence Spending

As noted in *The Military Balance 2014*, the percentage of Russian GDP devoted to defence spending has been steadily increasing, and in 2014 it rose to almost 3.5% of GDP from 3.15% the previous year. According to the draft federal budget sent to the State Duma at the end of September, in 2015 there will be a large increase to more than 4.2% of GDP, falling to 3.7% in 2016 and 3.6% in 2017. The elevated level of military spending in 2015, an increase in real terms of more than 25%, is explained in part by a decision to dispense with state-guaranteed credits as a means of funding the state defence order, likely because economic sanctions





Figure 8 **Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure** as % of GDP

have made external borrowing more difficult. The projected defence budget in 2015 will be R3.3 trillion (US\$88.3bn), compared with R2.5tr (US\$70bn) in 2014 and R2.1tr (US\$66.1bn) in 2013.

State Armaments Programme

The current high spending levels can be explained almost entirely by Russia's commitment to fund as fully as possible the ambitious State Armaments Programme to 2020, at least during the first five years (2011–15). From the outset it was envisaged that almost one-third of total funding (of more than R20tr, or around US\$436.5bn) would be allocated during those five years; available evidence indicates that this will be achieved, notwithstanding the faltering Russian economy. It is possible that the Ukraine conflict and economic sanctions have reinforced the spending commitment for 2015, however some planned procurement for 2016 and 2017 has been postponed until a later date. The reason given was the inability of Russia's defence industry to cope with the large volume of orders. While this is a plausible explanation, it is likely that there may also have been concerns that defence was becoming too heavy a burden on the state budget. Nonetheless, with such a large budgetary increase planned for 2015, the problem of limited defence-industrial capacity will likely be encountered during the year.

According to the armaments programme, by the end of 2020 at least 70% of equipment will be 'modern', although the precise definition of this remains unclear. To date, implementation has been uneven (see Table 4, p. 167). While the procurement of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has generally been successful, this has not been the case



Map 3 **Russia and Eurasia Regional Defence Spending¹**

for submarine-launched ballistic-missile development, due to problems with the *Bulava* missile and delays in building and commissioning new ballistic-missile submarines. In addition, the construction of attack submarines and large surface naval vessels has lagged behind schedule. Progressively greater numbers of new combat aircraft and helicopters have been received, and the introduction of the S-400 air-defence system has been proceeding steadily, though there are doubts whether the level of development of the new S-500 system will allow significant procurement before 2020. The ground forces have received little new equipment and much now depends on development of the new *Armata*-class heavy armoured-vehicle platform and the *Kurganets* and *Bumerang* vehicle families, scheduled to enter production in 2015–16.

An update of the existing State Armaments Programme to 2025 is under way, with the schedule for 2016–25 due for presidential approval by the end of 2015. The lack of an approved long-term economic forecast and long-term budget strategy has hampered this update. Before the Ukraine conflict, and the deterioration of relations with Western states, there was a

clearly stated intention to moderate the pace of armaments renewal after 2020, with discussion about reorientating the defence industry towards modernising the civilian economy. However, the new strategic landscape may lead to a reinforced commitment to military modernisation, albeit at a more moderate pace than the past five years.

Defence industry

Russia's defence industry is experiencing improved funding levels due to sustained increases in order volumes in recent years. Pay rates have been rising, permitting better retention and recruitment of new personnel. The workforce is once again expanding and the average age has been falling. Investment has increased sharply, boosted by both improved company earnings and funding under the classified programme entitled Development of the Defence-Industrial Complex to 2020, of which a new version is being drafted. Many industrial enterprises producing end-product armaments, especially those prioritised in the State Armaments Programme, are now undergoing major modernisation and re-equipment, mainly with imported machine tools and other capital

goods. In addition, the volume of research and development funding within, and for, the defence industry has increased significantly, and basic defence-sector research is being introduced within the framework of the Fund for Advanced Research, founded in October 2012.

Earnings from arms exports provided the principal source of funding for many defence industries until recently, with Russia second only to the US in terms of sales volume. In 2013, Russia reported US\$15.7bn in 'military-technical cooperation', but of this total, end-product arms sales accounted for only around 60%, the rest being spares, components and military-services provision. However, with domestic procurement taking priority, some Russian companies are encountering capacity constraints, and it is likely that the growth of arms exports will moderate. Rosoboronexport, responsible for 85% of exports, is forecasting sales of little more than US\$13bn over the next two to three years, similar to the export volume achieved in 2013.

In 2006, oversight of the defence industry was handed to the government's Military-Industrial




Figure 9 **Russia Defence Expenditure Trends (2005–17)¹**

Commission (MIC). This commission, unlike its Soviet forerunner, was principally a coordinating body, with limited authority to resolve differences between the defence ministry and industry, or within

The Ukraine crisis & Russia's defence industry in 2014

The conflict in Ukraine posed new problems for Russia's defence industry, in particular the decision by Ukraine's new president, Petro Poroshenko, to prohibit all military cooperation with Russia. While the overall volume of Ukrainian military deliveries to Russia has been relatively modest, there are several major dependencies that could create difficulties. The most significant are Ukraine's significant role as a supplier of engines for some Russian-built helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, the supply of power units for ships (including some of the new surface vessels now being built under the State Armaments Programme) and the role of Ukrainian enterprises in keeping Russia's RS-20 (SS-18 *Satan*) heavy ICBMs in operational use. The Russian government has either adopted an import substitution programme to secure domestic production of military materiel currently supplied by Ukraine, or it has turned to Belarus to augment supply chains. Additionally, some Ukrainian aircraft- and shipbuilding-sector workers are reported to have transferred to Russia following the loss of their jobs, although the extent and impact that this influx of skilled labour will have on Russian defence production is unclear. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that Russia will need two to three years to achieve independence from Ukrainian inputs, but this is probably overly optimistic. Full import substitution will

require billions of dollars' worth of investment, and will likely take at least five to ten years to achieve.

Sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union on the defence sector – including measures against specific Russian companies – are unlikely to have a significant impact on the implementation of the State Armaments Programme, principally because there has been no far-reaching defence-industrial integration with Western states. More significant threats to Russia's military-modernisation efforts are moves by the West to restrict its access to dual-use technologies. Russia's defence industry will likely be hard hit by a cessation of European electronic-component imports, and may come to rely more heavily on China and other Asian producers for substitutes. Russia's ambitious programme to modernise its defence-industrial production base will also be affected. With few exceptions, the domestic machine-tool industry is unable to produce the advanced equipment required. Consequently, Russian defence-industrial plants have been buying advanced machine tools and other production equipment in significant quantities from leading European, Japanese and US firms, and the state-owned arms manufacturer Rostec Corporation has been organising joint enterprises with some of these companies in Russia.

Table 4 **Russian Arms Procurement 2011–13 & Approximate State Armaments Programme 2020 Objectives**

	2011	2012	2013	2014 State Defence Order	Total to 2020
ICBMs	7	9	15*	15*	400+
SLBMs	20*	15*	15*		
Military Satellites ^a	9	6	15		100+
Fixed-wing aircraft	28	35	67	100	850*
<i>of which combat aircraft</i>	16*	30*	45*		450*
Helicopters	82	118	100	90*	1,120
<i>of which combat helicopters</i>	22	35	31		350*
UAVs			15		4,000+
S-400 air-defence systems (divisions)	2	2	2	2	56
Strategic nuclear submarines	0	0	2	1	8
Multi-role nuclear submarines	0	0	0	1	7
Diesel-electric submarines	0	0	0	1	8 to 10
Surface combat ships ^b	1	1	1	4	50
Tanks					2,300+
<i>Iskander</i> missile systems (brigades)			2	2	10

*Estimates

^aTotal number, excluding failed launches; ^bMainly frigates and corvettes

the defence sector itself. From 10 September 2014, responsibility for the MIC passed to the Presidential Administration, with President Vladimir Putin as chairperson, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin (previously chair) as deputy chair and Yurii Borisov, deputy defence minister for armaments, as secretary. It is likely that this move will lead to the MIC having powers similar to those enjoyed by its Soviet forerunner. Before this decision, two specialist agencies involved in arms acquisition – Rosoboronpostavka, which procures about a third of all military hardware for the defence ministry, and Rosoboronzakaz, which monitors all procurement activity – were dissolved and their powers transferred to the defence and industry ministries, and to other government departments. In effect, these measures restored key features of the Soviet system of arms procurement.

The previous defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, had attempted to change the arms acquisition system to enhance the power of the defence ministry as a customer, weakening the dominance of defence-industry suppliers – a legacy of the Soviet Union. He also began opening up the arms market to foreign participation, challenging the Soviet-era autarkic orientation. This new policy was symbolised by the 2011 contract to buy two *Mistral*-class amphibious-assault ships from France. Under the current minister, Sergei Shoigu, this partial internationalisation has been halted, with no new foreign deals, although some contracts that had been agreed were

continued, such as the domestic manufacture under licence of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles. Recent political and strategic developments have served to reinforce this reversion to self-reliance.

CENTRAL ASIA

The trend continues of growing Russian interest in Central Asian security. In May 2014, the Kazakh Parliament ratified the Joint Air-Defence Agreement with Russia. This had been signed in 2013, and headquarters are due to be located at Almaty. In October 2013, and after considerable delay, Tajikistan's president Emomalii Rahmon signed a decree confirming a 30-year extension to the basing rights for Russia's 201st Motor-rifle Division. The division, with some 7,000 troops, is Russia's largest foreign deployment, mainly at Dushanbe, though Russia maintains additional facilities in Tajikistan at Kulob and Qurghonteppa. Meanwhile, Moscow promised to assist in the modernisation of the Tajik armed forces by providing military-technical assistance. In February, Russia announced the reinforcement of Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan with four additional Su-25 *Frogfoot* ground-attack aircraft, to join the eight already there. Russia has also tried to professionalise the deployment, by shifting its staffing structure away from conscripts towards contract soldiers. Kyrgyzstan did not offer the United States an extension for its Air Transit Center at Manas, and the base closed on 3

June 2014 after providing support to US operations in Afghanistan for more than 12 years. There is speculation as to whether the US is seeking alternative basing rights in Uzbekistan, but for the time being a facility at Romania's Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base has replaced those offered at Manas.

Central Asian states have not publicly expressed strong views on Russian intervention in Ukraine. Kazakhstan, with a 6,800km border with Russia and a 25% ethnic-Russian population, is probably the most uneasy; however it is in a very different geopolitical situation to Ukraine and has a close economic relationship with Russia through the emerging Eurasian Economic Union. Kazakhstan's concerns are partly economic – sanctions that weaken the Russian economy indirectly weaken its own. The Tenge was devalued in February 2014 and additional delays to production in the Kashagan oil field, in the Kazakh zone of the Caspian Sea, could affect confidence in the economy. Downturns in the Russian economy also particularly affect Tajikistan, where approximately 50% of GDP consists of remittances provided by migrant labour in Russia.

The impact of the end of NATO's combat operations in Afghanistan and the drawdown of personnel and equipment continue to be discussed in Central Asia. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, bordering Afghanistan, may feel the effect of any ongoing instability more than Kazakhstan; though the greatest impact will be felt in Tajikistan, where a porous 1,400km border with Afghanistan makes combating narcotics trafficking a particular challenge. In June 2014 there was further unrest in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, with disturbances related to the narcotics trade, prompting fears of action by Tajik security forces, as happened in 2013.

Russia continues to promote the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as a means of reaching low-level security agreements in Central Asia. However, the disparity in economic wealth between the five Central Asian states has led to differing national military capabilities, and the programme of CSTO summits, meetings and exercises places demands on the limited resources of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. (Uzbekistan suspended membership in 2013 and Turkmenistan has never been a member.) Exercise scenarios are generally anti-terrorist-related, though it remains unlikely, analysts assess, that KSOR (the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force) will assist Tajikistan with Afghan border control. In September 2014 President

Vladimir Putin submitted to the Duma for ratification a 2009 agreement to create, according to Moscow, 'a secure command system for the forces and resources of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation collective security system'.


In autumn 2014, Kazakhstan's Peacekeeping Brigade (KAZBRIG) exercised for the first time in Europe. A company-level deployment was rehearsed, using Kazakh C-295 transport aircraft, and interoperability training with NATO units took place during the *Steppe Eagle* exercise at Joint Multinational Command Training Centre Hohenfels, Germany. Late in 2013, Kazakhstan passed a law to enable the deployment of Kazakh personnel on UN missions, and, with ambitions for non-permanent UN Security Council membership in 2017, the country retains a desire to improve capability through engagement with NATO.

The third biennial Kazakhstan Defence Equipment Exhibition took place in May 2014, with representatives of 208 companies from 28 countries participating. The defence ministry demonstrated Kazakhstan's land and air capabilities, which are still based on Russian-built equipment, and made clear an ambition to improve the armed forces' equipment. The goal to develop joint ventures between state-owned Kazakhstan Engineering and Western companies to enable technology transfer continues, but excessive levels of bureaucracy and a number of high-profile corruption cases, most noticeably with the conviction of a deputy minister of defence, have resulted in companies from outside the Commonwealth of Independent States exercising caution.

UKRAINE

The crisis in Ukraine during 2014 altered the European security landscape, bringing to the fore antagonism between Russia and the West not seen since the Cold War. The broader political and economic factors that had for some years fed this growing distrust on the geopolitical level are analysed in *Strategic Survey 2014* (pp. 151–64), but the crisis began as a domestic political dispute in Ukraine in response to the government's failure to sign an expected Association Agreement with the EU and culminated in a cycle of escalatory violence that led on 19–20 February to some 70 anti-government protesters being killed.

As state authority collapsed, President Viktor Yanukovich fled Kiev, even though a 21 February agreement brokered by the EU and Russia, designed to return Ukraine to the 2004 constitution, meant he



Map 4 **Russia Seizes Crimea**

could have stayed in power until at least December. In a constitutionally controversial move, parliament voted on 22 February to remove him from office and change the government, but this new administration significantly shifted the balance of internal Ukrainian regional representation. Two-thirds of Yanukovych's administration hailed from Ukraine's south and east. By contrast, 60% of the new administration came from the west of Ukraine.

Russia's leadership regarded events in Kiev as a coup, and feared that this new administration would move Ukraine rapidly towards EU and NATO membership. Moscow was also concerned for the future of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, headquartered at Sevastopol in Crimea. For President Vladimir Putin, the 'interests of the Russian nation and the Russian state' were at stake.

The seizure of Crimea

The Russian decision to deploy force to Crimea was driven by fear of losing its Black Sea Fleet base, but it was also an attempt to coerce Kiev into accommodating broader Russian demands. On 27–28 February, ostensibly pro-Russia militiamen, described as 'local self-defence forces', seized the parliament building in Simferopol. However, 'it was obvious that the operation to seize the Crimean parliament was carried out by an unidentified but very professional special task force', according to analysts at Moscow's Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Larger groups of unidentified troops in unmarked uniforms, who took up posts outside Ukrainian military bases and key infrastructure locations, were also clearly well equipped, organised and highly trained; these were also Russian troops, a presence that was denied

by Moscow until April. Nearly all, analysts believe, were from elite special-operations groups from the Southern Military District and the Airborne Assault Troops (VDV), some inserted covertly in advance, with others subsequently deployed in waves of rotary- and fixed-wing airlift. Personnel were also despatched from the naval infantry units co-located with the Black Sea Fleet.

Ukrainian military personnel at bases in Crimea were instructed by the Russian troops to defect, disarm or surrender but, though warning shots were fired, neither side engaged in combat. Russian troops were evidently under instruction to exercise fire-control and, as far as possible, secure objectives without bloodshed. Meanwhile, Ukrainian troops reportedly received conflicting or no orders from a ministry in Kiev that was doubtless struggling to come to terms with the surprise operation, as well as working to unpick details about the strength, objectives and broader intent of the invading force; all this amid a revolutionary situation in the capital and a newly installed cabinet. Internationally, Ukrainian defence officials had to contend with the cognitive dissonance created by the continual, if increasingly unconvincing, denials from Moscow that the so-called 'little green men' were in fact Russian troops.

Under intense pressure, some Ukrainian troops defected while others disarmed and eventually left Crimea. Some Ukrainian helicopters had managed to leave Belbek air base, but other aircraft could not because the runway had been blocked. These included MiG-29 combat aircraft; over half of Ukraine's MiG-29 fleet had been stationed at Belbek. The Russians later allowed some of these aircraft to leave by road convoy, while other military supplies, including armoured vehicles and naval vessels, were also returned to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Coast Guard was able to withdraw most of its fleet from Crimea, but naval vessels were blockaded, and most seized by Russia. A number of Ukrainian installations held out for nearly a month, but, hemmed in by tight Russian (and pro-Russia militia) blockades, they had all fallen by 25 March, when the last naval vessel, the *Cherkassy*, was seized by Russian commandos.

Ukraine's armed forces

By 2014, Ukraine's armed forces were a shadow of those the country had inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They operated mainly Soviet-era equipment, with much of this in need of upgrade or replacement. Defence spending remained stubbornly

low, consistently at around 1% of GDP in recent years. While the services suffered from inadequate financing, defence reforms were also significantly underfunded. The Ukrainian defence ministry noted in a 2012 white paper that the weakness in defence legislation and insufficient budget affected training, readiness and combat capability. Procurement targets were routinely missed and plans to end conscription by 2011 were not achieved. This plan was revived in 2013, and it was declared that the autumn draft would be the last. Unsurprisingly, conscription was reinstated in May 2014, after fighting broke out in the east.


As of early 2014, Ukraine's armed forces were showing the effects of cumulative funding reductions and changes in government priorities away from defence. Aircraft availability and serviceability levels were low, as were flying hours. While there was on paper an impressive number of MiG-29 and Su-27 combat aircraft, problems with serviceability and a policy of keeping a significant number of airframes in storage meant the total available combat fleet was much smaller; this was laid bare by the situation at Belbek, where only a limited proportion of the fixed-wing combat-aircraft fleet was operational at any one time.

Conflict in Ukraine's east

A contentious plebiscite on 16 March, in which a reported 97% of voters backed union with Russia, was 'held under the watchful eye of Russian servicemen in unmarked uniforms'. It was followed five days later by Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula. Growing diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia after this, coupled with intensified Western overtures to Ukraine, led Moscow to ratchet up pressure on Kiev. Snap military inspections were launched just over the border at the end of March, where Russian forces remained encamped, in strength, for some time.

In early April, an insurrection began to gather steam in the east, and armed separatists and pro-Russian activists seized government buildings in cities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Kiev launched an 'anti-terrorist' operation in response, deploying the regular armed forces and the newly created (and poorly trained) national guard, supported by paramilitary groups. *Strategic Survey 2014* notes that 'the decision to designate [the insurgency] a terrorist movement was likely to deepen the civil conflict', given that many in the east reportedly viewed the Kiev government as illegitimate or at least unrepresentative

The emergence of a pro-Russian separatist movement in eastern Ukraine in 2014, centred in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and supported by armed militia, has led to bitter military confrontation with forces loyal to Kiev. Slovyansk, some 150km west of Luhansk, marked the most westerly extent of separatist gains by April. The city was retaken in early July 2014 as the government's initially faltering counter-offensive gained strength. By the first week in August, state forces had effectively surrounded Luhansk, while there was heavy fighting between government and separatist forces in Donetsk. Now under heavy pressure themselves, the separatists were able to launch an offensive in the far south of the Donetsk region at the end of August, seizing Novoazovsk and advancing toward Mariupol on the coast. This was part of a broader effort – with significant Russian support – to push back the Ukrainian armed forces and to regain as much territory as possible. Government forces pulled back from Luhansk airport at the beginning of September while fighting continued throughout October despite a 5 September truce, including around Donetsk and its airport. In early November both NATO and the OSCE reported new sightings of unmarked military columns with heavy weaponry inside separatist-held areas.



Map 5 Conflict in Eastern Ukraine

of the country as a whole. This problem was exacerbated by Ukrainian tactics of engaging urban areas with long-range unguided munitions before sending in troops. During the conflict, they employed long-range artillery, mortars and multiple-barrel rocket launchers. However, the tactics used on both sides had negative consequences. Indeed, both government

and rebel forces made much use of artillery before ground assaults; a reflection, perhaps, of their shared Soviet military heritage. Human Rights Watch (HRW) also alleged the use of cluster munitions by Ukrainian forces, though HRW later said that 'there are also serious allegations that pro-Russian rebel forces, and possibly Russia itself, have used cluster munitions in

eastern Ukraine. All parties to the conflict in eastern Ukraine have access to similar weapons, so it is not always possible to draw definitive conclusions with respect to specific attacks.'

Negative consequences also arose from the relative lack of training and professional discipline on the part of irregular forces. Amnesty International chronicled human-rights abuses perpetrated by the volunteer battalions in areas formerly held by separatists, while it also said there was 'no doubt that summary killings and atrocities are being committed by both pro-Russian separatists and pro-Kyiv forces in Eastern Ukraine'. However, it was difficult to get a sense of the scale of abuses, the report continued, and there was much exaggeration.

The insurgent groups of what eventually became the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics undoubtedly had many locals in their ranks, including former regional Interior Ministry troops, but they were also bolstered by significant numbers of Russian nationals; some of these were, according to Moscow, either ex-military or serving personnel volunteering during their leave. The long-time 'defence minister' of the Donetsk rebel group was a Russian citizen who had left the Russian intelligence service only months earlier.

The rebels' rapid acquisition of military hardware raised interest. Once government troops departed from military bases in the east, separatists would have had access to remaining weapons, ammunition and armour, but weapons were also seized from government troops and volunteer fighters.

Reports of Russian military-intelligence presence among the rebels continued throughout the spring, but, initially, there was little in the way of hard, open-source evidence to directly connect Moscow to operations in east Ukraine until reports emerged of Russian armour in rebel-held areas. These reports had increased in frequency by mid-year, at the same time as government forces seemed to be gaining the upper hand in parts of the east. On 5 July rebels left a command centre at Slovyansk and a month later fighting broke out in Donetsk, Luhansk having been encircled two days before. On 17 July Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down, coming down near the town of Hrabove in Donetsk Oblast and killing nearly 300 people onboard. The aircraft was widely believed to have been brought down by an advanced surface-to-air missile system, possibly a *Buk*, and allegations persisted that the engagement was conducted from within rebel-held areas.

As Ukrainian forces continued to advance on the rebels, evidence of direct Russian involvement grew. Alleged Russian servicemen were shown, as prisoners, on Ukrainian television on 26 August (Moscow said they crossed the border by mistake), while IISS analysis of imagery at the same time assessed that some main battle tanks seen in separatist hands were likely to be Russian. The variant shown, the T-72BM, was only operated by Russian ground forces. Government gains seemed to force Moscow's hand, and reports of direct involvement grew dramatically after 27 August, when a new front opened up in the south, near Novoazovsk on the Sea of Azov. In the subsequent weeks, there were also press reports of 'secret' burials in Russia of servicemen killed on operations and there was an information clampdown there on coverage of military funerals that might be linked to combat deaths in Ukraine. Other reports pointed to formed units being despatched from Russia. A *Financial Times* article on 22 October carried the following quote from an alleged Russian serviceman in Luhansk: "'They gave us an order: who wants to go volunteer? And we put our hands up like this,'" he said, mocking someone being forced to put their hand up.'

The late-August counter-offensive seemed designed to split Ukrainian forces and involved, it appeared, new Russian firepower. Reports emerged of Ukrainian personnel coming under fire from artillery allegedly positioned across the Russian border, while on 28 August NATO released satellite imagery including alleged Russian self-propelled artillery, and support vehicles, arrayed in firing positions in Ukraine itself.

Ukraine also began to boost defence funding, using novel crowd-funding methods (see p. 173), and equipment availability improved, with maintenance plants beginning to repair previously unserviceable equipment. Integrated air and ground operations were conducted, as at Donetsk airport in May. However, opposition forces' adaptation to this developing capability, in the form of the employment of air-defence screens that shot down some Ukrainian helicopters and transport aircraft, meant that Ukrainian forces also had to keep changing tactics.

The ebb and flow of conflict in Ukraine's east was restrained, but not halted, by a ceasefire signed on 5 September. The period of conflict from February 2014 will have given Ukraine's armed forces pointers for the future: tactics and doctrines that had dominated since the 1990s, mainly inherited from the Soviet-era, have generally been unsuited to the current fighting amid urban areas and among populations. As time

progressed, many of Kiev's ground operations were conducted either by special forces or by limited numbers of combat-ready general forces, but most prominently by irregular forces formed as volunteer battalions – some of these from rightist groups and others financed by the country's tycoons. Conventional army and interior-ministry structures were often employed to carry out combat support or combat service support tasks. Volunteer battalions were nominally subordinated to either the defence or interior ministries, but this seemed a formality, as many operated with little coordination with, or support from, formal government forces. Regularising these groups and their tactics will be a significant challenge for a government struggling with a multi-faceted crisis.

Future training and force development could focus on more flexible regular formations, able to conduct coordinated operations with the national guard and volunteer battalions. Although some older equipment is being brought out of store to replace attrition losses, Kiev will likely, in the long run, look to procure equipment suitable for modern requirements. This could include mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles and equipment that has demonstrated its effectiveness during 2014, such as precision artillery rockets.

Defence economics

Even before the Crimea crisis erupted, Ukraine's economy was faltering due to a combination of high levels of state intervention in markets, a challenging business climate and poor domestic macro-economic policymaking. Declining investment levels, weak external demand and tight monetary policy – employed to defend the Ukrainian Hryvnia exchange-rate peg – combined to draw the economy into recession in mid-2012, where it remained as the crisis began in March 2014. As the year progressed, growing political uncertainty slowed domestic consumption and industrial production levels; overall economic contraction in 2014 was projected to be -6.5%. Capital flight placed downward pressure on the pegged exchange rate, which was abandoned in February 2014 as the international reserves required to defend it were depleted. Despite a US\$17 billion IMF loan facility agreed in April, the collapsing currency reached record lows over the course of the year, placing strain on the banking sector and raising the possibility that the government might default on its external-debt obligations.

Ukraine prioritised its defence budget amid this broader economic pressure, and reduced health,

agriculture and welfare budgets in order to augment defence spending. The existing budget law for 2014 was revised in March to allocate around UAH40.53bn (US\$3.59bn) towards defence and security (including funding for the interior ministry), which the government claimed as a 15.6% nominal increase over 2013 levels. This was supplemented by a UAH6.9bn (US\$611 million) general budget reserve fund and a UAH5bn (US\$442m) special defence and security reserve fund, bringing total defence and security outlays in 2014 to UAH52.4bn (US\$4.64bn). Separately, in March, the defence ministry established a 'Support the Ukrainian Army' fund for private citizens and business to contribute donations via text messages or bank transfers, which would fund medical and logistics support. By November 2014, this had raised UAH151m (US\$13.4m). In addition, there were numerous reported instances of small-scale, non-governmental assistance provided by local residents or business groups to supply their local battalions with equipment (e.g. ammunition, bullet-proof vests), although much of this remains undocumented, and there were also international initiatives to supply non-lethal equipment to Ukraine. Overall, most of these funding increments are estimated to have been channelled towards the land, air and joint forces; expenditure on land and air forces more than doubled in 2014, and spending on joint forces increased by around 77%. By contrast, allocations to the navy fell by more than a fifth. Despite these efforts, in July the finance minister stated that high operational and maintenance spending had meant that the government was running out of funds to pay salaries, and in response proposed new tax measures and subsidy reforms to expand the fiscal space available in the national budget.

Longer-term funding increases were announced later in 2014: in August the president announced that some US\$3bn (around UAH34bn) would be assigned to re-equip the army, while in September the finance minister proposed an allocation of UAH63bn (US\$4.88bn) for defence and security in the draft 2015 budget. Then, in October, the government announced – as part of its 'Strategy 2020' programme – that it was planning a fivefold increase in the defence budget by 2020, to 5% of GDP, financed by new taxes on salaries, goods and housing. However, Ukraine has in the past underspent its initially planned budgetary allocations, and in the current climate it is difficult to estimate the degree to which these aspirations reflect realistic budgetary projections.

Armenia ARM

Armenian Dram d		2013	2014	2015
GDP	d	4.27tr	4.59tr	
	US\$	10.4bn	11.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	3,173	3,373	
Growth	%	3.5	3.2	
Inflation	%	5.8	1.8	
Def bdtg [a]	d	188bn	194bn	
	US\$	458m	470m	
FMA (US)	US\$	2.7m	2.7m	1.7m
US\$1=d		409.63	412.81	

[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military pensions

Population 3,060,927

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	9.8%	3.4%	4.2%	4.7%	21.4%	4.2%
Female	9.3%	3.3%	4.3%	4.8%	24.2%	6.3%

Capabilities

Given continuing tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the armed forces' main focus is territorial defence. Armenia is a CSTO member, and Russia provides national air defence from a leased base. Conscription continues, but there is also a growing cohort of professional officers. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin, and serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft has been a problem for the air force. While overall military doctrine remains influenced strongly by Russian thinking, overseas deployments, including to ISAF in Afghanistan, have enabled personnel to learn from international counterparts. The country aims to develop its peacekeeping contingent into one brigade with NATO standards, so that Armenia can deploy a battalion capable of self-sustainment and interoperability with NATO forces. However, defence ties with Russia continue on a broad range of issues, and both countries signed a cooperation agreement in 2014. Armenia completed a Strategic Defence Review in May 2011 and has also signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO.

ACTIVE 44,800 (Army 41,850 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,850) Paramilitary 4,300

Conscript liability 24 months.

RESERVES some mob reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 22,900; 18,950 conscripts (total 41,850)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn)
1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn)

1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)

1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)

1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt)

Other

1 indep MR trg bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT regt

1 AD bde

2 AD regt

1 (radiotech) AD regt

1 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 101 T-72

AIFV 98: 75 BMP-1; 6 BMP-1K; 5 BMP-2; 12 BRM-1K

APC (W) 130: 8 BTR-60; 100 look-a-like; 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80

ARTY 232

SP 38: **122mm** 10 2S1; **152mm** 28 2S3

TOWED 131: **122mm** 69 D-30; **152mm** 62: 26 2A36; 2 D-1; 34 D-20

MRL 51: **122mm** 47 BM-21; **273mm** 4 WM-80

MOR **120mm** 12 M120

AT • MSL • SP 22: 9 9P148; 13 9P149

AD

SAM

SP 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4 *Ganef*); 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*);

9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*)

TOWED S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)

MANPAD 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*)

GUNS

SP ZSU-23-4

TOWED **23mm** ZU-23-2

UAV **Light** 15 *Krunk*

RADAR • LAND 6 SNAR-10

MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 12: 8 9K72 *Elbrus* (SS-1C *Scud* B); 4 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

AEV MT-LB

ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1

Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100

1 Air & AD Joint Command

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable

ATK 15: 13 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*

TPT 3: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid*; **PAX** 1 A319CJ

TRG 14: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; 10 Yak-52

HELICOPTERSATK 7 Mi-24P *Hind*ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K *Hind*; 2 Mi-24R *Hind* (cbt spt)

MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)

C2 2 Mi-9 *Hip* G (cbt spt)TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

SAM • SP S-300/S-300PM (SA-10/SA-20)

Paramilitary 4,300**Ministry of Internal Affairs****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

4 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV 55: 5 BMD-1; 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K; 5 BRM-1K

APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152

Border Troops

Ministry of National Security

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV 43: 5 BMD-1; 35 BMP-1; 3 BRM-1K

APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70

DEPLOYMENT**Legal provisions for foreign deployment:****Constitution:** Codified constitution (1995, amended 2005)**Specific legislation:** 'Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia'**Decision on deployment of troops abroad:** by the president, in accordance with 'Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia' (Article 5 (2) (1)). Also, under Art. 55 (13) of constitution, president can call for use of armed forces (and National Assembly shall be convened). (Also Art. 81 (3) of constitution.)**AFGHANISTAN**

NATO • ISAF 121

LEBANON

UN • UNIFIL 1

SERBIA

NATO • KFOR 36

UKRAINE

OSCE • Ukraine 2

FOREIGN FORCES

OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan

Bulgaria OSCE 1**Czech Republic** OSCE 1**Poland** OSCE 1**Russia** 3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29*Fulcrum*; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 1 SAM bty with 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*)**Sweden** OSCE 1**Ukraine** OSCE 1**Azerbaijan AZE**

Azerbaijani New Manat m		2013	2014	2015
GDP	m	57.7bn	60.5bn	
	US\$	73.5bn	77.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	7,900	8,303	
Growth	%	5.8	4.5	
Inflation	%	2.4	2.8	
Def exp	m	2.75bn		
	US\$	3.5bn		
Def bdt [a]	m	1.53bn	1.64bn	
	US\$	1.95bn	2.11bn	
FMA (US)	US\$	2.7m	2.7m	1.7m
US\$1=m		0.78	0.78	

[a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of procurement outlays.

Population 9,686,210

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	12.1%	4.2%	5.2%	4.8%	20.7%	2.4%
Female	10.5%	3.9%	5.0%	4.6%	22.7%	3.9%

Capabilities

Given continuing tensions with neighbouring Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a major focus for the armed forces is territorial defence. While they have yet to successfully transition from a Soviet-era model, rising oil revenues have allowed an increase in defence expenditure, providing the opportunity to acquire additional platform capabilities, including the Russian S-300 SAM system. However, it is unclear whether the potential benefits brought by such modern systems have been felt in terms of operational capability. The armed forces still rely on conscription, and readiness within the services varies between units. The air force also suffers from training and maintenance problems, and the armed forces cannot organically support external deployments. Azerbaijan maintains defence relationships with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan, and has a close military relationship with Turkey. US military assistance has included support to maritime-security operations in the Caspian Sea. Peacekeeping deployments have included a small number of personnel in Afghanistan.

ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)**Paramilitary 15,000***Conscript liability* 17 months, but can be extended for ground forces.**RESERVE 300,000**

Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 56,850**

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

5 corps HQ

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

4 MR bde

Light

19 MR bde

Other

1 sy bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 arty trg bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**MBT** 433: 95 T-55; 244 T-72; 94 T-90S**AIFV** 218: 20 BMD-1; 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 100 BMP-3; 15 BRM-1; 7 BTR-80A**APC** 568**APC (T)** 336 MT-LB**APC (W)** 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70**PPV** 90: 45 *Marauder*; 45 *Matador***ARTY** 542**SP** 87: **122mm** 46 2S1; **152mm** 24: 6 2S3; 18 2S19 *Msta-S*;
155mm 5 ATMOS-2000; **203mm** 12 2S7**TOWED** 207: **122mm** 129 D-30; **130mm** 36 M-46; **152mm**
42: 18 2A36; 24 D-20**GUN/MOR** **120mm** 36: 18 2S9 NONA; 18 2S31 *Vena***MRL** 100+: **122mm** 52+: 43 BM-21; 9+ IMI *Lynx*; **128mm**
12 RAK-12; **220mm** 6 TOS-1A; **300mm** 30 9A52 *Smerch***MOR** **120mm** 112: 5 CARDOM; 107 PM-38**AT • MSL • MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (AT-3 *Sagger*);
9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*);
9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*); *Spike-LR***AD • SAM • SP** 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4 *Ganef*): 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8
Gecko); 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K37M *Buk-M1* (SA-
11 *Gadfly*)**MANPAD** 9K32 *Strela* (SA-7 *Grail*); 9K34 *Strela-3*; (SA-14
Gremlin); 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (SA-24
Grinch)**MSL • SSM** ε4 9M79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)**RADAR • LAND SNAR-1** *Long Trough*/SNAR-2/-6 *Pork*
Trough (arty); *Small Fred*/*Small Yawn*/SNAR-10 *Big Fred*
(veh, arty); GS-13 *Long Eye* (veh)**UAV • ISR • Medium** 3 *Aerostar*

AEV MT-LB

MW *Bozena***Navy 2,200****EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 8**CORVETTES • FS** 1 *Kusar* (ex-FSU *Petya II*) with 2 RBU
6000 *Smerch* 2, 2 twin 76mm gun**PSO** 1 *Luga* (*Woodnik* 2 Class) (FSU Project 888; additional
trg role)**PCC** 3: 2 *Petrushka* (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1
Shelon (ex-FSU Project 1388M)**PB** 3: 1 *Araz* (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 *Bryza* (ex-FSU Project 722);
1 *Poluchat* (ex-FSU Project 368)**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES** 4**MHC** 4: 2 *Yeovgenya* (FSU Project 1258); 2 *Yakhont* (FSU
Sonya)**AMPHIBIOUS** 6**LSM** 3: 1 *Polnochny A* (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT;
180 troops); 2 *Polnochny B* (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6
MBT; 180 troops)**LCU** 1 *Vydrat* (FSU) (capacity either 3 AMX-30 MBT or
200 troops)**LCM** 2 T-4 (FSU)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT** 4**AGS** 1 (FSU Project 10470)**YTB** 2**YTD** 1**Air Force and Air Defence 7,900****FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum***FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 regt with MiG-21 *Fishbed*; Su-17 *Fitter*; Su-24 *Fencer*;
Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-25UB *Frogfoot B***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; Yak-40 *Codling***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 regt with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind*; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 44 combat capable**FTR** 14 MiG-29 *Fulcrum***FGA** 11: 4 MiG-21 *Fishbed* (1 more in store); 4 Su-17 *Fitter*;
1 Su-17U *Fitter*; 2 Su-24 *Fencer*†**ATK** 19: 16 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 3 Su-25UB *Frogfoot B***TPT** 4: **Medium** 1 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 3 Yak-40 *Codling***TRG** 40: 28 L-29 *Delfin*; 12 L-39 *Albatros***HELICOPTERS****ATK** 26 Mi-24 *Hind***MRH**: 20+ Mi-17-IV *Hip***TPT** 20: **Medium** 13 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite***UAV • ISR • Medium** 4 *Aerostar***AD • SAM** S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Neva* (SA-
3 *Goa*); /S-200 *Vega* (SA-5 *Gammon*) static; S-300PM/PMU2
(SA-20 *Gargoyle*)**MSL • AAM • IR** R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*)**IR/SARH** R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*)**Paramilitary ε15,000****Border Guard ε5,000**

Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIFV** 168 BMP-1/2**APC (W)** 19 BTR-60/70/80**ARTY • MRL** **122mm** 3 T-122**HELICOPTERS • ATK** 24 Mi-35M *Hind*

Coast Guard

The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the State Border Service.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12

PBF 8: 1 *Osa II* (FSU Project 205); 2 *Shaldag V*; 2 Silver Ships 48ft; 3 *Stenka*

PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 *Point* (US); 1 *Grif* (FSU *Zhuk*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ARS 1 *Iva* (FSU *Vikhr*)

Militia 10,000+

Ministry of Internal Affairs

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

DEPLOYMENT

Legal provisions for foreign deployment:

Constitution: Codified constitution (1995)

Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By parliament upon proposal by president (Art. 109, No. 28)

AFGHANISTAN

NATO • ISAF 94

FOREIGN FORCES

OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan

Bulgaria OSCE 1

Czech Republic OSCE 1

Poland OSCE 1

Sweden OSCE 1

Ukraine OSCE 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Data presented here represents an assessment of the de facto situation. Nagorno-Karabakh was part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), but mostly populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when inter-ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted in Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention to secede from Azerbaijan and join the Armenian SSR. Baku rejected this and armed conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994. All ethnic Azeris had been expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh and almost all ethnic Armenians were forced to leave Azerbaijan. Since 1994, Armenia has controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh, and also seven adjacent regions of Azerbaijan, often called the 'occupied territories'. While Armenia provides political, economic and military support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared itself independent – although this has not been recognised by any other state, including Armenia. Azerbaijan claims, and the rest of the international community generally regards, Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as part of Azerbaijan. (See IISS Strategic Comment, *Medvedev momentum falters in Nagorno-Karabakh*, August 2011.)

Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh. Main battle tanks are usually placed at around 200–300 in number, with similar numbers for armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces, with small numbers of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation. Available personnel number estimates are between 18,000–20,000. (See p. 491.)

Belarus BLR

Belarusian Ruble r		2013	2014	2015
GDP	r	637tr	820tr	
	US\$	71.7bn	77.2bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	7,577	8,195	
Growth	%	0.9	0.9	
Inflation	%	18.3	18.6	
Def exp	r	€6.05tr		
	US\$	€681m		
US\$1=r		8,879.99	10,630.36	

Population 9,608,058

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	7.9%	2.5%	3.4%	4.3%	23.9%	4.5%
Female	7.5%	2.4%	3.3%	4.1%	26.5%	9.7%

Capabilities

The primary role of the armed forces is to protect territorial integrity. The announcement that a Russian air base will be set up in Belarus in 2016, housing Su-27 combat aircraft, will provide additional air capability within the country. Much of the military inventory consists of ageing Soviet-era equipment. Air-combat capabilities could be bolstered by plans to upgrade its Su-27s and there are also plans to procure UAVs. The Belarusian defence relationship with Russia includes regular joint exercises, and Minsk could notionally support a regional joint operation with Moscow. However, with the exception of the 5th Spetsnaz Bde, ground-force capability is probably limited – although snap inspections began at the start of 2014 to try and improve readiness. In 2014 Moscow approved the donation of an unknown number of S-300PM SAM systems to Belarus. Minsk is exploring defence-industrial cooperation with Russia, but capacity limitations in the Belarusian defence industry will limit substantive cooperation. Belarus is currently under EU and US sanctions and an arms embargo is in place.

ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 16,500 Air 15,000 Special Operations Forces 6,000 Joint 10,500) Paramilitary 110,000

RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 16,500

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

2 comd HQ (West & North West)

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

2 mech bde

2 mech bde(-)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

2 MRL regt

2 engr regt

1 NBC regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 515: 446 T-72; 69 T-80

AIFV 1,011: 875 BMP-2; 136 BRM-1

APC • APC (T) 50 MT-LB

ARTY 957

SP 434: **122mm** 198 2S1; **152mm** 236: 108 2S3; 116 2S5; 12 2S19 *Farm*

TOWED 152mm 180: 48 2A36; 132 2A65

GUN/MOR 120mm 48 2S9 NONA

MRL 234: **122mm** 126 BM-21; **220mm** 72 9P140 *Uragan*;

300mm 36 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 120mm 61 2S12

AT • MSL

SP 236: 126 9P148 *Konkurs*; 110 9P149 *Shturm*

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

RADAR • LAND GS-13 *Long Eye*/SNAR-1 *Long Trough*/SNAR-2/-6 *Pork Trough* (arty); some *Small Fred*/*Small Yawn*/SNAR-10 *Big Fred* (veh, arty)

MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 96: 36 FROG/9M79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); 60 *Scud*

AEV MT-LB

VLB MTU

Air Force and Air Defence Forces 15,000

Flying hours 15 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

2 sqn with MiG-29S/UB *Fulcrum*

GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot* A/B

TRANSPORT

1 base with An-12 *Cub*; An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; Il-76 *Candid*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-6 *Hook*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24K *Hind* G2; Mi-24R *Hind* G1; Mi-26 *Halo*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable

FTR 38 MiG-29S/UB *Fulcrum*

FGA (21 Su-27P/UB *Flanker* B/C non-operational)

ATK 34 Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot* A/B

TPT 13: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid* (+9 civ Il-76 available for

mil use); **Medium** 3 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 8: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 6 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG Some L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 49 Mi-24 *Hind*

ISR 20: 8 Mi-24K *Hind* G2; 12 Mi-24R *Hind* G1

TPT 168: **Heavy** 43: 29 Mi-6 *Hook*; 14 Mi-26 *Halo*;

Medium 125 Mi-8 *Hip*

MSL

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*)

ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 *Killer*)

AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*)

SARH R-27R (AA-10 *Alamo* A)

Air Defence

AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar

FORCES BY ROLE**AIR DEFENCE**

1 bde with S-200 (SA-5 *Gammon*)

1 bde with S-200 (SA-5 *Gammon*); S-300PS (SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 bde with S-300V(SA-12A *Gladiator*/SA-12B *Giant*)

1 bde with 9K37 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*)

1 bde with 9K37 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*); 9K332 *Tor*-M2E (SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

2 bde with 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*)

2 regt with S-300PS (SA-10B *Grumble*)

1 regt with S-200 (SA-5 *Gammon*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AD • SAM**

SP 9K37 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*); S-300V(SA-12A *Gladiator*/SA-12B *Giant*); 9K35 *Strela*-10 (SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); S-300PS (SA-10B *Grumble*); 12 9K332 *Tor*-M2E (SA-15 *Gauntlet*)

TOWED S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)

STATIC S-200 (SA-5 *Gammon*)

Special Operations Forces 6,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

2 (mobile) mech bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

APC • APC (W) 192: 39 BTR-70; 153 BTR-80

ARTY • TOWED 122mm 48 D-30

AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*)

Joint 10,500 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff)**FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty gp

1 MRL bde

2 SSM bde

2 engr bde

1 EW unit

1 ptn bridging regt
2 sigs bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB

ARTY 196

SP 152mm 70 2S5

TOWED 152mm 90 2A65

300mm 36 9A52 *Smerch*

MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 96: 36 FROG/9M79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); 60 *Scud*

Paramilitary 110,000**Border Guards 12,000**

Ministry of Interior

Militia 87,000

Ministry of Interior

Ministry of Interior Troops 11,000**DEPLOYMENT****LEBANON**

UN • UNIFIL 2

SOUTH SUDAN

UN • UNMISS 4 obs

UKRAINE

OSCE • Ukraine 1

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 1 ftr flt with 5 Su-27 *Flanker*; 1 A-50 *Mainstay*; 4 SAM units with S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*)

Georgia GEO

Georgian Lari		2013	2014	2015
GDP	lari	26.8bn	29.2bn	
	US\$	16.1bn	16.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	3,597	3,607	
Growth	%	3.2	5.0	
Inflation	%	-0.5	4.6	
Def bdgt	lari	660m	711m	750m
	US\$	397m	393m	
FMA (US)	US\$	14m	12m	10m
US\$1=lari		1.66	1.81	

Population 4,935,880

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	9.3%	3.2%	4.1%	4.0%	21.2%	6.0%
Female	8.3%	2.8%	3.9%	4.0%	23.8%	9.3%

Capabilities

Georgia's armed forces continue to make efforts to address lessons from the conflict with Russia in 2008, which revealed significant shortcomings in key areas,

including reservist organisation, communications, anti-armour and air-defence capabilities. A substantial amount of US-supplied equipment was destroyed or captured in the conflict, and Georgia lost a number of its Russian-origin T-72 MBTs. The Israeli short-range *Spyder* system was subsequently acquired to bolster the air-defence capability and rapid-reaction special forces have improved capabilities through training and exercising. A 2012 enhanced defence-cooperation agreement with the US will provide training in cyber defence, border security, military-education development and counter-insurgency operations. Moves are under way to generate a pool of four-year-contract servicemen to boost professionalisation. Current plans call for the small air force – comprising Soviet-era ground-attack aircraft, combat-support helicopters and transport and utility helicopters – to merge with the army. Georgia deployed personnel to ISAF in Afghanistan, and has aspirations for NATO membership. Training activity involves international forces, including the US.

ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 17,750 Air 1,300 National Guard 1,600) Paramilitary 11,700

Conscript liability 18 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 14,000; 3,750 conscript (total 17,750)

FORCES BY ROLE**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Light**

5 inf bde

Amphibious

2 mne bn (1 cadre)

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bn

1 SIGINT bn

1 MP bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 123: 23 T-55; 100 T-72

RECCE 4+ *Didgori-2*

AIFV 72: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2; 1 BRM-1K

APC 199+

APC (T) 69+: 3+ *Lazika*; 66 MT-LB

APC (W) 120+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 8+ *Didgori-1*; 3+ *Didgori-3*; 65 *Ejder*

PPV 10 *Cougar*

ARTY 240

SP 67 152mm 66: 32 DANA; 20 2S1; 13 2S3; 1 2S19; 203mm 1 2S7

TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36; 10 2A65

MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21; 6 GRADLAR; 18 RM-70

MOR 120mm 65: 14 2S12; 33 M-75; 18 M120

AT €50

MSL €10

GUNS €40

AD • SAM • SP 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); *Spyder*
MANPAD *Grom*; 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K36
Strela-3 (SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Ginlet*)

Air Force 1,300 (incl 300 conscript)

1 avn base, 1 hel air base

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable

ATK 12: 3 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 7 Su-25K *Frogfoot A*; 2 Su-25UB
*Frogfoot B*TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 *Colt*; 1 Tu-134A *Crusty* (VIP); 2Yak-40 *Codling*TRG 9 L-29 *Delfin*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6 Mi-24 *Hind*TPT 29 Medium 17 Mi-8T *Hip*; Light 12 Bell 205 (UH-
1H *Iroquois*)UAV • ISR • Medium 1+ *Hermes* 450AD • SAM 1–2 bn 9K37 *Buk-M1* (SA-11 *Gadfly*), 8 9K33
Osa-AK (SA-8B *Gecko*) (two bty), 6–10 9K33 *Osa-AKM*
updated SAM systems.

National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon Army

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf bde

Paramilitary 11,700

Border Guard 5,400

Coast Guard

HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard
in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Guard,
within the Ministry of the Interior.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21

PBF 6: 4 *Ares* 43m; 1 *Kaan* 33; 1 *Kaan* 20PB 15: 1 *Akhmeta*; 2 *Dauntless*; 2 *Dilos* (ex-GRC); 1
Kutaisi (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 *Point*; 7 *Zhuk* (3 ex-UKR)
(up to 20 patrol launches also in service)AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 *Vydra*
(ex-BLG)

LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT • YTL 1

Ministry of Interior Troops 6,300

DEPLOYMENT

Legal provisions for foreign deployment of armed
forces:

Constitution: Codified constitution (1995)

Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the presi-
dency upon parliamentary approval (Art. 100)

AFGHANISTAN

NATO • ISAF 755; 1 mtn inf bn

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

NATO • ISAF 140; 1 inf coy

SERBIA

OSCE • Kosovo 4

UKRAINE

OSCE • Ukraine 1

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition as sovereign states.

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; some S-300 SAM; some atk hel); 1 mil base at Djava/Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

Kazakhstan KAZ

Kazakhstani Tenge t	2013	2014	2015	
GDP	t	35.3tr	40.3tr	
	US\$	232bn	226bn	
per capita	US\$	13,509	12,950	
Growth	%	6.0	4.6	
Inflation	%	5.8	6.9	
Def bdgt	t	348bn	363bn	377bn
	US\$	2.29bn	2.03bn	
FMA (US)	US\$	1.8m	1.5m	0.8m
US\$1=t		152.13	178.68	

Population 17,948,816

Ethnic groups: Kazakh 51%; Russian 32%; Ukrainian 5%; German 2%; Tatar 2%; Uzbek 13%

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	12.5%	3.7%	4.5%	4.7%	20.1%	2.4%
Female	12.6%	3.5%	4.4%	4.7%	22.4%	4.6%

Capabilities

Kazakhstan's armed forces are small and reliant on Soviet-era equipment. A 2011 Military Doctrine identified both internal and external security concerns, and risks from regional instability, but there were few force-structure changes detailed, with much focus on the development of Kazakhstan's defence industry. Kazakhstan maintains a close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced through

its membership of the CSTO and SCO. Moscow operates a radar station at Balkash, and seeks to include Kazakhstan in a regional air-defence network for the CSTO. As such, Russia is aiming to provide S-300PS air-defence systems gratis from its own stocks and in May 2014 a Joint Air-Defence Agreement was ratified. In the army, air-mobile units are held at the highest level of readiness, with other units at lower levels. There are ongoing efforts to improve the navy and the air force, with modest procurement projects under way. Airlift is being improved, with joint ventures and production envisaged with European companies for rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft and continued receipt of the C-295. However, airworthiness remains problematic. The navy, meanwhile, is seeking to procure its first corvette from overseas designs.

ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000) Paramilitary 31,500
Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 20,000

4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Mechanised

4 mech bde

Air Manoeuvre

4 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde

1 SSM unit

3 cbt engr bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 300 T-72

RECCE 100: 40 BRDM; 60 BRM

AIFV 652: 500 BMP-2; 107 BTR-80A; 43 BTR-82A; 2 BTR-3E

APC 357

APC (T) 150 MT-LB

APC (W) 207: 190 BTR-80; 17 *Cobra*

ARTY 602

SP 246: **122mm** 126: 120 2S1; 6 *Semser*; **152mm** 120 2S3

TOWED 150: **122mm** 100 D-30; **152mm** 50 2A65;

(**122mm** up to 300 D-30 in store)

GUN/MOR **120mm** 25 2S9 *Anona*

MRL 118: **122mm** 100 BM-21 *Grad*; **300mm** 18 *Lynx*

(with 50 msl); (**122mm** 100 BM-21 *Grad*; **220mm** 180

9P140 *Uragan* all in store)

MOR 63 SP **120mm** 18 CARDOM **120mm** 45 2B11/M120

AT

MSL

SP 3 BMP-T

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs*

(AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-6 *Spiral*)

GUNS **100mm** 68 MT-12/T-12

MSL • SSM 12 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

AEV MT-LB

Navy 3,000

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17

PCG 1 *Kazakhstan* with 2 quad Inchr with 3424 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 1 *Ghibka* Inchr with SA-N-10 *Gimlet* SAM

PBF 5: 3 *Sea Dolphin*; 2 *Saygak*;

PB 15: 4 *Almaty*; 3 *Archangel*; 1 *Dauntless*; 4 *Sardar*; 1 *Turk* (AB 25); 2 *Zhuk* (of which 1 may be operational)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 *Zhaik*

Coastal Defence

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 coastal defence bde

Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence)

Flying hours 100 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

2 sqn with MiG-31/MiG-31BM *Foxhound*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with MiG-27 *Flogger D*; MiG-23UB *Flogger C*

2 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

1 unit with Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154 *Careless*,

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*, An-26 *Curl*, An-30 *Clank*, An-72 *Coaler*

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

5 sqn with Mi-24V *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H); EC145; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17V-5 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

AIR DEFENCE

Some regt with S-75M *Volkhov* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125

Neva (SA-3 *Goa*); S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*); 2K11 *Krug*

(SA-4 *Ganef*); S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*); 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 122 combat capable

FTR 55: 12 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; 41

MiG-31/MiG-31BM *Foxhound*

FGA 53: 24 MiG-27 *Flogger D*; 4 MiG-23UB *Flogger C*; 21

Su-27 *Flanker*; 4 Su-27UB *Flanker*

ATK 14: 12 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*

ISR 1 An-30 *Clank*

TPT 15: **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 12; 6 An-26 *Curl*,

2 An-72 *Coaler*; 2 C-295; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 1 Tu-154 *Careless*

TRG 17 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 40+ Mi-24V *Hind* (first 9 upgraded)

MRH 20 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*

TPT 64: **Heavy** 2 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 50 Mi-8 *Hip*;
Light 12: 6 Bell-205 (UH-1H); 6 EC145

AD • SAM 147+

SP 47+: 20 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*); 27+ 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4 *Ganef*)/S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*); static; S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*)

TOWED 100 S-75M *Volkhov* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Neva* (SA-3 *Goa*)

MSL

ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 *Kerry*)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*)

ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 *Kyle*); Kh-27 (AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*)

AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*); SARH R-33 (AA-9 *Amos*); ARH R-77 (AA-12 *Adder* – on MiG-31BM)

Paramilitary 31,500

Government Guard 500

Internal Security Troops €20,000

Ministry of Interior

Presidential Guard 2,000

State Border Protection Forces €9,000

Ministry of Interior

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS

HEL • TPT • **Medium** 1 Mi-171

DEPLOYMENT

WESTERN SAHARA

UN • MINURSO 2 obs

Kyrgyzstan KGZ

Kyrgyzstani Som s		2013	2014	2015
GDP	s	350bn	391bn	
	US\$	7.23bn	7.65bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	1,280	1,342	
Growth	%	10.5	4.1	
Inflation	%	6.6	8.0	
Def bdtg [a]	s	4.91bn	4.87bn	
	US\$	101m	95m	
FMA (US)	US\$	1.5m	1.5m	
US\$1=s		48.45	51.16	

[a] Expenses on Ministry of Defence & Ministry of Interior.

Population 5,604,212

Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 56%; Russian 17%; Uzbek 13%; Ukrainian 3%

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	15.2%	4.7%	5.2%	4.8%	17.3%	1.9%
Female	14.5%	4.5%	5.1%	4.7%	19.1%	3.0%

Capabilities

Kyrgyzstan maintains one of the smaller armed forces in Central Asia, with ageing land equipment, limited air-combat capabilities and no navy. A new military doctrine was enacted in July 2013, setting out possible threats to the state and plans to reform the armed forces. The reform plans promise, among other things, modern armed forces with enhanced command-and-control, effective military logistics and a modern air-defence system, adding the term 'mobilisation readiness'. In general, combat readiness remains low with large numbers of poorly trained conscripts within the armed forces. For these reasons, Kyrgyzstan has a close strategic relationship with Russia, being a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Moscow maintains a modest presence of strike and transport aircraft in Kant air base, which it has leased since 2003, and in February 2014 Russia announced that four additional Su-25 *Frogfoot* ground-attack aircraft would be based there. Kyrgyzstan did not offer the US an extension for its presence at Manas air base, which closed in June 2014.

ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Paramilitary 9,500

Conscript liability 18 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,500

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 MR bde

1 (mtn) MR bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 150 T-72

RECCE 30 BRDM-2

AIFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2

APC (W) 35: 25 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80

ARTY 246

SP 122mm 18 2S1

TOWED 141: 100mm 18 M-1944; 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 16 D-1

GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 *Anona*

MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120

AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 (AT-5 *Spandrel*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS 100mm 18 MT-12/T-12

AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)‡

GUNS 48

SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4

TOWED 57mm 24 S-60

Air Force 2,400**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**1 regt with L-39 *Albatros****FIGHTER/TRANSPORT**1 (comp avn) regt with MiG-21 *Fishbed*; An-2 *Colt*; An-26 *Curl***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip***AIR DEFENCE**Some regt with S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*); S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 33 combat capableFGA 29 MiG-21 *Fishbed*TPT • **Light** 6: 4 An-2 *Colt*; 2 An-26 *Curl*TRG 4 L-39 *Albatros****HELICOPTERS**ATK 2 Mi-24 *Hind*TPT • **Medium** 8 Mi-8 *Hip***AD • SAM**SP 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4 *Ganef*)TOWED S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)**Paramilitary 9,500****Border Guards** 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers)**Interior Troops** 3,500**National Guard** 1,000**DEPLOYMENT****LIBERIA**

UN • UNMIL 3 obs

MOLDOVA

OSCE • Moldova 1

SERBIA

OSCE • Kosovo 1

SOUTH SUDAN

UN • UNMISS 2 obs

SUDAN

UN • UNAMID 2 obs

UN • UNISFA 1 obs

UKRAINE

OSCE • Ukraine 4

FOREIGN FORCESRussia €500 Military Air Forces: 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip***Moldova MDA**

Moldovan Leu L		2013	2014	2015
GDP	L	100bn	108bn	
	US\$	7.97bn	7.74bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	2,239	2,176	
Growth	%	8.9	1.8	
Inflation	%	4.6	5.1	
Def exp	L	303m		
	US\$	24m		
Def bdtg [a]	L	304m	355m	403m
	US\$	24m	25m	
FMA (US)	US\$	1.25m	1.25m	1.25m
US\$1=L		12.59	13.95	

[a] Excludes military pensions

Population 3,583,288

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	9.1%	3.3%	4.1%	4.7%	23.2%	4.2%
Female	8.6%	3.1%	3.8%	4.4%	24.6%	6.9%

Capabilities

Moldova has limited military capability and mainly Soviet-era equipment. Its conscript-based armed forces' primary focus remains the disputed territory of Transdnestr, though the country is also looking to develop further its capacity to contribute to peacekeeping and crisis-management missions in a multinational context. Moldovan forces are deployed in small numbers on UN operations and the country is developing units for interoperability with NATO. Implementing the recommendations of the 2011 Strategic Defence Review, carried out with UK support, is a priority, though funding problems mean this could prove a challenge. Russia continues to station an army garrison as well as a 'peacekeeping' contingent in Transdnestr, and in early 2014 conducted exercises in the territory. Following the annexation of Crimea and Moldova's developing ties with the West, this presence is additionally problematic. The strategic and military implications of the June 2014 signing of an association agreement with the EU are as yet unclear.

ACTIVE 5,350 (Army 3,250 Air 800 Logistic Support 1,300) Paramilitary 2,400**RESERVE 58,000** (Joint 58,000)**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE**Light**

3 mot inf bde

1 mot inf bn

Other

1 gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

1 NBC coy

1 sigs coy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RECCE 5 BRDM-2

AIFV 44 BMD-1

APC 157

APC (T) 62: 9 BTR-D; 53 MT-LB

APC (W) 95: 11 BTR-80; 84 TAB-71

ARTY 148

TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) *M-1938*; 152mm 52: 21 2A36; 31 D-20GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 *Anona*MRL 220mm 11 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 59: 82mm 52; 120mm 7 M-120

AT

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113*Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12

AD • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11 S-60

RADAR • LAND 4: 2 ARK-1; 2 SNAR-10

Air Force 800 (incl 250 conscripts)**FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT**2 sqn with An-2 *Colt*; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*; Mi-8PS *Hip*; Yak-18**AIR DEFENCE**1 regt with S-125 *Neva* (SA-3 *Goa*)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**TPT • Light 6: 2 An-2 *Colt*; 1 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-72 *Coaler*

1 Yak-18

HELICOPTERSMRH 4 Mi-17-1V *Hip* HTPT • Medium 2 Mi-8PS *Hip*AD • SAM 3 S-125 *Neva* (SA-3 *Goa*)**Paramilitary 2,400**

Ministry of Interior

OPON 900 (riot police)

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT**Legal provisions for foreign deployment:****Constitution:** Codified constitution (1994)**Decision on deployment of troops abroad:** By the parliament (Art. 66)**CÔTE D'IVOIRE**

UN • UNOCI 4 obs

LIBERIA

UN • UNMIL 2 obs

SERBIA

NATO • KFOR 41

SOUTH SUDAN

UN • UNMISS 1

UKRAINE

OSCE • Ukraine 9

FOREIGN FORCES

Czech Republic OSCE 1

Estonia OSCE 1

France OSCE 1

Germany OSCE 1

Kyrgyzstan OSCE 1

Poland OSCE 1

Russia €1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers) Military Air Forces 7 Mi-24 *Hind*/Mi-8 *Hip*

Spain OSCE 1

Sweden OSCE 1

Switzerland OSCE 1

Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)

United Kingdom OSCE 1

United States OSCE 3

Russia RUS

Russian Rouble r		2013	2014	2015
GDP	r	66.8tr	72.7tr	
	US\$	2.1tr	2.06tr	
	US\$ [a]	3.5tr	3.6tr	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	14,591	14,317	
Growth	%	1.3	0.2	
Inflation	%	6.8	7.4	
Def bdgt	r	2.1tr	2.47tr	3.29tr
	US\$	66.1bn	70bn	
	US\$ [a]	110bn	121bn	
US\$1=r	MER	31.84	35.33	
	PPP	19.12	20.42	

[a] PPP estimate

Population 142,470,272**Ethnic groups:** Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%; Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8%

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.2%	2.4%	3.5%	4.4%	23.7%	4.0%
Female	7.8%	2.3%	3.3%	4.4%	26.8%	9.1%

Capabilities

The various strands of Russian military modernisation described in previous editions of *The Military Balance* continue. Some of these measures were successfully tested

during the Russian military seizure of Crimea in 2014. New infantry equipment, communications and *Tigr* light-armoured vehicles were observed during this operation, as was electronic-warfare equipment. But the operation did not reflect the effect of reform on the broader force; troops in Crimea were initially mainly VDV and special forces, reflective of the higher levels of training, command-and-control, equipment and funding that these forces have enjoyed. The tactics displayed showed an integrated use of special forces, rapid mobility and electronic-warfare tools, coupled with deniability and deception that demonstrated the 'non-linear' warfare discussed by a top Russian military official, described by some in the West as 'hybrid warfare'. The concurrent rapid mobilisation of the Western and Southern Military districts, which brought a reported 40,000 troops to assembly areas close to the Ukrainian border, also apparently proceeded smoothly. These 'snap inspections' in most Military Districts continued. Some were huge in scale, and Russia continues to use these to identify areas for improvement. Although most conventional combat capability was not tested in 2014, the standing and morale of the Russian armed forces will have been boosted by the Crimea operation. (See pp. 159–67.)

ACTIVE 771,000 (Army 230,000 Navy 130,000 Air 148,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces 80,000 Airborne 32,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Command and Support 150,000) Paramilitary 489,000

Conscript liability 12 months.

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)

Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve obligation to age 50.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces €80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)

Navy

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 12:

- 3 *Kalmar* (Delta III) with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 *Stingray*) strategic SLBM
- 6 *Delfin* (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU *Sineva* (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM (of which 1 vessel in repair following a fire; expected return to service 2014)
- 1 *Akula* (*Typhoon*)† in reserve with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing)
- 2 *Borey* with capacity for 16 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) SLBM (missiles not yet operational), (1 additional unit with expected ISD 2014/15)

Strategic Rocket Force Troops

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers organised in 12 divs. Launcher gps normally with 10 silos (6 for RS-20/SS-18), or 9 mobile Inchr, and one control centre

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MSL • STRATEGIC 378

ICBM 378: 54 RS-20 (SS-18 *Satan*) (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); 160 RS-12M (SS-25 *Sickle*) (mobile single warhead); 40 RS-18 (SS-19 *Stiletto*) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl.); 60 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (SS-27M1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (SS-27M1) road mobile (single warhead); 42 RS-24 *Yars* (SS-27M2; €3 MIRV per msl); 4 RS-24 *Yars* (SS-27M2; €3 MIRV per msl) silo-based

Long-Range Aviation Command

FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER

- 1 sqn with Tu-160 *Blackjack*
- 3 sqn with Tu-95MS *Bear*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

BBR 78: 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack* each with up to 12 Kh-55 SM (AS-15A/B *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS6 (*Bear* H-6) each with up to 6 Kh-55/SM (AS-15A/B *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS16 (*Bear* H-16) each with up to 16 Kh-55 (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; (Kh-102 likely now in service on Tu-95MS)

Aerospace Defence Forces

Formations and units to detect missile attack on the RF and its allies, to implement BMD, and to be responsible for military/dual-use spacecraft launch and control

Space Command

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SATELLITES 74

COMMUNICATIONS 35: 3 Mod *Globus* (*Raduga-1M*); 9 *Strela*; 19 *Rodnik* (*Gonets-M*); 4 *Meridian*

NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 33 GLONASS

ELINT/SIGINT 4: 1 *Kondor*; 1 *Liana* (*Lotos-S*); 1 *Persona*; 1 *Tselina-2*;

EARLY WARNING 2 *Oko*

RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi, (St Petersburg); Armavir, (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk, (Murmansk); Mischelevka, (Irkutsk); Kaliningrad; Pechora, (Komi); Yeniseysk, (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul, (Altayskiy); Orsk, (Orenburg) and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH)

Aerospace Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE

- 3 AD bde HQ
- 8 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*); S-300PM (SA-20 *Gargoyle*)
- 4 regt with S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AD • SAM • SP 222: 150 S-300PS/PM (SA-10 *Grumble*/SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 48 S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 24 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-22 *Greyhound*)

MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (ABM-3 *Gazelle*); (32 51T6 (ABM-4 *Gorgon*) in store; possibly destroyed)

RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow)

Army €230,000; (incl conscripts)

Transformation process continues; 4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk)), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command.

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

10 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

7 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bde

Armoured

1 (4th) tk div (2 tk regt, 1 arty regt)

3 tk bde (1 armd recce bn; 3 tk bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn;

1 MRL bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)

Mechanised

2 (2nd & 201st) MR div (2 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

28 MR bde (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 MR bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)

2 MR bde (4–5 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn)

3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 MR bn; 1 arty bn)

1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 AD bn)

COMBAT SUPPORT

8 arty bde

4 MRL bde

1 MRL regt

4 SSM bde with 9K720 *Iskander-M* (SS-26 *Stone*)

5 SSM bde with 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab* — to be replaced by *Iskander-M*)

9 AD bde

4 engr bde

1 MP bde

5 NBC bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

10 log bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 2,600: 1,300 T-72B/BA; 400 T-72B3; 550 T-80BV/U; 350 T-90/T-90A; (17,500 in store: 2,800 T-55; 2,500 T-62; 2,000 T-64A/B; 7,000 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90)

RECCE 1,200+: 100+ *Dozor*, 100+ *Tigr*, 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store)

AIFV 5,125+: 500 BMP-1; 3,000 BMP-2; 500+ BMP-3; 700 BRM-1K; 275 BTR-80A/82A; 150 BTR-82AM; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2)

APC 6,000+

APC (T) 3,500+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB; (2,000 MT-LB in store)

APC (W) 2,500: 800 BTR-60; 200 BTR-70; 1,500 BTR-80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store)

ARTY 4,180+

SP 1,500: **122mm** 150 2S1; **152mm** 1,350: 800 2S3; 100 2S5; 450 2S19; (4,300 in store: **122mm** 2,000 2S1; **152mm** 1,950: 1,000 2S3; 850 2S5; 150 2S19; **203mm** 320 2S7)

TOWED 150: **152mm** 150 2A65; (12,415 in store: **122mm** 8,150: 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); **130mm** 650 M-46; **152mm** 3,575: 1,100 2A36; 600 2A65; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 M-1943; 100 ML-20 M-1937; **203mm** 40 B-4M)

GUN/MOR 180+

SP **120mm** 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34

TOWED **120mm** 100 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 850+ **122mm** 550 BM-21; **220mm** 200 9P140 *Uragan*; some TOS-1A; **300mm** 100 9A52 *Smerch*; (3,220 in store: **122mm** 2,420: 2,000 BM-21; 420 9P138; **132mm** 100 BM-13; **220mm** 700 9P140 *Uragan*)

MOR 1,500

SP (**240mm** 430 2S4 in store)

TOWED 1,500: **82mm** 800 2B14; **120mm** 700 2S12; (2,200 in store: **120mm** 1,900: 1,000 2S12; 900 PM-38; **160mm** 300 M-160)

AT

MSL

SP BMP-T with 9K120 *Ataka* (AT-9 *Spiral* 2); 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9P157-2 with 9K123 *Chrisantema* (AT-15 *Springer*)

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K112 *Kobra* (AT-8 *Songster*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (AT-13 *Saxhorn* 2); 9K116 *Bastion/Basnya* (AT-10 *Stabber*); 9K119 *Reflex/Svir* (AT-11 *Sniper*); 9K135 *Kornet* (AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL **73mm** SPG-9

RL **105mm** RPG-29

GUNS • **TOWED** **100mm** 526 MT-12; (**100mm** 2,000 T-12/MT-12 in store)

AD

SAM 1,570+

SP 1,570+: 350+ 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-17 *Grizzly*); 400 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (SA-8B *Gecko*); 400 9K35M3 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 120+ 9K330/9K331 *Tor* (SA-15 *Gauntlet*); 250+ 2K22 *Tunguska* (SA-19 *Grison*)

MANPAD 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba*; 9K338 *Igla-S* (SA-24 *Grinch*); 9K34 *Strela-3* (SA-14 *Gremlin*)

GUNS

SP **23mm** ZSU-23-4

TOWED **23mm** ZU-23-2; **57mm** S-60

UAV • **Heavy** Tu-143 *Reys*; Tu-243 *Reys*/Tu-243 *Reys D*; Tu-300 *Korshun* **Light** BLA-07; *Pchela-1*; *Pchela-2*

MSL • **SRBM** 120: 70 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); 50 9K720 *Iskander-M* (SS-26 *Stone*); (some *Scud* in store)

AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IRM; MT-LB

ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A

VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2

MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2

Reserves

Cadre formations

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Mechanised

13 MR bde

Navy €130,000; (incl conscripts)

4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 59**STRATEGIC • SSBN** 12:

- 3 *Kalmar* (*Delta* III) with 16 R-29R *Volna* (SS-N-18 *Stingray*) strategic SLBM
- 6 *Delfin* (*Delta* IV) with 16 R-29RMU *Sineva* (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM (1 expected to return to service by end-2014 following repair)
- 1 *Akula* (*Typhoon*)† in reserve for training with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing)
- 2 *Borey* with capacity for 16 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) SLBM (missiles not yet operational); (1 additional vessel with expected ISD 2014/15)

TACTICAL 47**SSGN** 9:

- 8 *Antey* (*Oscar* II) (of which 3 in reserve/repair) with 2 12-cell Inchr with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) ASHM, 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 4 single 533mm TT
- 1 *Yasen* (*Graney*) with 1 octuple VLS with 3M55 *Onyx* ASHM; 3M14 *Kalibr* (SS-N-30) SLCM; 8 single 533mm TT

SSN 17:

- 2 *Schuka-B* (*Akula* II) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT
- 8 *Schuka-B* (*Akula* I) (of which 2 in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT (one further boat leased to India for 10 years from 2012)
- 2 *Kondor* (*Sierra* II) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT
- 1 *Barracuda* (*Sierra* I) (in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, RPK-2 (SS-N-15 *Starfish*) and T-53 HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with RPK-7 (SS-N-16 *Stallion*) ASHM and T-65 HWT
- 4 *Schuka* (*Victor* III) (of which 1 in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 2 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT

SSK 21:

- 15 *Paltus* (*Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-53 HWT
- 5 *Varshavyanka* (*Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels under construction)
- 1 *Lada* (AIP fitted) with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels in build)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 35

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 *Orel* (*Kuznetsov*) with 1 12-cell VLS with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) ASHM, 4 sextuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 *Udav* 1, 8 CADS-N-1

Kortik CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 6 AK630 CIWS (capacity 18-24 Su-33 *Flanker D* FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R *Helix* AEW hel)

CRUISERS 6**CGHMN** 2:

- 2 *Orlan* (*Kirov*) with 10 twin VLS with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) ASHM, 2 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 12 octuple VLS with *Fort/Fort M* (SA-N-6 *Grumble*/SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000 *Udav* 1, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3, 6 CADS-N-1 *Kortik* CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 3 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (1 non-operational; undergoing extensive refit and expected return to service in 2017)

CGHM 4:

- 1 *Berkot-B* (*Kara*)† (scheduled to be decommissioned), with 2 quad Inchr with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 2 twin Inchr with 4K60 *Shtorm* (SA-N-3 *Goblet*) SAM, 2 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000, 2 twin 76mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 3 *Atlant* (*Slava*) with 8 twin Inchr with *Vulkan* (SS-N-12 mod 2 *Sandbox*) ASHM, 8 octuple VLS with *Fort/Fort M* (SA-N-6 *Grumble*/SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 single Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 6 AK650 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (1 currently non-operational; expected return to service in 2015)

DESTROYERS 18**DDGHM** 17:

- 8 *Sarych* (*Sovremenny*) (of which 3 in reserve†) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 2 twin Inchr with 3K90 *Uragan*/9K37 *Yezh* (SA-N-7 *Gadfly*/SA-N-12 *Grizzly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 8 *Fregat* (*Udaloy* I) each with 2 quad Inchr with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 8 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
- 1 *Fregat* (*Udaloy* II) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 8 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 CADS-N-1 *Kortik* CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

DDGM 1:

- 1 *Komsomolets* *Ukrainy* (*Kashin* mod) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 twin Inchr with *Volnya* (SA-N-1 *Goa*) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 1 twin 76mm gun

FRIGATES 10

FFGHM 6:

- 2 *Jastreb (Neustrashimy)* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 4 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 6 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000, 2 CADS-N-1 *Kortik* CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW) (3rd vessel launched, but production halted in 1997; unclear status)
- 1 *Steregushchiy* (Project 20380) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 *Kortik* CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
- 3 *Steregushchiy* (Project 20381) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 12-cell VLS with 3K96 *Redut* SAM, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 *Kortik* CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (4 additional vessels in build, of which two are improved *Steregushchiy* II)

FFGM 4:

- 1 *Gepard* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 1 *Gepard* with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14 *Kaliber* (SS-N-30) LACM, 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 1 *Burevestnik (Krivak I mod)*† with 1 quad Inchr with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2*, 2 twin 76mm guns
- 1 *Burevestnik M (Krivak II)* each with 1 quad Inchr with RPK-3 *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHM/ASW, 2 twin Inchr with 10 *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2*, 2 100mm guns

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 84

CORVETTES 48

FSGM 17:

- 2 *Grad Sviyazhsk (Buyan-M)* with 1 octuple VLS with 3M55 *Onyx* ASHM; 3M14 *Kalibr* (SS-N-30) LACM, 2 sextuple Inchr with 3M47 *Gibka* (SA-N-10 *Grouse*) SAM; 1 AK630-M2 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (6 additional vessels in build)
- 2 *Sivuch (Dergach)* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 12 *Ovod (Nanuchka III)* with 2 triple Inchr with P-120 *Malakhit* (SS-N-9 *Siren*) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*), 1 76mm gun
- 1 *Ovod (Nanuchka IV)* with 2 triple Inchr with 3M55 *Onyx* (SS-N-26) ASHM, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*), 1 76mm gun

FSM 31:

- 3 *Albatros (Grisha III)* with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2*. 1 twin 57mm gun

- 18 *Albatros (Grisha V)* with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2*, 1 76mm gun
- 3 *Astrakhan (Buyan)* with 1 sextuple Inchr with 3M47 *Gibka* (SA-N-10 *Grouse*), 1 A-215 *Grad-M* 122mm MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
- 7 *Parchim II* with 2 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2*, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCFG 25:

- 6 *Molnya (Tarantul II)* with 2 twin Inchr with P-15M *Termit* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 19 *Molnya (Tarantul III)* with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PBM 7 *Grachonok* with 1 quad Inchr with 3M47 *Gibka* (SA-N-10 *Grouse*), (original design was as diving tender)

PHG 3 *Vekhr (Matka)* with 2 single Inchr with P-15M *Termit* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) ASHM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PHT 1 *Sokol (Mukha)* with 2 quad 406mm TT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 53

MHO 2 *Rubin (Gorya)* with 2 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MSO 11: 10 *Akvamaren (Natya)*; 1 *Agat (Natya II)* (all with 2 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 RBU1200 *Uragan*, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

MSC 25: 23 *Yakhont (Sonya)* with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM); 2 Project 1258 (*Yevgenya*)

MHI 15: 9 *Sapfir (Lida)* with 1 AK630 CIWS; 3 Project 696 (*Tolya*); 3 *Malakhit (Olya)*

AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 20:

4 *Tapir (Alligator)* with 2-3 twin Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

12 Project 775 (*Ropucha I*) with 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

3 Project 775M (*Ropucha II*) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

1 *Tapir (Alligator (mod))* with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-29 *Helix B*; 13 MBT; 300 troops) (vessel launched in 2012; expected ISD end-2013))

LANDING CRAFT 25

LCU 11:

2 *Dyugon* (3 more in build)

9 Project 11770 (*Serna*) (capacity 100 troops)

LCM 7 *Akula (Ondatra)* (capacity 1 MBT)

LCAC 7:

2 *Dzheryan (Aist)* with 2 twin AK630 CIWS (capacity 4 lt tk)

2 *Pomornik (Zubr)* with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))

3 *Kalmart (Lebed)* (capacity 2 lt tk)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 626

SSAN 7: 1 *Orenburg (Delta III Stretch)*; 1 *Losharik* (one further vessel under construction); 2 *Project 1851 (Paltus)*; 3 *Kashalot (Uniform)*

SSA 1 *Sarov*

ABU 12: 8 *Kashtan*; 4 *Sura*

AE 2: 1 *Muna*; 1 *Dubnyak*

AEM 3: 2 *Amga*; 1 *Lama*

AG 3: 2 *Vytegrales*; 1 *Potok*

AGB 4 *Dobrynya Mikitich*

AGE 2: 1 *Tchusovoy*; 1 *Zvezdochka* (2 more vessels under construction)

AGI 11: 2 *Alpinist*; 1 *Balzam*; 3 *Moma*; 5 *Vishnya*

AGM 1 *Marshal Nedelin*

AGOR 6: 1 *Akademik Krylov*; 2 *Sibiriyakov*; 2 *Vinograd*; 1 *Seliger*

AGS 21: 3 *BGK-797*; 6 *Kamenka*; 9 *Onega*; 3 *Vaygach*

AGSH 1 *Samara*

AGSI 50: 8 *Biya*; 25 *Finik*; 7 *Moma*; 12 *Yug*

AH 3 *Ob †*

AK 2 *Bira*

AOL 13: 2 *Dubna*; 5 *Uda*; 6 *Altay (mod)*

AOR 5 *Boris Chilikin*

AORL 3: 1 *Kaliningradneft*; 2 *Olekma*

AOS 1 *Luzá*

AR 13 *Amur*

ARC 7: 4 *Emba*; 3 *Klasma*

ARS 14: 4 *Mikhail Rudnitsky*; 10 *Goryn*

AS 1 *Project 2020 (Malina)*

ASR 2: 1 *Nepal*; 1 *Alagez*

ATF 62: 1 *Alexander Piskunov*; 2 *Baklazzhan*; 5 *Katun*; 3 *Ingul*; 2 *Neftegaz*; 14 *Okhtensky*; 18 *Prometey*; 1 *Prut*; 3 *Sliva*; 13 *Sorum*

AWT 2 *Manych*

AXL 12: 10 *Petrushka*; 2 *Smolny* with 2 *RBU 2500*, 2 twin 76mm guns

YDG 28: 15 *Bereza*; 13 *Pelym*

YDT 91: 40 *Flamingo*; 20 *Nyryat 2*; 28 *Yelva*; 3 *Project 11980*

YGS 60 *GPB-480*

YO 36: 5 *Khobi*; 30 *Toplivo*; 1 *Konda*

YPB 30 *Bolva*

YPT 12 *Shelon*

YTB 60: 3 *PE-65*; 2 *Project 745MB/S*; 9 *Project 16609*; 11 *Stividor*; 35 *Sidehole*

YTR 42: 27 *Pozharny*; 15 *Morkov*

Naval Aviation €28,000

4 Fleet Air Forces

Flying hours 60+ hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

1 sqn with *Su-33 Flanker D*; *Su-25UTG Frogfoot*

1 sqn (forming) with *MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum*

1 sqn with *Su-27 Flanker*

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

1 regt with *Su-24M/MR Fencer*

1 sqn with *Su-24M/MR Fencer*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

2 sqn with *Il-18D*; *Il-20RT Coot A*; *Il-22 Coot B*; *Il-38/Il-38N May**

8 sqn with *Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix*

1 sqn with *Mi-14 Haze A*

2 sqn with *Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J**

1 unit with *Ka-31R Helix*

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with *An-26 Curl*; *Be-12 Mail**; *Mi-8 Hip*

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with *An-12PS Cub*; *An-26 Curl*; *Tu-134*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with *An-12BK Cub*; *An-24RV Coke*; *An-26 Curl*; *An-72 Coaler*; *An-140*

2 sqn with *An-26 Curl*; *Tu-134*

TRAINING

1 sqn with *Su-30SM*; *L-39 Albatros*

1 sqn with *An-140*; *Tu-134*; *Tu-154*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with *Mi-8 Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT 136** combat capable

FTR 40: 2 *MiG-29K Fulcrum*; 2 *MiG-29KUB Fulcrum*; 18 *Su-33 Flanker D*; 18 *Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker*

FGA 31: 28 *Su-24M Fencer*; 3 *Su-30SM*

ATK 5 *Su-25UTG Frogfoot*

ASW 27 *Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J*

MP 26: 3 *Be-12 Mail**; 1 *Il-18D*; 22 *Il-38/Il-38N May**

ISR 8 *Su-24MR Fencer E**

SAR 3 *An-12PS Cub*

EW • ELINT 4: 2 *Il-20RT Coot A*; 2 *Il-22 Coot B*

TPT 50: **Medium** 2 *An-12BK Cub*; **Light** 46: 1 *An-24RV Coke*; 27 *An-26 Curl*; 6 *An-72 Coaler*; 2 *An-140*; 10 *Tu-134*; **PAX** 2 *Tu-154M Careless*

TRG 4 *L-39 Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 83: 63 *Ka-27 Helix*; 20 *Mi-14 Haze A*

EW 8 *Mi-8 Hip J*

AEW 2 *Ka-31R Helix*

SAR 56: 16 *Ka-27PS Helix D*; 40 *Mi-14PS Haze C*

TPT • Medium 36: 28 *Ka-29 Helix*; 4 *Mi-8T Hip*; 4 *Mi-8MT Hip*

MSL

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); *Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt)*

ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter); *Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)*

AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); *R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)*; *R-73 (AA-11 Archer)*; **SARH R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo)**

Naval Infantry (Marines) €20,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (fleet) SF bde (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)

2 (fleet) SF bde (cadre) (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)

MANOEUVRE**Mechanised**

2 MR bde

1 MR bde (forming)

1 MR regt

5 indep naval inf bde

1 indep naval inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 arty bde
- 1 arty regt
- 1 SSM bde with 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

AIR DEFENCE

- 2 SAM regt with 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); *Strela-1/ Strela-10* (SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher*)
- 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*)
- 1 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**MBT** 200 T-72/T-80**RECCE** 60 BRDM-2 each with 9K11 *Malyutka* (AT-3 *Sagger*)**AIFV** 300 BMP-2**APC** 800

APC (T) 300 MT-LB

APC (W) 500 BTR-80

ARTY 365

SP 263: 122mm 113: 95 2S1; 18 2S19; 152mm 150: 50 2A36; 50 2A65; 50 2S3

GUN/MOR 66

SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S

TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K

MRL 122mm 36 BM-21**AT****MSL**SP 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9P157-2 with 9K123 *Khrisantema* (AT-15 *Springer*)**MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*)**GUNS** 100mm T-12**AD****SAM**SP 86: 20 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); 50 *Strela-1/Strela-10* (SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher*); 8 S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*); 8 S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*)**MANPAD** 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)**GUNS** 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4**MSL • SRBM** 12 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)**Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops 2,000****FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

- 3 AShM bde
- 2 AShM regt
- 1 indep AShM bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**ARTY • SP** 130mm ε36 A-222 *Bereg***AShM** 36+: 24 3K60 *Bal* (SS-C-6 *Sennight*); 12 K-300P *Bastion* (SS-C-5 *Stooge*); some 4K44 *Redut* (SS-C-1 *Sepal*); some 4K51 *Rubezh* (SS-C-3 *Styx*)**Military Air Forces ε148,000 (incl conscripts)**Flying hours 60 to 100 hrs/year (combat aircraft)
120+ (transport aircraft)

HQ at Balashikha, near Moscow. A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM, UKR and UZB. The Russian Air Force is currently undergoing a period of restructuring, both in terms of general organisation as well as air-base and unit structure.

FORCES BY ROLE**BOMBER**

- 4 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire C*
- 3 sqn with Tu-95MS *Bear*
- 1 sqn with Tu-160 *Blackjack*

FIGHTER

- 1 regt with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*
- 1 regt with MiG-29SMT/UBT *Fulcrum*
- 1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound*
- 1 regt with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*
- 1 regt with MiG-31; Su-27SM2; Su-30M2
- 4 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*
- 2 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

- 1 regt with MiG-31BM; Su-24M/M2/MR
- 1 regt with Su-27SM2 *Flanker*; Su-35S *Flanker*; Su-30M2
- 1 regt with Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2
- 1 regt with Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-30SM

GROUND ATTACK

- 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*
- 2 sqn with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*
- 8 sqn with Su-25/Su-25SM *Frogfoot*
- 1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*; Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

- 1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*; Su-24MR *Fencer**

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

- 1 sqn with Mi-8PPA *Hip*

ISR

- 2 regt with Su-24MR *Fencer**
- 1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer**
- 1 flt with An-30 *Clank*

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

- 1 sqn with A-50/A-50U *Mainstay*

TANKER

- 1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M *Midas*

TRANSPORT

- 6 regt/sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154 *Careless*; Mi-8 *Hip*
- 1 regt with An-124 *Condor*; Il-76MD *Candid*
- 1 regt with An-12BK *Cub*; Il-76MD *Candid*
- 1 sqn with An-22 *Cock*
- 3 regt with Il-76MD *Candid*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

- 1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*
- 2 sqn with Ka-52A *Hokum B*
- 4 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*
- 3 sqn with Mi-28N *Havoc B*
- 1 sqn with Mi-35 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 17 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*

AIR DEFENCE

- 8 AD bde HQ
- 4 regt with 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-17 *Grizzly*); S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*)
- 17 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*); S-300PM (SA-20)
- 2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 1,201 combat capable

BBR 141: 63 Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire* C; 31 Tu-95MS6 *Bear*; 31 Tu-95MS16 *Bear*; 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack*

FTR 420: 120 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 30 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; 100 MiG-31B/31BS *Foxhound*; 50 MiG-31BM *Foxhound*; 100 Su-27 *Flanker*; 20 Su-27UB *Flanker*

FGA 345: 28 MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29UBT *Fulcrum*; 100 Su-24M *Fencer*; 50 Su-24M2 *Fencer*; 47 Su-27SM2 *Flanker*; 14 Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; 14 Su-30M2; 15 Su-30SM; 46 Su-34 *Fullback*; 25 Su-35S *Flanker*

ATK 215: 150 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 50 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*; 15 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*

ISR 86: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 80 Su-24MR *Fencer**; 2 Tu-214ON

ELINT 32: 15 Il-20M *Coot A*; 5 Il-22 *Coot B*; 12 Il-22M *Coot B*

AEW&C 22: 15 A-50 *Mainstay*; 3 A-50U *Mainstay*; 4 Il-76SKIP (Be-976 – telemetry aircraft)

C2 6: 2 Il-76VKP; 4 Il-86VKP *Maxdome*

TKR 15: 5 Il-78 *Midas*; 10 Il-78M *Midas*

TPT 432: **Heavy** 123: 9 An-124 *Condor*; 4 An-22 *Cock*; 110 Il-76MD/MF *Candid*; **Medium** 65 An-12BK *Cub*; **Light** 226: 115 An-26 *Curl*; 25 An-72 *Coaler*; 5 An-140; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 18 Tu-154 *Careless*

TRG 198: 150 L-39 *Albatros*; 48 Yak-130 *Mitten*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 296+: 12 Ka-50 *Hokum*; 56+ Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 150 Mi-24D/V/P *Hind*; 54+ Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 24 Mi-35 *Hind*

EW 54: 50 Mi-8PPA *Hip*; 4 Mi-8MTRP-1 *Hip*

TPT 532: **Heavy** 32 Mi-26/Mi-26T *Halo*; **Medium** 500 Mi-8/Mi-8MT/Mi-8MTSh/Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*

TRG 30: 10 Ka-226; 20 *Ansats-U*

UAV • ISR Light some *Pchela-1T*

AD • SAM • SP 376: 80 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-17 *Grizzly*); 240 S-300PS/PM (SA-10 *Grumble*/SA-20 *Gargoyle*); 20 S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 24 S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 12 9K6K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-22 *Greyhound*)

MSL

AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D *Alamo*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*); R-60T (AA-8 *Aphid*); **SARH** R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C *Alamo*); R-33/33S (AA-9 *Amos A/B*); **ARH** R-77/R-77-1 (AA-12/AA-X-12B *Adder*); K-37M (AA-13 *Axehead*); **PRH** R-27P/EP (AA-10E/F *Alamo*)

ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*); Kh-25MP (AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-15P (AS-16 *Kickback*) Kh-31P/PM (PM entering production) (AS-17A *Krypton*)

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-13 *Kingbolt*/AS-18 *Kazoo*); Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-31A/AM (AM entering production) (AS-17B *Krypton*); Kh-38 (entering production)

LACM Kh-22/32 (AS-4 *Kitchen*); Kh-55/55SM (AS-15A/B *Kent*); Kh-101; Kh-102; Kh-555 (AS-15C *Kent*)

BOMBS • Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L; **TV-guided** KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD; UPAB 1500

Airborne Troops €32,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (AB Recce) SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Air Manoeuvre**

4 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt)

1 indep AB bde

3 air aslt bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**RECCE** *Tigr*

AIFV 1,165: 100 BMD-1; 1,000 BMD-2; 10 BMD-3; 30 BMD-4; 25 BTR-80A

APC • APC (T) 700 BTR-D

ARTY 600+

TOWED 122mm 150 D-30

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 250 2S9 NONA-S (500 in store: 120mm 500 2S9 NONA-S)

MOR • TOWED 200+ **82mm** 150 2B14; **120mm** 50+ 2B23

AT**MSL**

SP 100 BTR-RD

MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K112 *Kobra* (AT-8 *Songster*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (AT-13 *Saxhorn 2*); 9K116 *Bastion/Basnya* (AT-10 *Stabber*); 9K119 *Reflex/Svoir* (AT-11 *Sniper*); 9K135 *Kornet* (AT-14 *Spriggan*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

RL 105mm RPG-29

GUNS • SP: 125mm 36+ 2S25

AD • SAM

SP 150 BTR-ZD

MANPAD 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K333 *Verba*; 9K338 *Igla-S* (SA-24 *Grinch*); 9K34 *Strela-3* (SA-14 *Gremlin*)

ARV BREM-D; BREHM-D

Special Operations Forces €1,000**FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

2 SF unit

Russian Military Districts**Western Military District**

HQ at St Petersburg

Army**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

2 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

1 tk div

1 tk bde

Mechanised

1 MR div

4 MR bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 MRL bde

2 SSM bde with *Iskander-M*
 1 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)
 2 AD bde
 1 engr bde
 1 MP bde
 1 NBC bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bde

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

1 tk bde

Mechanised

2 MR bde

Northern Fleet**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES 33**

STRATEGIC 9 SSBN (one to transfer to PF)

TACTICAL 24: 4 SSGN; 13 SSN; 7 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11: 1 CV; 2 CGHMN (one non-operational); 1 CGHM (in repair); 7 DDGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9: 3

FSGM; 6 FSM

MINE WARFARE 12: 1 MHO (in repair); 3 MSO; 8 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 4 LST

Naval Aviation**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

2 sqn with Su-33 *Flanker D*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Il-20RT *Coot A*; Il-38 *May**; Tu-134

3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 18 Su-33 *Flanker D*

ATK 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

ASW 13 Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J*

EW • ELINT 3: 2 Il-20RT *Coot A*; 1 Il-22 *Coot B*

MP 14 Il-38 *May**

TPT 9: 8 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix A*

TPT Ka-29 *Helix B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

1 MR bde

1 MR bde (forming)

1 naval inf bde

1 naval inf regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

1 AShM bde

Baltic Fleet**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 3 SSK: 1 *Lada*; 2 *Paltus* (*Kilo*)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 2 DDGHM; 6 FFGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20: 4 FSGM; 7 FSM; 8 PCFG; 1 PBM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15: 4 MSC; 11 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS 13: 4 LST; 2 LCU; 5 LCM; 2 LCAC

Naval Aviation**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with Su-27 *Flanker*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

FGA 10 Su-24M *Fencer*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer**

TPT 8: 6 An-26 *Curl*; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

1 MR bde

1 MR regt

1 naval inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops**FORCES BY ROLE****COASTAL DEFENCE**

1 AShM regt

Military Air Force

1st Air Force & Air Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

- 1 regt with MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*
- 1 regt with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; Su-27 *Flanker*
- 1 regt with Su-27 *Flanker*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR

- 1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound*; Su-24M/M2/MR *Fencer*

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

- 1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*; Su-24MR *Fencer*

ISR

- 1 flt with A-30 *Clank*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

- 1 sqn with Mi-8PPA *Hip*

TRANSPORT

- 1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

- 1 bde with Ka-52A *Hokum B*; Mi-28N *Havoc B*; Mi-35 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8MTV-5 *Hip*
- 2 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 3 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*

AIR DEFENCE

- 1 regt with 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-17 *Grizzly*); S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*)
- 7 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*); S-300PM (SA-20 *Gargoyle*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

- FTR 160: 51 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 109 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*
- FGA 102: 28 MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29UBT *Fulcrum*; 44 Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*; 24 Su-34 *Fullback*
- ISR 38: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 10 MiG-25RB *Foxbat** 24 Su-24MR *Fencer**
- TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

- ATK 58+: 12 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 30 Mi-24 *Hind*; 12 Mi-28N *Havoc B*; 4+ Mi-35 *Hind*
- EW 10 Mi-8PPA *Hip*
- TPT • **Medium** 50 Mi-8 *Hip*
- AD • **SAM** • **SP** 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-17 *Grizzly*); S-300PS/PM (SA-10 *Grumble*/SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*)

Airborne Troops

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

- 1 (AB *Recce*) SF regt

MANOEUVRE

- Air Manoeuvre**
- 3 AB div

Central Military District

HQ at Yekaterinburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

- 2 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

- 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

- 1 tk bde

Mechanised

- 1 (201st) MR div
- 7 MR bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

- 2 arty bde
- 1 MRL bde
- 2 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)
- 2 AD bde
- 1 engr bde
- 2 NBC bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

- 2 log bde

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

- 3 MR bde

Military Air Force

2nd Air Force & Air Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

- 1 regt with MiG-31BM *Foxhound*
- 2 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*

GROUND ATTACK

- 2 sqn with Su-24 *Fencer*

ISR

- 1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TRANSPORT

- 1 regt with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154; Mi-8 *Hip*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

- 2 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 2 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*

AIR DEFENCE

- 6 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

- FTR 73 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
- FGA 26 Su-24M *Fencer*
- ISR 13 Su-24MR *Fencer E*
- TPT 36 An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154 *Careless*

HELICOPTERS

- ATK 24 Mi-24 *Hind*
- TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 *Halo*; 40 Mi-8 *Hip*
- AD • **SAM** • **SP** S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*)

Airborne Troops

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvre
1 AB bde

Southern Military District

HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance

1 recce bde

Mechanised

6 MR bde

1 MR bde (Armenia)

1 MR bde (Abkhazia)

1 MR bde (South Ossetia)

3 (lt/mtn) MR bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 MRL regt

1 SSM bde with *Iskander-M* (SS-26 *Stone*)

2 AD bde

1 engr bde

1 NBC bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2 log bde

Black Sea Fleet

The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in the Crimea, at Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaia Bay.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 2 SSK (also 1 *Som* (*Tango*) in reserve)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5: 2 CGHM; 1 DDGM; 2 FFGM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20: 4 FSGM; 6 FSM; 1 PHM; 5 PCFG; 3 PBM; 1 PHT

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9: 1 MHO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 9: 8 LST; 1 LCU

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

1 regt with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-27 *Helix*

1 sqn with Mi-14 *Haze*

MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Be-12 *Mail**; Mi-8

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FGA 18 Su-24M *Fencer*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

MP 6 Be-12 *Mail**

TPT 6 An-26

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • **Medium** Mi-8 *Hip* (MP/EW/Tpt)

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 naval inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 ASHM bde

1 indep ASHM bn

Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 FFGM
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11: 2 FSGM; 3 FSM; 2 PCFG; 3 PHM; 1 PBM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7: 5 MSC; 2 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS 11: 2 LCM; 4 LCU; 5 LCAC

Military Air Force

4th Air Force & Air Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (Armenia)

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 regt with Su-27 *Flanker*; Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2

GROUND ATTACK

6 sqn with Su-25/Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

1 regt with Su-34 *Fullback*; Su-24M *Fencer*

ISR

1 regt with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*/Mi-8 *Hip*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

1 sqn with Ka-52A *Hokum B*

3 sqn with Mi-28N *Havoc B*

1 sqn with Mi-35 *Hind*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*

AIR DEFENCE

1 regt with 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-17 *Grizzly*)

2 regt with S-300PM (SA-20 *Gargoyle*)
 1 regt with S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1*
 (SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 121: 63 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 58 Su-27 *Flanker*
FGA 88: 62 Su-24M *Fencer*; 12 Su-27SM3 *Flanker*;
 2 Su-30M2; 12 Su-34 *Fullback*
ATK 129 Su-25/Su-25SM *Frogfoot*
ISR 24 Su-24MR *Fencer**
TPT 12 An-12 *Cub*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 64: 16 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 34 Mi-28N *Havoc*
 B; 14 Mi-35 *Hind*
TPT 72: **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 62 Mi-8
Hip
AD • SAM • SP 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-
 17 *Grizzly*); S-300PM (SA-20 *Gargoyle*); S-400 (SA-21
Growler); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Troops

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Air Manoeuvr
 1 AB div
 1 air aslt bde

Eastern Military District

HQ located at Khabarovsk

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

4 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Mechanised

10 MR bde

1 MGA div

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde

1 MRL bde

3 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

3 AD bde

1 engr bde

1 NBC bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

4 log bde

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

8 MR bde

Pacific Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 22

STRATEGIC 3 SSBN

TACTICAL 19: 5 SSGN; 5 SSN; 9 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9: 1 CGHM;
 8 DDGHM (of which three in reserve)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23: 3

FSGM; 9 FSM; 10 PCFG; 1 PBM

MINE WARFARE 7: 2 MSO; 5 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 6: 4 LST; 2 LCU

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Il-18D; Il-22 *Coot B*; Il-38 *May**

1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J**

TRANSPORT

2 sqn with An-12BK *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 24 MiG-31 *Foxhound*

ASW 14 Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J**

MP 15 Il-38 *May**

EW • ELINT 1 Il-22 *Coot B*

TPT 6: 2 An-12BK *Cub*; 3 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

2 naval inf bde

AIR DEFENCE

1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

FORCES BY ROLE

COASTAL DEFENCE

1 AShM bde

1 AShM regt

Military Air Force

3rd Air Force & Air Defence Command

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; Su-27SM2 *Flanker*;
 Su-30M2

1 regt with Su-27SM2 *Flanker*; Su-30M2; Su-35S
Flanker

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-30SM

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*

2 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR

1 regt with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TRANSPORT

2 sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/
Tu-154 *Careless*

ATTACK HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*
1 sqn with Ka-52A *Hokum B*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-8 *Hind*/Mi-26 *Halo*

AIR DEFENCE

2 regt with 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/SA-17
Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*)
3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*); S-300PM
(SA-20 *Gargoyle*)
1 regt with S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1*
(SA-22 *Greyhound*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 20 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
FGA 103: 44 Su-24M *Fencer*; 10 Su-24M2 *Fencer*; 47
Su-27SM2 *Flanker*; 2 Su-30M2
ATK 72 Su-25 *Frogfoot*
ISR 28 Su-24MR *Fencer E*
TPT 22 An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*; 1
Tu-154 *Careless*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 44: 20 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 24 Mi-24 *Hind*
TPT 60: **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 56 Mi-8
Hip

AD • SAM • SP 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*/
SA-17 *Grizzly*); S-300PS/PM (SA-10 *Grumble*/SA-20
Gargoyle); S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); S-400 (SA-
21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-22 *Greyhound*)

Airborne Troops**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Air Manoeuvre
2 air aslt bde

Paramilitary 489,000**Federal Border Guard Service** €160,000

Directly subordinate to the president; now reportedly
all contract-based personnel

FORCES BY ROLE

10 regional directorates

MANOEUVRE

Other
7 frontier gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR

ARTY • SP 90: 122mm 2S1; 120mm 2S12; 120mm 2S9
Anona

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS

FRIGATES • FFHM 3 *Nerey* (*Krivak III*) with 1 twin
Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad
533mm TT Inchr, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 Inchr, 1
100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix A* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 233**PCM 46:**

2 *Molnya II* (*Pauk II*) with 1 quad Inchr with *Strela-2*
(SA-N-5 *Grail* SAM), 2 twin 533mm TT Inchr, 2
RBU 1200 Inchr, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
27 *Svetljak* (*Svetlyak*) with 1 quad Inchr with *Strela-2*
(SA-N-5 *Grail* SAM), 2 single 406mm TT, 1 AK630
CIWS, 1 76mm gun
17 *Molnya I* (*Pauk I*) with 1 quad Inchr with *Strela-2*
(SA-N-5 *Grail* SAM), 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU
1200, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PHT 2 *Antares* (*Muravey*)

PCO 17: 8 Project 503 (*Alpinist*); 1 *Sprut*; 5 *Rubin* with 1
AK630 CIWS; 2 *Antur*; 1 *Purga*

PSO 4 *Komandor*

PCC 13 *Tarantul* (*Stenka*) with 4 406mm TT, 2 twin
AK630 CIWS

PB 45: 3 Project 14310 (*Mirazh*); 13 Type 1496; 12 *Grif*
(*Zhuk*); 17 *Kulik*

PBR 25: 3 *Ogonek* with 2 AK630 CIWS; 8 *Piyavka* with
1 AK630 CIWS; 5 *Shmel* with 1 76mm gun; 6 *Moskit*
(*Vosh*) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 2 *Slepen*
(*Yaz*) with 2 115mm guns; 1 *Gornostay*

PBF 81: 1 A-125; 2 *Bogomol* with 2 twin AK630 CIWS, 1
76mm gun; 17 *Mangust*; 4 *Mustang* (Project 18623); 15
Saygak; ε40 *Sobol*; 2 *Sokzhoi*

AMPHIBIOUS • LC • LCAC 7 *Tsaplya* (used for patrol
duties)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 41

AGB 5 *Ivan Susanin* (primarily used as patrol ships)

AGS 2 *Yug* (primarily used as patrol ships)

AK 8 *Neon Antonov*

AKSL 6 *Kanin*

AO 2: 1 *Baskunchak*; 1 Project 1510

ATF 18 *Sorum* (primarily used as patrol ships)

AIRCRAFT • TPT ε86: 70 An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/An-72
Coaler/Il-76 *Candid*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Yak-40 *Codling*; 16 SM-
92

HELICOPTERS: ε200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix* ASW/Mi-24
Hind Atk/Mi-26 *Halo* Spt/Mi-8 *Hip* Spt

Federal Agency for Special Construction (MOD) €50,000**Federal Communications and Information Agency** €55,000**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE**

Other
4 paramilitary corps
28 paramilitary bde

Federal Protection Service €10,000–30,000
active

Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB
regt)

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

Mechanised
1 mech inf regt

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB regt

Other

1 (Presidential) gd regt

Federal Security Service €4,000 active (armed)**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

Some cdo unit (including Alfa and Vypel units)

Interior Troops €170,000**FORCES BY ROLE**

7 Regional Commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus, Volga, Eastern, North-Western and Siberian

MANOEUVRE**Other**

3 (55th, 59th & ODon) paramilitary div (2-5 paramilitary regt)

18 (OBRON) paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)

2 indep paramilitary bde (OBR/OSMBR)

102 paramilitary regt/bn (incl special motorised units)

11 (special) paramilitary unit

Aviation

8 sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**MBT** 9**AIFV/APC (W)** 1,650 BMP-1/BMP-2/BTR-80**ARTY** 35**TOWED 122mm** 20 D-30**MOR 120mm** 15 PM-38**AIRCRAFT TPT** 23: **Heavy** 9 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 2An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 12 An-26 *Cursor*; 6 An-72 *Coaler***HELICOPTERS** • **TPT** 70: **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo*;**Medium** 60 Mi-8 *Hip***Railway Troops (MOD)** €20,000

4 regional commands

FORCES BY ROLE**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

10 (railway) tpt bde

Cyber

Until 2003, activities within the cyber domain were the responsibility of the Russian SIGINT agency, FAPSI. In 2003, this agency was abolished and its responsibilities divided between the defence ministry and the internal security service (FSB). The first official doctrinal statement on the role of the Russian military in cyberspace, the 'Conceptual Views on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information Space', was released at the end of 2011, and described cyber-force tasks with little correlation to those of equivalent commands in the West. In particular, the document contains no mention of the possibility of offensive cyber activity. It is also entirely defensive in tone, and focuses on force protection and prevention of information war, including allowing for a military role in negotiating international treaties governing information security. Following a mixed performance in the information

aspects of the armed conflict with Georgia in 2008, there was discussion about creating 'Information Troops', whose role would include cyber capability; but this initiative was publicly scotched by the FSB. In January 2012, then-CGS Makarov gave a different picture of the three main tasks for any new command: 'disrupting adversary information systems, including by introducing harmful software; defending our own communications and command systems'; and 'working on domestic and foreign public opinion using the media, Internet and more'. The third task is a reminder that, unlike some other nations with advanced cyber capabilities, Russia deals in cyber warfare as an integral component of information warfare. Operations in Crimea in early 2014, and in the wider information space concerning the conflict in Ukraine, demonstrate that Russian thinking and capacity has matured in these areas. In Crimea, Russian troops demonstrated integrated use of EW and SOF capabilities, as well as wider use of cyberspace and strategic communications to shape an effective information campaign targeted as much at domestic as foreign audiences.

DEPLOYMENT**ARMENIA**3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 AD bty with S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 1 AD bty with 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*)**BELARUS**1 ftr flt with 5 Su-27 *Flanker*; 1 A-50 *Mainstay*; 4 SAM units with S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*); 1 radar station at Baranovichi (*Volga* system; leased); 1 naval comms site**BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

UN • UNOCI 11 obs

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

UN • MONUSCO 28 obs

GEORGIA

7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; some S-300 SAM; some atk hel); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)

KAZAKHSTAN1 radar station at Balkash (*Dnepr* system; leased)**KYRGYZSTAN**€500; 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip* spt hel**LIBERIA**

UN • UNMIL 3 obs

MIDDLE EAST

UN • UNTSO 4 obs

MOLDOVA/TRANSNIESTR€1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/AIFV/APC; 7 Mi-24 *Hind*; some Mi-8 *Hip*

SERBIA

OSCE • Kosovo 1

SOUTH SUDAN

UN • UNMISS 3; 2 obs

SUDAN

UN • UNISFA 1 obs

SYRIA

1 naval facility at Tartus

TAJIKISTAN

5,000; 1 mil base with (1 (201st) MR div; 40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 80 BTR-80; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12/12 9P140 *Uragan*); 4 Mi-8 *Hip*

UKRAINE

Crimea: 20,000; 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty bde; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 20 BTR-80 APC; 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 SAM bn with S-300PM; 1 ASHM unit with K-300P *Bastion*; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system)

Donetsk/Luhansk: 300+ (reported)

OSCE • Ukraine 16

WESTERN SAHARA

UN • MINURSO 11 obs

Tajikistan TJK

Tajikistani Somoni Tr		2013	2014	2015
GDP	Tr	40.5bn	46.6bn	
	US\$	8.5bn	9.16bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	1,045	1,103	
Growth	%	7.4	6.0	
Inflation	%	5.0	6.6	
Def bdgt [a]	Tr	923m	€946m	
	US\$	194m	186m	
FMA (US)	US\$	0.8m	1.5m	0.7m
US\$1=Tr		4.8	5.1	

[a] Defence and law enforcement expenses

Population 8,051,512

Ethnic groups: Tajik 67%; Uzbek 25%; Russian 2%; Tatar 2%

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	16.8%	5.0%	5.2%	5.1%	16.3%	1.3%
Female	16.2%	4.8%	5.1%	5.0%	17.3%	1.8%

Capabilities

The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than token forces and most equipment is of Soviet origin, with no significant procurement plans in place. The paucity of military capability partially reflects that the primary security concern remains internal and border security, with the country sharing an extended border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan's membership of the CSTO

provides a security guarantee and, along with Dushanbe's defence relationship with Moscow, this is reinforced by the presence in Tajikistan of Russia's largest overseas military base (since the annexation of Crimea brought Sevastopol under Russia's direct administration). Given the overall weaknesses of the Tajik armed and security forces – which include limited special-forces training and personnel issues revolving around high numbers of conscripts and low planning capacity – low-level militant activity linked to drug trafficking could continue to burden and challenge the armed forces.

ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300, Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Paramilitary 7,500

Conscript liability 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 7,300****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

3 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 SAM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 37: 30 T-72; 7 T-62

AIFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2

APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

ARTY 23

TOWED 122mm 10 D-30**MRL 122mm** 3 BM-21**MOR 120mm** 10

AD • SAM 20+

TOWED 20 S-75 *Dvoina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora-2M* (SA-3 *Goa*)**MANPAD** 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)‡**Air Force/Air Defence 1,500****FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT**1 sqn with Tu-134A *Crusty***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17TM *Hip* H**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT****TPT • Light** 1 Tu-134A *Crusty***TRG 4+**: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; some Yak-52**HELICOPTERS****ATK** 4 Mi-24 *Hind***TPT • Medium** 11 Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-17TM *Hip* H**Paramilitary 7,500****Interior Troops 3,800****National Guard 1,200**

Emergencies Ministry 2,500

Border Guards

DEPLOYMENT

UKRAINE

OSCE • Ukraine 1

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia 5,000; 1 mil base with (1 (201st) MR div; 40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 80 BTR-80; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12/12 9P140 *Uragan*); 4 Mi-8 *Hip*

Turkmenistan TKM

Turkmen New Manat TMM		2013	2014	2015
GDP	TMM	116bn	135bn	
	US\$	40.8bn	47.5bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	7,157	8,203	
Growth	%	10.2	10.1	
Inflation	%	6.8	5.0	
Def exp	TMM	€1.75bn		
	US\$	€612m		
FMA (US)	US\$		0.69m	0.1m
USD1=TMM		2.85	2.85	

Population 5,171,943

Ethnic groups: Turkmen 77%; Uzbek 9%; Russian 7%; Kazak 2%

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.4%	4.9%	5.3%	5.1%	19.1%	1.8%
Female	13.0%	4.8%	5.2%	5.1%	19.9%	2.4%

Capabilities

Turkmenistan's largely conscript-based armed forces are poorly equipped and remain reliant on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine. The country declared neutrality in 1999 and enshrined this principle in its 2009 Military Doctrine. Delivery of around 30 T-90S MBTs, ordered from Russia in 2011, has yet to be finalised. The air force has a limited number of combat aircraft and helicopters, though availability is uncertain. Airlift is modest, and insufficient to deliver substantial military effect overseas, or even across the country. There are plans to strengthen coastal naval forces by 2015, and some assets have already been procured, leading to a moderate improvement in the Caspian Sea naval presence. Military capability is believed to be limited by low levels of training and availability of spare parts.

ACTIVE 22,000 (Army 18,500 Navy 500 Air 3,000)

Conscript liability 24 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 18,500

5 Mil Districts

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

3 MR div

2 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre

1 air aslt bn

Other

1 MR trg div

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL regt

1 AT regt

1 SSM bde with *Scud*

2 SAM bde

1 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE +

MBT 680: 10 T-90S; 670 T-72

RECCE 170 BRDM/BRDM-2

AIFV 942: 930 BMP-1/BMP-2; 12 BRM

APC (W) 829 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

ARTY 570

SP 56: 122mm 40 2S1; 152mm 16 2S3

TOWED 269: 122mm 180 D-30; 152mm 89: 17 D-1; 72 D-20

GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 *Anona*

MRL 131: 122mm 65: 9 9P138; 56 BM-21; 220mm 60 9P140 *Uragan*; 300mm 6 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 PM-38

AT

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 (AT-6 *Spiral*)

GUNS 100mm 72 MT-12/T-12

AD • SAM 53+

SP 53: 40 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); 13 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*)

MANPAD 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)‡

GUNS 70

SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4

TOWED 57mm 22 S-60

MSL • SSM 10 SS-1 *Scud*

Navy 500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19

PCFG 2 *Edermen* (RUS *Molnya*) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran* ASHM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 1 76mm gun

PCC 4 *Arkadag*

PBF 12: 5 *Grif-T*; 5 *Dearsan* 14: 2 *Sobol*

PB 1 *Point*

Air Force 3,000

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; Su-17 *Fitter*; Su-25MK *Frogfoot*

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind*

TRAINING

1 unit with Su-7B *Fitter A*; L-39 *Albatros*

AIR DEFENCE

Some sqn with S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*); S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT** 94 combat capable

FTR 24: 22 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FGA 68: 3 Su-7B *Fitter A*; 65 Su-17 *Fitter B*

ATK 2 Su-25MK *Frogfoot* (41 more being refurbished)

TPT • Light 1 An-26 *Curl*

TRG 2 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 10 Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

AD • SAM 50 S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*)/S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)/S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*)

east. Meanwhile, conscription was reinstated in May; it had only been suspended for a short time, so much experience in conscript management and related infrastructure would have remained. Defence spending has remained low, with most areas underfunded. By the end of 2014, Ukraine's defence plants (a substantial defence industry remains) were returning to service the first aircraft recovered by road from Crimea. (See pp. 168–73.)

ACTIVE 121,500 (Army 64,000 Navy 7,000 Air 45,000 Airborne 5,500) Paramilitary n.k.

Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. During the Autumn 2013 draft, authorities indicated that conscription could be suspended in 2014. Contract servicemen comprise just over 50% of the armed forces.

RESERVE 1,000,000 (Joint 1,000,000)

Military service within 5 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**Army 64,000**

Includes both Land Forces and 8th Army Corps. Ground combat in the east is conducted by a mixture of regular and national guard units, and irregular formations.

FORCES BY ROLE**COMMAND**

1 corps HQ

SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF regt

MANOEUVRE**Armoured**

2 tk bde

Mechanised

9 mech bde

1 mtn bde

Aviation

2 avn bde

1 avn regt

COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

3 MRL regt

1 SSM bde

3 AD regt

4 engr regt

1 EW regt

1 CBRN regt

4 sigs regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 700 T-64BV/BM; (10 T-84 *Oplot*; 165 T-80; 600 T-72; 650 T-64; 20 T-55 all in store)

RECCE 450 BRDM-2

AIFV 1,249: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2; 200 BMP-1; 900 BMP-2;

4 BMP-3; 115 BRM-1K

APC 490

APC (T) 15 BTR-D

APC (W) 360: up to 10 BTR-4; 5 BTR-60; 235 BTR-70; 110 BTR-80

ARTY 1,862

SP 528+: **122mm** 240 2S1; **152mm** 288: 35 2S19 *Farm*; 235 2S3; 18 2S5; **203mm** 2S7 (up to 90 in store)

Ukraine UKR

Ukrainian Hryvnia h		2013	2014	2015
GDP	h	1.45tr	1.52tr	
	US\$	178bn	135bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	3,930	2,979	
Growth	%	-0.0	-6.5	
Inflation	%	-0.3	11.4	
Def bdtg [a]	h	19.7bn	40.5bn	63bn
	US\$	2.41bn	3.59bn	
FMA (US)	US\$	7m	4.2m	2m
US\$1=h		8.16	11.30	

[a] Defence & security budget, includes funds for the Interior Ministry. 2014 figure excludes funding from general budget reserve fund and special defence and security reserve fund.

Population 44,291,413

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	7.2%	2.6%	3.3%	4.2%	23.4%	5.2%
Female	6.8%	2.4%	3.2%	4.1%	26.9%	10.7%

Capabilities

In 2014, Ukrainian armed forces were evicted from Crimea by Russian VDV, Spetsnaz and other special-operations forces. Air-force and navy units based there lost the majority of their materiel, with a large number of vessels co-opted by Russian forces, although some equipment such as SU-27s was returned in various states of disrepair. Ukraine's subsequent mobilisation showed that combat capability had been greatly 'hollowed out' by inadequate resourcing and reduced training over many years. The country continues to operate mainly Soviet-era equipment, or derivatives of these designs, and only a small proportion of the army and air force are combat ready, with initial operations to evict pro-Russian rebels from eastern Ukraine reportedly dependent on a few soldiers and helicopters and a single airborne regiment with inadequate logistics. A new national guard and irregular volunteer militias formed in 2014, and took part in the fighting in the

TOWED 515: **122mm** 75 D-30; **152mm** 440: 180 2A36; 130 2A65; 130 D-20
GUN/MOR • **120mm** • **TOWED** 2 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 348: **122mm** 203: 18 9P138; 185 BM-21; **220mm** 70 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 75 9A52 *Smerch*
MOR **120mm** 220: 190 2S12; 30 PM-38

AT

MSL • **MANPATS** 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*)
GUNS **100mm** ε500 MT-12/T-12

HELICOPTERS

ATK 134 Mi-24 *Hind*
TPT • **Medium** 30 Mi-8 *Hip*

AD

SAM • **SP** 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); (Some S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator*) in store)
GUNS 470:
SP **23mm** ZU-23-2; **30mm** 70 2S6
TOWED **57mm** ε400 S-60

RADAR • **LAND** *Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big Fred* (arty)

MSL • **SSM** 212: 50 FROG; 90 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); 72 *Scud-B*

AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB

ARV BREM-2; BREM-64; T-54/T-55

VLB MTU-20

Navy 7,000 (incl Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry)

After Russia's annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa. Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in Crimea.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS** 1

FRIGATES • **FFHM** 1 *Hetman Sagaidachny* (RUS *Krivak III*) with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT with T-53 HWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7

CORVETTES • **FSM** 1 *Grisha* (II/V) with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 1-2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 1 76mm gun

PCFGM 2 *Tarantul II* (FSU *Molnya*) with 2 twin Inchr with P-15 *Termit-R* (SS-N-2D *Styx*) AShM; 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*); 1 76mm gun

PHG 2 *Matka* (FSU *Vekhr*) with 2 single Inchr with P-15 *Termit-M/R* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) AShM, 1 76mm gun

PCMT 1 *Pauk I* (FSU *Molnya II*) with 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200, 1 76mm gun

PB 1 *Zhuk* (FSU *Grif*)

MINE WARFARE • **MINE COUNTERMEASURES** 4

MHI 1 *Yevgenya* (FSU *Korund*)

MSO 1 *Natya* with 2 RBU 1200

MSC 2 *Sonya* (FSU *Yakhont*)

AMPHIBIOUS**LANDING SHIPS**

LSM 1 *Polnochny C* (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LANDING CRAFT 3

LCAC 1 *Pomornik* (*Zubr*) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))

LCU 2

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 30

AG 2

AGI 2 *Muna*

AGS 1 *Biya*

AKL 1

AO 2 *Toplivo*

AWT 1 *Sudak*

AXL 3 *Petrushka*

YDT 13: 1 *Yelva*; 12 other

YTM 2

YTR 2 *Pozharny*

YY 1 *Sokal*

Naval Aviation ε1,000

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable

ASW 1 Be-12 *Mail*

TPT • **Light** 2 An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 3 Mi-14 *Haze*

TPT • **Medium** 1 Ka-29 *Helix-B*

Naval Infantry ε500

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

Light

1 inf bn

Air Forces 45,000

Flying hours 40 hrs/yr

FORCES BY ROLE**FIGHTER**

4 bde with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27 *Flanker*

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 bde with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR

2 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E**

TRANSPORT

3 bde with An-24; An-26; An-30; Il-76 *Candid*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Mi-8; Mi-9; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AIR DEFENCE

11 bde/regt with 9K37M *Buk-M1* (SA-11); S-300P/PS/PT (SA-10)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 202 combat capable

FTR 116: 80 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 36 Su-27 *Flanker*

FGA 34 Su-24 *Fencer*

ATK 29 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 25: 2 An-30 *Clank*; 23 Su-24MR *Fencer E**

TPT 43: **Heavy** 18 Il-76 *Candid*; **Light** 25: 3 An-24 *Coke*;

20 An-26 *Curl*; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 37 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

C2 4 Mi-9

TPT 33: **Medium** 30 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 3 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*
AD • SAM • SP 322: 250 S-300P/PS/PT (SA-10 *Grumble*);
 72 9K37M *Buk*-M1 (SA-11 *Gadfly*)

MSL

ASM: Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-59 (AS-13 *Kingbolt*); Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*);

ARM: Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*); Kh-25MP (AS-12 *Kegler*);
 Kh-28 (AS-9 *Kyle*)

AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*)

SARH R-27 (AA-10A *Alamo*)

Airborne Forces €5,500**FORCES BY ROLE:****MANOEUVRE**

Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bde

3 air mob bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV 75: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2

APC 136

APC (T) 25 BTR-D

APC (W) 111: 1 BTR-60; 110 BTR-80

ARTY 118

TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30

GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 *Anona*

MOR 120mm 24 2S12

Paramilitary**National Guard** €33,000

Ministry of Internal Affairs; 6 territorial comd

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

Armoured

Some tk bn

Mechanised

Some mech bn

Light

Some lt inf bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT T-64; T-72 (reported)

AIFV BTR-3; €50 BTR-4

APC

APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80

PPV *Streit Cougar*; *Streit Spartan*

Border Guard n.k.**Maritime Border Guard**

The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border Guards and is not part of the navy.

FORCES BY ROLE**PATROL**

4 (cutter) bde

2 rvn bde

MINE WARFARE

1 MCM sqn

TRANSPORT

3 sqn

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 trg div

1 (aux ships) gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 26

PCFT 6 *Stenka* with 4 single 406mm TT

PCT 3 *Pauk* I with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200,
 1 76mm gun

PHT 1 *Muravey* with 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm
 gun

PB 12: 11 *Zhuk*; 1 *Orlan* (seven additional vessels
 under construction)

PBR 4 *Shmel*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1

AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 *Camp*; **Light** An-24
Coke; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*

HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 *Helix* A

Civil Defence Troops n.k.

(Ministry of Emergency Situations)

FORCES BY ROLE**MANOEUVRE**

Other

4 paramilitary bde

4 paramilitary regt

DEPLOYMENT**Legal provisions for foreign deployment:**

Constitution: Codified constitution (1996)

Specific legislation: 'On the procedures to deploy Armed Forces of Ukraine units abroad' (1518-III, March 2000).

Decision on deployment of troops abroad: Parliament authorised to approve decision to provide military assistance, deploy troops abroad and allow foreign military presence in Ukraine (Art. 85, para 23); Also, in accordance with Art. 7 of the specific legislation (above), president is authorised to take a decision to deploy troops abroad and at the same time to submit a draft law to the Parliament of Ukraine for approval.

AFGHANISTAN

NATO • ISAF 10

ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN

OSCE • Minsk Conference 1

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

UN • UNOCI 40; 1 hel flt

CYPRUS

UN • UNFICYP 2

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

UN • MONUSCO 254; 10 obs; 2 atk hel sqn; 1 hel sqn

LIBERIA

UN • UNMIL 177; 2 obs; 1 hel sqn

MOLDOVA

10 obs

SERBIA

NATO • KFOR 25

OSCE • Kosovo 1

UN • UNMIK 2 obs

SOUTH SUDAN

UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs

SUDAN

UN • UNISFA 2; 4 obs

FOREIGN FORCES

Albania OSCE 2

Armenia OSCE 2

Austria OSCE 7

Belarus OSCE 1

Belgium OSCE 3

Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 3

Bulgaria OSCE 8

Canada OSCE 5

Croatia OSCE 4

Czech Republic OSCE 9

Denmark OSCE 9

Estonia OSCE 7

Finland OSCE 21

France OSCE 12

Georgia OSCE 1

Germany OSCE 21

Greece OSCE 1

Hungary OSCE 18

Ireland OSCE 4

Italy OSCE 13

Kyrgyzstan OSCE 4

Latvia OSCE 5

Lithuania OSCE 2

Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 1

Moldova OSCE 9

Montenegro OSCE 1

Netherlands OSCE 6

Norway OSCE 7

Poland OSCE 12

Romania OSCE 14

Russia OSCE 16

Slovakia 4

Slovenia 1

Spain OSCE 8

Sweden OSCE 9

Switzerland OSCE 9

Tajikistan OSCE 1

Turkey OSCE 6

United Kingdom OSCE 15

United States OSCE 28

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Following the overthrow of Ukraine's President Yanukovich in February 2014, the region of Crimea requested to join the Russian Federation after a referendum regarded as unconstitutional by the new Ukrainian government. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition.

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia Crimea: 20,000; 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty bde; 80 BMP-2; 20 BTR-80; 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 SAM bn with S-300PM; 1 ASHM unit with K-300P *Bastion*; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system) and Mukachevo (*located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo (located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and Mukachevo*)

Donetsk/Luhansk: 300+ (reported)

Uzbekistan UZB

Uzbekistani Som s		2013	2014	2015
GDP	s	119tr	142tr	
	US\$	56.8bn	63.1bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	1,878	2,061	
Growth	%	8.0	7.0	
Inflation	%	11.2	10.0	
Def exp	s	€3.33tr		
	US\$	€1.59bn		
FMA (US)	US\$	2.7m	1.2m	0.7m
US\$1=s		2,094.66	2,249.76	

Population 28,929,716

Ethnic groups: Uzbek 73%; Russian 6%; Tajik 5%; Kazakh 4%; Karakalpak 2%; Tatar 2%; Korean <1%; Ukrainian <1%

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	12.8%	5.0%	5.4%	5.3%	19.3%	2.0%
Female	12.1%	4.8%	5.4%	5.2%	20.0%	2.7%

Capabilities

Uzbekistan's conscript-based armed forces are the most capable in Central Asia, and better equipped than those of its immediate neighbours. In contrast to other Central Asian states, Uzbekistan maintains an ambivalent strategic relationship with Russia: although it uses mainly Soviet-era equipment, maintains bilateral defence ties and is a member of the SCO, it suspended its membership of the CSTO in mid-2012. The relationship with Russia may strengthen, though, after the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan leaves a potentially unstable country with multiple security concerns on Uzbekistan's border. As part of an agreement covering transit rights for US and UK military equipment returning from Afghanistan, the Uzbek armed forces will receive some military equipment, although the type and amount are unclear. Fixed-wing airlift is limited, but there is substantial rotary-wing lift, allowing for deployment across the country's challenging

topography. Flying hours are reported to be low, with logistical and maintenance shortcomings affecting the availability of aircraft.

ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)

Paramilitary 20,000

Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 24,500

4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured

1 tk bde

Mechanised

11 MR bde

Air Manoeuvr

1 air aslt bde

1 AB bde

Mountain

1 lt mtn inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde

1 MRL bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64; 170 T-62

RECCE 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM

AIFV 399: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2; 270 BMP-2

APC 309

APC (T) 50 BTR-D

APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80

ARTY 487+

SP 83+: **122mm** 18 2S1; **152mm** 17+: 17 2S3; 2S5 (reported);

203mm 48 2S7

TOWED 200: **122mm** 60 D-30; **152mm** 140 2A36

GUN/MOR **120mm** 54 2S9 *Anona*

MRL 108: **122mm** 60: 24 9P138; 36 BM-21; **220mm** 48

9P140 *Uragan*

MOR **120mm** 42: 5 2B11; 19 2S12; 18 PM-120

AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 *Malyutka* (AT-3 *Sagger*);

9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*)

GUNS **100mm** 36 MT-12/T-12

Air Force 7,500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; Su-27/Su-27UB

Flanker

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24 *Fencer*; Su-24MP *Fencer F**

GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*; Su-17M (Su-17MZ)

Fitter C; Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ) *Fitter G*

ELINT/TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12/An-12PP *Cub*; An-26/An-26RKR *Curl*

TRANSPORT

Some sqn with An-24 *Coke*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-26 *Halo*; Mi-8 *Hip*;

1 regt with Mi-6 *Hook*; Mi-6AYa *Hook C*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 135 combat capable

FTR 30 MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

FGA 74: 26 Su-17M (Su-17MZ)/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ)

Fitter C/G; 23 Su-24 *Fencer*; 25 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

ATK 20 Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*

EW/Tpt 26 An-12 *Cub* (med tpt)/An-12PP *Cub* (EW)

ELINT 11 Su-24MP *Fencer F**

ELINT/Tpt 13 An-26 *Curl* (lt tpt)/An-26RKR *Curl* (ELINT)

TPT • Light 2: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 5 L-39 *Albatros* (9 more in store)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 29 Mi-24 *Hind*

C2 2 Mi-6AYa *Hook C*

TPT 79 **Heavy** 27: 26 Mi-6 *Hook*; 1 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium**

52 Mi-8 *Hip*

AD • SAM 45

TOWED S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)

STATIC S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*)

MSL

ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 *Kerry*); Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*)

ARM Kh-25P (AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-28 (AS-9 *Kyle*); Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*)

AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*); **IR/**

SARH R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*)

Paramilitary up to 20,000

Internal Security Troops up to 19,000

Ministry of Interior

National Guard 1,000

Ministry of Defence

FOREIGN FORCES

Germany 100; some C-160 *Transall*

Table 5 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia and Eurasia

Designation	Type	Quantity (Current)	Contract Value	Prime Nationality	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
Azerbaijan (AZE)								
T-90S	MBT	100	n.k.	RUS	UKBTM	2013	2013	Deliveries ongoing
<i>Sa'ar</i> 62 OPV	PSO	6	n.k.	ISR	Israel Shipyards	2014	n.k.	For Coast Guard
Belarus (BLR)								
S-300PM	SAM	16	Free transfer	RUS	Government surplus	2014	n.k.	Donation of four batteries
Kazakhstan (KAZ)								
BTR-82A	AIFV	190	n.k.	RUS	VPK	2011	2011	Deliveries ongoing
C-295M	Lt tpt ac	2	n.k.	Int'l	Airbus Group (Airbus Defence & Space)	2013	2014	Follow-on to original 2012 order. Part of an eight ac MoU. First ac in test
Russia (RUS)								
<i>Bulava</i> (SS-N-X-32)	SLBM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	MITT	n.k.	2009	In development. For <i>Borey</i> -class SSBNs
T-72B3	MBT upgrade	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	UKBTM	n.k.	2013	Upgrade of existing T-72 fleet. First delivered to Western Military District in 2013
<i>Armata</i>	AFV	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	UKBTM	2014	2015	Heavy tracked universal combat platform programme. Serial production scheduled to commence 2016
<i>Kurganets-25</i>	AFV	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	KMZ	2014	2015	Medium tracked universal combat platform programme. Serial production scheduled to commence 2016
<i>Bumerang</i>	AFV	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	VPK	2014	2015	Medium wheeled universal combat platform programme
BTR-82A	AIFV	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	VPK	n.k.	2011	Improved BTR-80A series; first production models delivered to Southern Military District in 2011
<i>Borey</i> -class	SSBN	3	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	1996	2012	Second vessel commissioned Dec 2013. Third in sea trials. 16 SLBM launch tubes
<i>Borey-A</i> -class	SSBN	5	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	2012	2015	Two vessels laid down so far. Pricing dispute continues and will be reviewed in 2015
<i>Yasen</i> -class	SSN	5	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	1993	2013	First vessel commissioned Dec 2013. Delayed for financial reasons. Fourth laid down May 2014
<i>Varshavyanka</i> -class (<i>Kilo</i>)	SSK	6	n.k.	RUS	Admiralty Shipyards	2010	2014	First vessel commissioned Aug 2014. Fifth and sixth laid down late Oct 2014
<i>Lada</i> -class	SSK	3	n.k.	RUS	Admiralty Shipyards	1997	2010	First vessel accepted in 2010. Construction on further two boats suspended in 2011 but resumed in 2012/13
<i>Admiral Gorshkov</i> -class	FFGHM	6	US\$400m	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	2005	2014	First vessel in trials as of late 2014
<i>Steregushchiy</i> -class	FFGHM	6	n.k.	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard/ Komosololsk Shipyard	2001	2008	Third vessel delivered to Baltic Fleet May 2013; fourth vessel delivered Jun 2014. Two more in build for Pacific Fleet

Table 5 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia and Eurasia

Designation	Type	Quantity (Current)	Contract Value	Prime Nationality	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
Improved <i>Steregushchiy</i> -class	FFGHM	2	n.k.	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	2011	2015	First of class laid down Feb 2012. Second of class laid down Jul 2013
<i>Admiral Grigorovich</i> -class (<i>Krivak IV</i>)	FFGHM	6	n.k.	RUS	Yantar Shipyard	2010	2014	Six vessels in build for Black Sea Fleet. First vessel launched Mar 2014. ISD expected Nov 2014
<i>Buyan-M</i> -class	FSG	12	n.k.	RUS	Zelenodolsk Shipyard	2010	2014	Nine for Caspian Flotilla and three for Black Sea Fleet. First vessels commissioned Jul 2014
<i>Vladivostok</i> -class (<i>Mistral</i>)	LHD	2	US\$1.2bn	FRA	DCNS/STX	2011	n.k.	Contract suspended by France Sep 2014 citing Russian actions in Ukraine
Tu-160 <i>Blackjack</i>	Bbr ac upgrade	15	n.k.	RUS	UAC	2007	2012	Upgrade of <i>Blackjack</i> fleet, programme lagging behind original schedule
MiG-29K <i>Fulcrum D</i>	Ftr ac	24	n.k.	RUS	UAC (MiG)	2012	2013	20 MiG-29K and four MiG-29KUB. For navy. Deliveries ongoing
MiG-29SMT <i>Fulcrum</i>	FGA ac	16	R17bn (US\$470m)	RUS	UAC (MiG)	2014	2015	Eight to be delivered in 2015 and remainder in 2016
Su-30M2	FGA ac	16	n.k.	RUS	UAC (Sukhoi)	2012	2014	Deliveries ongoing
Su-30SM	FGA ac	72	n.k.	RUS	UAC (Sukhoi)	2012	2012	Twelve for navy and 60 for air force. Deliveries under way
Su-34 <i>Fullback</i>	FGA ac	60	n.k.	RUS	UAC (Sukhoi)	2012	2014	Deliveries ongoing
Su-35S <i>Flanker</i>	FGA ac	48	See notes	RUS	UAC (Sukhoi)	2009	2012	Part of combined order for 48 Su-35S, 12 Su-27SM3 and four Su-30 worth US\$2.5bn. Deliveries ongoing
Il-76MD-90A	Hvy tpt ac	39	US\$4bn	RUS	Aviastar-SP	2012	2014	First ac rolled out Jun 2014; delivery due by end of 2014
Ka-52 <i>Hokum B</i>	Atk hel	140	US\$4bn	RUS	Russian Helicopters (Kamov)	2011	2011	Deliveries ongoing
Mi-28N <i>Havoc</i>	Atk hel	30	n.k.	RUS	Russian Helicopters (Rostvertol)	2010	2013	Follow-up to 2005 order for 67. Deliveries ongoing
Mi-8AMTSh <i>Hip</i>	Med tpt hel	172	n.k.	Rus	Russian Helicopters (Ulan-Ude)	2010	2010	Deliveries began in late 2010 and are ongoing
Mi-8MTV-5 <i>Hip</i>	Med tpt hel	140	n.k.	RUS	Russian Helicopters (Kazan)	2011	2014	First batch delivered Oct 2014
<i>Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet)</i>	SAM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	n.k.	n.k.	Deliveries ongoing
<i>Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)</i>	SAM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	n.k.	n.k.	One bde set delivered. May be succeeded by <i>Buk-M3</i>
S-400 <i>Triumf (SA-21 Growler)</i>	SAM	18	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	n.k.	2007	Seventh regt deployed 2014
S-300V4 (<i>SA-23 Gladiator/Giant</i>)	SAM	12	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	2012	n.k.	Three battalion sets
96K6 <i>Pantsir-S1</i>	AD	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	KBP Instrument Design Bureau	n.k.	2010	Delivery in progress to S-400 regiments
9K720 <i>Iskander</i>	SRBM/LACM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	KBM	2005	2006	Ballistic and cruise missile variants. In service with four brigades by late 2014
Ukraine (UKR)								
BTR-4	APC (W)	194	n.k.	UKR	KMDB	2014	2014	Being delivered to national-guard units